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 Abstract 
 
Supreme command matters to a country at war. The supreme commander, typically a military 
general, is charged with ultimate judgment authority and responsibility for a community’s strategic 
performance in a conflict.1 Despite this clear importance, as Harvard’s Sarah Sewall has remarked, 
“we lack the tools to judge military leadership.”2 Aside from uncritical biographies and battle-
focused military histories, the supreme commander’s role has evaded serious academic scrutiny. 
This historical study seeks to illuminate patterns in exemplary supreme command. It first 
considers the topic’s importance, then consults the characteristics associated with superlative 
supreme command, with particular focus on military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s “military 
genius” as an ideal type.3 It then tests the assembled characteristics through three in-depth case 
studies using primary source records (e.g. dispatches and memoranda) as direct artifacts of 
judgment to quantify and qualify contrasts between opposing supreme commanders. Later on, it 
looks to formal, observable characteristics to enable comparisons among high-achieving supreme 
commanders. This dissertation finds superior judgment, attended by a distinct sense of empathy and 
grit, and accompanied by several other common characteristics, is what drives successful supreme 
command. This finding held true across different conflicts, strategies, and other comparative 
measures. This work concludes by thinking through the finding’s utility as well as pondering the 
extent to which these traits can be learned through experience or education.  
 
  
                                                        
1 Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 205-
208. 
2 Sarah Sewall, “Soldiers and Citizens: The Military, Politics, and Society in 21st Century America,” 
November 7, 2009, in Massachusetts Foundation for the Humanities at Boston College, video, at 14 minutes, 
accessed January 2, 2016, http://masshumanities.org/showcase/soldiers-citizens-military-and-civic-
culture-in-america/.  
3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), 110. 
 Acknowledgements 
 
This doctoral dissertation would never have been finished, let alone started, without the support of 
a great host of institutions and individuals. Each deserves high praise, certainly higher than these 
few words could ever express in such a short space, and what follows is merely the down payment 
on a lifetime of gratitude. 
Research costs more than time; financial resources are necessary to travel to the places 
where ideas and information are to be found. While studying for this degree I have been fortunate 
to receive generous support from a number of organizations, most of which are at West Point. The 
Modern War Institute provided a travel allowance that enabled me to visit the University of 
Reading’s annual postgraduate Politics and International Relations Conference, as did the West 
Point Office of the Dean’s Faculty Development Research Fund. Across campus, the Network 
Science Center supported my curiosity about foreign general officers with a research grant to study 
this cohort’s networking behavior, which expanded my thinking on the subject of senior military 
leadership. The Center for the Study of Civil Military Operations helped me to engage in deep study 
and informal meetings in London, Oxford, and Reading. And, importantly, with the welcome 
assistance of an office space at the U.S. Air Force Academy in the Military and Strategic Studies 
Department, the U.S. Army Strategist career office facilitated my getting across the finish line and 
supported the final year of my PhD research. 
There were also many libraries and learning opportunities that enabled this degree. West 
Point’s Jefferson Library must be considered one of the finest in the world on war, and over the 
course of 34 months there, I checked out so many books I lost count (the library, of course, ran the 
numbers for me: 234). I was fortunate to visit the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library in 
Kansas, the George Washington Presidential Library in Virginia, the University of Utah Library, and 
the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives in London. I also benefitted greatly from a U.S. Army 
War College military staff ride covering the Overland Campaign through Virginia. Additionally, 
simply living at West Point for nearly three years, amid the ghosts of graduates past and the cadets 
of conflict’s future, was personally motivating. 
I must thank, profusely, Professor Emeritus Colin Gray for taking me on as a student. As an 
active duty Army officer, I was destined to be a distant pupil; he ought to be commended for 
sponsoring such a hard case. And especially when Professor Gray fell ill, Professor Beatrice Heuser 
stepped in to catch me when I tripped over my own mistakes. I am deeply indebted to both. 
Due to my military service, aside from several visits to Reading, the bulk of the work was 
performed while stationed at West Point, in South Korea, and at the U.S. Air Force Academy. As 
such, I owe thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Brian DeToy, PhD, and Colonel Liam Collins, PhD, who 
 both enthusiastically supported my continued education through the time they provided me while I 
taught in their academic departments. In the same category, though not as warmly, it was also 
helpful that a certain North Korean dictator did not start a war while I served on the Peninsula, 
which might have seriously hindered the writing process. 
While my parents, Barbara and Peter Cavanaugh, gathered the kindling, my wife Rachel, and 
daughters Grace and Georgina, fuel the fire to finish this degree every day. Simply put, they make 
me want to know more and more, and even more, if for no other reason than to be a better 
husband and father. 
Finally, my first time at war, I was a confused, twenty-four-year-old junior officer. I have 
struggled to understand conflict ever since. This dissertation has been my best effort to help the 
next batch of confused, twenty-four-year-olds to understand their wars a little better. If anyone, this 
was for them. 
 
  
 Table of Contents 
 
 
1. Introduction: Charting Course ................................................................................................................... 1 
2. The Characteristics of Exemplary Supreme Commanders .......................................................... 18 
3. George Washington ..................................................................................................................................... 42 
4. Ulysses S. Grant ............................................................................................................................................ 89 
5. Dwight D. Eisenhower ............................................................................................................................. 144 
6. Conclusion: Thinking Theoretically About Supreme Command ............................................ 207 
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................................... 233  
 
ML Cavanaugh 
On Supreme Command 
 
 1 
1. Introduction: Charting Course 
 
1.1 Setting the Stage 
 
To a country at war, supreme command matters. 
Most would accept this plain statement as accurate, even if it might be difficult to arrive at a 
specific set of criteria or common understanding of this highest level of military command. Therein 
lies the problem. British major general and military theorist J.F.C. Fuller once wrote of generalship 
that “greatness is not a thing which can be weighed and measured.”4 While this is true regarding 
specific precision, it is equally correct to point out that there are enough objective data (and sound 
reason) available to determine many of the qualities which distinguish truly exceptional supreme 
commanders. Unlike the dark matter that plagues physicists, researchers can grasp how supreme 
command works.5 
As with many military subjects, readers reflexively reach for Prussian general officer Carl 
von Clausewitz’s treatment of the subject in his classic On War. Clausewitz described “military 
genius,” which, from today’s perspective appears synonymous with superlative military leadership. 
It might also be that it is an ideal description of supreme command. Clausewitz subjected his study 
of military genius to “scientific analysis in order to ascertain its principal characteristics.” While he 
was not after the “specific rules used by genius,” he instead sought the “underlying causal linkages 
that make those rules, and others, possible.”6 Clausewitz wrote,  
 
A true quality of genius belongs to every level of command, from lowest to highest, though 
history and posterity reserve the title of genius only for those who have served at the highest 
position—that of commander in chief—for here the demands on understanding and 
psychological makeup are much greater… 
Bringing an entire war or its great acts, its campaigns, to a brilliant end requires 
exceptional insight into the higher relations of the state. The conduct of war and political 
intercourse here become one, the military commander is simultaneously the statesman… 
We say: the military commander becomes the statesman, but he must not stop being 
the commander; from his perspective he grasps the entire political situation on the one hand,                                                         
4 J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1929; 
second edition 1958), xi. 
5 Neil deGrasse Tyson, “Neil deGrasse Tyson with Robert Krulwich,” February 1, 2007, in 92Y 
Talks Episode 64, audio, accessed January 2, 2016, http://92yondemand.org/neil-degrasse-tyson-
with-robert-krulwich-92y-talks-episode-64.  
6 Antulio J. Echevarria II, Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
102, 111. 
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while on the other he is precisely aware of what he can accomplish with the means at his 
disposal.7  
 
Clausewitz further described that “great [military] genius” is characterized by “superior 
insights,” “superior intellect,” “power of judgment,” and the ability to bring a war to a “successful 
close.” Clausewitz also wrote about several other characteristics in military geniuses, including 
“determination, firmness, staunchness, and strength of character,” and acknowledged these would 
be difficult to measure with any objective validity.8 
Clausewitz’s list of vaunted characteristics begs the basic question: What is supreme 
command? Clausewitz employed the term “commander-in-chief,” which might incorrectly lead 
some to mistake the role for a political one (i.e. presidents and prime ministers). But Clausewitz 
intended the German term Feldherr, which meant supreme military commander, akin to what 
modern audiences might know as a “combatant commander.”9 Moreover, modern military doctrine 
prescribes that such command “includes the authority and responsibility” for using resources to 
achieve specified goals.10 Such authority enables decision-making, which is the act of “selecting a 
course of action as the one most favorable to accomplish the mission.”11 So at the highest level, the 
supreme commander is the “person with the responsibility for making, or conducting, military 
strategy or strategies designed for the course and outcome of an entire conflict,” because “subject to 
political control, [this person] has duty of care over the entire competitive performance of his 
security community.”12 The supreme commander holds ultimate security responsibility and 
authority for a society. While some might prefer to reserve that title for politicians and heads of 
state, the term “supreme commander” is marked by its explicitly martial function, and for the 
purposes of this dissertation will mean the senior-most person making military and strategic 
decisions in a particular security community, which typically means a military officer. Besides, 
according to Clausewitz’s definition, this is the only person eligible, by position, to hold the lofty 
title of “military genius.” 
                                                        
7 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), 111-112. 
8 Clausewitz, On War, 111-112. 
9 Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London: Pimlico, 2002), 73. 
10 Department of the Army, ADP 6-0: Mission Command (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 
2012), 5. 
11 Department of the Army, Field Manual 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2003), 1-6. Cited in Eitan Shamir, Transforming 
Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2011), 9. 
12 Gray, The Strategy Bridge, 205, 207. 
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But how does supreme command work? Can supreme commanders actually be said to win 
wars? If so, how? What guides their decisions? What experiences and education support exemplary 
performance, and to what extent is this driven by some innate ability? Unfortunately, as Harvard’s 
Sarah Sewall has remarked, “we lack the tools to judge military leadership.”13 
The primary object of the current study is to explore supreme command in extreme 
circumstances at war, upholding the principle that “to study the finest steel, best to search for the 
hottest furnace.”14 In suit, this research considers three case studies which were to have far-reaching 
impact on the United States: General George Washington, fighting in the summer of 1776 through 
the early winter of 1777, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant from the late spring of 1864 through 
President Abraham Lincoln’s re-election in November of that year, and General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower’s effort to break onto the European continent in 1944 and on until his forces reached 
the German border. These individuals were immersed in conflicts that defined the United States in 
terms of existence, continued unity, and physical security. These three cases offer unique aspects 
and military situations. 
General George Washington was a materially and organizationally inferior insurgent in 
1776, fighting against a vastly superior expeditionary British invasion force under General William 
Howe. Broadly speaking, Washington employed an exhaustion strategy; his aim was the “gradual 
erosion of the enemy nation’s will or means to resist.”15 His policy objective was simple and direct: 
survival for a fledgling state, which did not even exist at the moment he took command of his 
ragtag army. 
By 1864, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant had risen in rank to command all Union 
forces against the Confederacy. If not quite as formal by position, the de facto supreme commander 
of all Confederate forces, and Grant’s opponent, was General Robert E. Lee. This was a tough 
fight, primarily on land, yet with an important brown-water component, to put down and pacify a 
conventionally-armed, widespread terrain-holding insurgency. Because the combatants were so 
familiar, the war was fought between two sides that likely knew more about one another than any 
other opponent, fitting Sun Tzu’s proscription to “know” one’s enemy.16 Though most attention 
                                                        
13 Sewall, “Soldiers and Citizens: The Military, Politics, and Society in 21st Century America,” at 14 
minutes. 
14 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: The 
Free Press, 2002), xiv. 
15 Robert Bateman, “There Are Three (And Only Three) Types of Military Strategy,” Esquire 
(November 30, 2015). 
16 Sun Tzu, “Chapter 1: Estimates,” and “Chapter 3: Offensive Strategy,” in The Art of War, trans. 
Samuel Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 84. 
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centers on the Grant versus Lee narrative, the wider war was where Grant truly made his attrition 
strategy work in his effort to “gradually erode the combat power” of the Confederacy.17 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s forcible entry onto the European continent was part of an 
annihilation strategy aimed at the “immediate destruction of the combat power of the enemy’s 
armed forces.”18 Despite Eisenhower’s having “held only one command, a stateside training post 
for less than a year in 1918,” historian Stephen Ambrose has called Eisenhower “the most 
successful general of the greatest war ever fought.”19 The character of this industrial warfare was 
enormous: global, total war, with significant joint and multinational cooperation at all levels. 
The objective is to explore the judgment of these three successful supreme commanders, 
the way their minds worked in dialectic with the enemy as part of the lethal choices they had to 
make, and ultimately how they came out on top. By doing so, this research also examines the 
broader issue of understanding the margin between success and failure at war. Judgment and 
decision-making is at the core of this study, as well as leadership’s “process of influencing people.”20 
The available literature on supreme command is quite limited. Even a casual observer would 
notice the gap. Colin Gray has called this lack of “careful and deep [study] of the role of the 
[supreme] commander a “prominent” weakness in “modern Western strategic theory.”21 There is 
significant academic value in spending time reflecting on Clausewitz’s “military genius,” especially as 
a stand-in for superlative military leadership.22 
Supreme commanders matter as a particular class of individuals that “play a central role in 
shaping international relations,” a pivotal part of “first image” international relations theories that 
argue “the behavior of nations springs from the behavior of individuals.”23 Kenneth Pollack and 
Daniel Byman have found that “International relations cannot be understood if the role of the 
individual is ignored” and even if critics contend this is to focus on “exceptions,” it is important to 
note that “such exceptional individuals knit the tapestry of history.”24 Eliot Cohen has made a 
similar point, that “the experience of exceptional persons make some uneasy,” but “war for the 
most essential national interests, enable us to see more clearly what great leaders do and of what 
they are made.”25                                                         
17 Bateman, “There Are Three.” 
18 Bateman, “There Are Three.” 
19 Stephen E. Ambrose, “Eisenhower’s Generalship,” Parameters (June 1990), 90, 98. 
20 Department of the Army, ADP 6-0, 6. 
21 Gray, Strategy Bridge, 199. 
22 Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, 102-103. 
23 Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the 
Statesmen Back In,” International Security Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), 111, 114. 
24 Byman and Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesmen Back In,” 145. 
25 Cohen, Supreme Command, xiv. 
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At certain pivotal moments, individuals matter. Though focused on the role of the 
individual, it is important to also acknowledge some limits imposed by reality, which ought to be 
considered in balance.26 
There is a tradition in international relations that embraces such a duality, neoclassical 
realism, which balances systemic considerations with individually constructed ones, where, for 
example, as Gideon Rose has pointed out, “perceptions of relative power…matter, not simply [as] 
relative quantities of physical resources or forces in being.” The “neoclassical realist archetype is 
Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War,” which posited the “real cause of the war was the 
‘growth of power in Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta,’ and then describes how 
systemic incentives were translated through unit-level variables into the foreign policies of the 
various Greek city-states.”27 In sum, while academic literature leaves a specific gap with respect to 
supreme command, there is a suitable base of intellectual support on which to conduct research.  
 
1.2 Aims and Arguments 
 
The central research question is: What are the characteristics of successful wartime American supreme 
commanders? Such a study is valuable, as British military theorist Basil H. Liddell Hart has noted: 
“Can we find any quality, or qualities, so marked in all of [history’s supreme commanders] as to 
represent a common denominator, and provide a key to their outstanding performance?”28 
This dissertation identifies a pattern. In the three case studies, three principal characteristics 
of successful American wartime supreme commanders stood out: judgment, empathy, and grit. 
Superior judgment was particularly important. If one compares the relative, cumulative judgments 
of adversary supreme commanders in the military campaigns that exercised the greatest influence 
over these three war outcomes, the supreme commander that demonstrated superior judgment 
tended to generate greater relative positive strategic effect on the path to the achievement of policy 
objectives.29 This was true across all three case studies, which featured different strategies (e.g. 
Washington: exhaustion; Grant: attrition; Eisenhower: annihilation), different characters of conflict, 
                                                        
26 Paul Kennedy, “The Kaiser and German Weltpolitik: reflections on Wilhelm II’s place in the 
making of German foreign policy,” in Kaiser Wilhelm II New Interpretations: The Corfu Papers ed. John 
C. G. Rohl, Niclaus Sombart (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 165. 
27 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics Vol. 51, No. 1 
(October 1998), 147, 153-154. 
28 Basil H. Liddell Hart, “What Is Military Genius?” Strand Magazine (October 1941), 48. Liddell 
Hart Center for Military Archives, Reference 10/1941/25b, 50. 
29 Roger J. Spiller, “Six Propositions,” in Between War and Peace: How America Ends Its Wars, ed. 
Matthew Moten (New York: Free Press, 2011), 18. 
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time periods, and war aims. All these characteristics changed while superior judgment remained a 
constantly important, objective factor. 
This pattern, and the importance of judgment, empathy, and grit, is also useful in 
understanding the concept of strategy. Colin Gray popularized the “bridge” as a metaphor for 
strategy, and explained, “The strategists who hold the bridge are tasked with the generally 
inordinately complex and difficult mission of translating political purpose, or policy, into feasible 
military, and other, plans.” Gray wrote the objective is to turn “one currency” (i.e. power) into 
“desired political consequences.” In this telling, the metaphorical strategy bridge is static. Later in 
the same book, Gray asked rhetorically, “But who practices strategy? Exactly who holds the strategy 
bridge?—and how do they hold it?”30 
This dissertation confronts Gray’s questions. In each of the previously mentioned case 
studies, a successful “bridge” was constructed: Washington, Grant, and Eisenhower all built strategy 
bridges and prevented their opponents from the same. This dissertation returns to the crucial point 
at which Washington, Grant, and Eisenhower’s keystone and adjacent bricks were put into place. By 
studying these moments, just before each strategy was a fully assembled “bridge,” provides a 
window into how the key judgments (e.g. keystones) were fit into place. To do so is a way of 
understanding strategy as a dynamic process, in addition to its role as a finished product. 
To begin to understand supreme command, one must set some conditions or frameworks 
for an organizing philosophy. In this case, there are two: the relative nature of war and the criticality 
of focusing on conflict as a judgment-centric endeavor. 
 
1.3 Framework One: War is a Duel  
 
All war is relative and measured against the opponent. The enemy sets the bar. Put another way, the 
tortoise did not win for being objectively fast; the tortoise won for being relatively faster than the 
hare at reaching the specified finish line. For another illustration, Emile Simpson has called strategy 
an individual “dialogue between desire and possibility.”31 While poetic, Simpson left out the critical 
second “dialogue,” the struggle against the opponent. Even as early as 1817, August Ruehle von 
Lilienstern, wrote in his book, On Engagements: “An engagement...presupposes the existence and 
interaction of two inimical parties” in which both interact with and influence each other.32 Not long                                                         
30 Gray, The Strategy Bridge, 7, 197. 
31 Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 116. 
32 Ruehle von Lilienstern’s handbook was structured around the hierarchy of conflict, starting with 
smaller engagements, then larger groups, and finally states locked in combat. August Ruehle von 
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after, Carl von Clausewitz recognized this particular dimension was so important that it featured 
prominently in his book, On War: 
 
I shall not begin by expounding a pedantic, literary definition of war, but go straight to the 
heart of the matter, to the duel. War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go 
to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers.33   
 
War is waged against a living, willed opponent. Frank Hoffman has acknowledged this 
point, that strategy is “developed and deployed in a competitive context relative to an adversary,” 
and this setting “reflect[s] the simple reality that war involves an interactive series of action, 
response, and counteraction.”34 
So war and competition encapsulate at least two perspectives, both of which are required to 
understand the other in context. Or as Michael Horowitz and his co-authors have recently written, 
an 
 
in-depth study of [senior leaders] of any single country, gives only a partial view of their 
personalities and decision-making processes. For example, any study of John F. Kennedy 
would be incomplete without a discussion of his relationship with Nikita Khrushchev. We 
cannot fully understand Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy without understanding Mikhail 
Gorbachev.35 
 
It may be helpful to explain two alternate perspectives this research will conscientiously 
avoid. One is Emile Simpson’s War From the Ground Up, which adopts a view of conflict from the 
tactical perspective, looking upwards.36 This is useful for junior military officers who so often are 
the implementers of military strategy. Alternately, there is the top-down view. Journalist Bob 
Woodward is the most prolific practitioner in this genre, who has written many books about the 
highest part of the national security hierarchical chain, notably during the American wars in Iraq and 
                                                        
Lilienstern, On Engagements (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1817), 3. Cited in Beatrice Heuser, The Strategy 
Makers: Thoughts on War and Society from Machiavelli to Clausewitz (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security 
International, 2010), 175. 
33 Clausewitz, On War, 75. 
34 Frank Hoffman, “On Strategy: Building the Whole House,” January 16, 2014, War on the Rocks, 
text, accessed January 2, 2016, http://warontherocks.com/2014/01/on-strategy-building-the-
whole-house/.  
35 Michael C. Horowitz, Allan C. Stam, Cali M. Ellis, Why Leaders Fight (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 20-21.  
36 Simpson, War From the Ground Up. 
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Afghanistan.37 Both Simpson and Woodward see war with vertical, latitudinal perspectives. While 
these may be useful for some scholarship, this dissertation instead pursues a more horizontal 
approach by evaluating supreme commanders’ performance across the front lines from one 
another. 
Supreme commanders occupy a privileged position between the “centurion’s tactical 
acumen” and positions at the top of military hierarchy, requiring both political and “strategic 
ability.”38 This is because the supreme commander, as the senior military strategist, “has obligations 
reaching both higher and lower, neither of which can be performed in isolation from each other.”39 
The supreme commander connects to policy and the political sphere while at the same time 
overseeing tactical efforts for the friendly cause. As one interpretation of Clausewitz puts it, this is 
war from the center of the “storm,” the duel between supreme commanders.40 
This duel is relevant today, apparent in a lecture by retired General Stanley McChrystal, 
former commander of all coalition forces in Afghanistan, who acknowledged his enemy had the 
greatest influence on McChrystal because “he forced me to think about how to fight.”41 
This perspective is useful even in modern warfare, in which it is often said “there is no front 
line,” and so there may not be a linear frontier between two combatants. However, anywhere there 
is a contested space between two combatants, even if it is not necessarily being contested in the 
physical realm (i.e. ideas), there is value in studying such engagements. Provided there is violent 
intent and action directed between two combatants, the “duel” perspective helps understand the 
utility of supreme command. Consider, for example, the U.S. war effort in Iraq, which often 
featured no set front line. There were, additionally, multiple combatants fighting against the U.S.-led 
coalition, such as: Al Qaeda terrorists, Sunni tribes, Shi’a militias, and Kurdish separatist groups. 
Even these multiple armed factions and forces, with separate political grievances, typically shared a 
common military objective to harm and eject Western militaries from Iraq and the greater Middle                                                         
37 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade Iraq (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 2004). See also Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008). See also Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2010). 
38 Jason W. Warren, “The Centurion Mindset and the Army’s Strategic Leader Paradigm,” Parameters 
45:3 (Autumn 2015), 29. 
39 Francis Park, “A Framework for Developing Military Strategists,” Infinity Journal Vol. 5, Issue 1, 
(Fall 2015), 11. 
40 Note: In at least one translation, Clausewitz analogizes command in war to command of a 
“storm-tossed ship.” See John E. Tashjean, “Talking Point: The Ideal General of General von 
Clausewitz,” RUSI Journal 131:4 (1986), 76.  
41 Stanley McChrystal, “Public Lecture: My Share of the Task,” February 25, 2015, in Pritzker 
Military Library, video, accessed January 2, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M7k9hZDCj8I.  
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East. The duel still applies when warfare features one actor against many, provided the many seek 
common strategic goals. 
This perspective is important because, as the opponent is always a willed one, performance 
in war must be measured relative to the opponent. Retired British Royal Navy officer Steven Jermy 
has raised this point, “the term ‘good strategy’ is a poor term. Strategy, generally speaking, is about a 
dialectic, it’s about a confrontation, so that’s why ‘superior’ is the much better term, because 
strategy can only be gauged in terms of confrontation.”42 Moreover, Correlli Barnett’s observation 
that “most British defeats have been caused by stupidity,” can only be true in a relative sense, 
measured against the opponent.43 This standard is inherently subjective, because the enemy’s efforts 
are the pre-conflict unknown standard against which success is measured. A combatant will not 
know how “good” he or she has to be until the day of the contest; Colin Gray has reinforced this 
point, that the strategist “need only be good enough” to be better than the enemy.44 
This subjective standard can be objectively measured, but only after-the-fact, which is to 
say, post-conflict. Only then can one compare the relative, cumulative performance of two supreme 
commanders to understand and explain the result. This dissertation adopts as its lens that war is a 
duel and will focus research on the temporal part of the duel that mattered most in the eventual 
result.   
 
1.4 Framework Two: Judgments and Decisions Drive War 
 
Judgment is critical to the conduct of war. Thinking comes before fighting as the mind guides the 
fist. Doctor and author Atul Gawande has noted a mentor used to say, “Most surgery is done in 
your head,” leading Gawande to derive that “performance it not determined by where you stand or 
where your elbow goes. It’s determined by where you decide to stand, where you decide to put your 
elbow.”45 Actions begin with thought, and so the ability to deconstruct thought which precedes 
action is key to understanding outcomes. This is true even more so with military judgment. Whereas 
a doctor’s decision is often for a narrow audience (i.e. the patient), the nature of military conflict is 
                                                        
42 Steven Jermy, “Strategy for Action: Using Force Wisely in the 21st Century,” October 26, 2011, in 
Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict Programme, Oxford University, audio, accessed January 2, 2016, 
http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/strategy-action-using-force-wisely-21st-century. 
43 Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals, quoted in Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military 
Incompetence (London: Pimlico, 1976), 157. 
44 Colin S. Gray, “The Strategist as Hero,” Joint Force Quarterly 62, 3rd Quarter (July 2011), 45. 
45 Atul Gawande, “Personal Best,” in Leadership: Essential Writings By Our Greatest Thinkers ed. 
Elizabeth D. Samet (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2015), 155. Originally published in The New 
Yorker (October 3, 2011). 
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that a great many individuals must work in concert to achieve some mission or aim. Because of this 
need to coordinate widely, we have dispatches and military records which provide insight into these 
judgments. 
The philosopher John Locke once explained “an act of knowledge is based upon certain 
understanding, while an act of judgment occurs when knowledge is uncertain or incomplete, and 
the shortfall in knowledge must be made good by presumption.”46 This uncertainty is endemic to 
military operations because they always take place against a living, willed opponent. The presence of 
a dynamic enemy means one must necessarily deal with uncertainty. Theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan 
also wrote extensively on teaching military command and that such circumstances are dependent 
upon “the large play of contingency.”47 (He also considered the quest for military certainty a 
crippling mistake.48) British Field Marshal Archibald Wavell agreed, stating “the mind of the general 
in war is buried, not merely for 48 hours but for days and weeks, in the mud and sand of unreliable 
information and uncertain factors.”49 War literally cannot continue absent judgment and decision 
because they are what enable war to proceed through such uncertainty. Even if an opponent 
forestalls a particular judgment or commits to strategic patience, these non-judgments still register a 
strategic effect with the opponent just as an active judgment might. 
As strategic judgment always takes place under uncertainty, it is often paired with another 
factor in order to counteract this uncertainty. Antulio Echevarria has described this pair as “sense” 
and “sensibility.”50 This is both the judgment itself (e.g. “sense”) paired with the internal strength 
(e.g. “sensibility”) to carry it out. Furthermore, historian Jon Sumida finds,  
 
The synthesis of judgment and will was intelligent emotion—or, in a word, intuition. When the 
degrees of uncertainty and danger were extremely high as they were likely to be at a time of 
crisis during a battle or campaign, extraordinary intuition was required to promote rapid and 
decisive command that transcended mere assertion of judgment to become creative 
performance, or in other words, an artistic act.51 
                                                        
46 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer 
Mahan Reconsidered (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 104. Quotes John 
Locke, “Book Four: Of Knowledge and Opinion,” in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
abridged and ed. A.D. Woozley (Cleveland, OH: Meridian, 1964; first published 1690), 403. 
47 Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy, 52. 
48 A. T. Mahan, The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain, Volume I (New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 125. 
49 Archibald Wavell, Generals and Generalship: The Lees Knowles Lectures delivered at Trinity College, 
Cambridge, in 1939 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), 4. 
50 Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, 108. 
51 Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy, 104. 
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Admittedly, there are difficulties in studying matters that are internal, psychological, and 
temporal, something this dissertation will take on. But while challenging, this dissertation will lean 
as much as possible on objective judgments that are verifiable in the historical record. 
Lastly, how does the modern military conceive of these war judgments? Don Snider has 
written extensively on the military as a profession, and finds, “Professions deal in expert knowledge.  
Systematized, scientific body of knowledge theoretical and practical, it takes years to learn, it takes 
longer to practice.”52 Snider concludes this description of distinct expertise with a focus on 
judgment: “If we define ‘moral’ as meaning influencing the life of another human being” then “the 
practice of the military professional…[is] the repetitive exercise of discretionary judgment…[with] 
high moral content.”53 
Judgment and decisions are necessary at war to overcome the uncertainty inherent to an 
activity defined by the constant presence of a living, willed enemy. Judgment and decisions are what 
propel war forward, and at the core of all military endeavors. War may be a clash of wills, but it is 
equally a clash of judgments.  
 
1.5 Research Process 
 
In light of these two frameworks, this dissertation does four basic things. First, it asks whether 
supreme commanders can affect war outcomes. This preliminary hurdle must be crossed, and will 
engage with some of the different scholarly fields that provide input on the topic. Second, this 
dissertation will ask what characteristics make supreme commanders exemplary. Due to the relative 
lack of literature on supreme commanders, this dissertation will consider a wider class of writing 
that discusses the broader (related) subject of generalship. 
After the preliminary question of whether supreme commanders can affect outcomes is 
addressed, and a set of successful characteristics is developed, the dissertation then moves on to 
case studies. The three case studies will compare this set of exemplary characteristics to three 
successful supreme commanders (Washington, Grant, and Eisenhower), and search for patterns 
that transcend time. Finally, this dissertation will conclude by discussing the findings, their utility, 
and to what extent these traits can be learned through education or experience.                                                         
52 Don Snider, "Public Lecture: Future Trends in American Civil-Military Relations," April 2, 2011, 
in Foreign Policy Research Institute, audio, accessed January 2, 2016, 
http://www.fpri.org/multimedia/2011/04/future-trends-american-civil-military-relations-audio-
video.  
53 Snider, “Future Trends.” 
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This dissertation is restricted to cases in which a successful supreme commander guided a 
war to successful conclusion. The case studies in this dissertation represent the most meaningful 
and high consequence conflicts for the United States: the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, and 
World War II. Generals Washington, Grant, and Eisenhower all successfully concluded these major 
wars as supreme commander. 
From the broadest perspective, this dissertation employs John Stuart Mill’s “method of 
difference” which identifies similar general variables (e.g. war, context) and “different values on the 
study variable” (e.g. adversary supreme commanders).54 This is important for a reason identified by 
J.F.C. Fuller:  
 
Comparisons are often waste of time, and more especially so when they are made out of place 
and out of date. Thus, to compare Alexander the Great with Napoleon would not be a 
profitable task…Grant we can, however, compare with Lee, and Lee with Grant; for though in 
so many ways these two men were different, they were of the same nation, they fought at the 
same date and in the same war.55 
 
This dissertation specifically evaluates successful supreme commanders in context against 
the enemy and in the environment against which they had to contend. It evaluates this performance 
and how it contributed to a war’s successful conclusion. 
Through process tracing, this dissertation backtracks from the war’s outcome to the war’s 
most consequential campaign. Some would call this the “decisive” campaign, in that it exercised a 
“decisive” impact on the war; other historians prefer to call it a “terminal” campaign, to denote a 
“strategically important” campaign that exercised the greatest influence on the war’s ultimate 
outcome. This dissertation will adopt the term “terminal” campaign to indicate that the campaign in 
question had the most sway over the war’s termination and result.56 
This dissertation employs process tracing “by identifying intervening steps” between a war’s 
successful military conclusion (i.e. Confederate surrender at Appomattox Court House in the 
                                                        
54 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), 57. 
55 J.F.C. Fuller, Grant and Lee: A Study of Personality and Generalship (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1957; reprint First Midland Book Edition, 1982), 242. 
56 In doing so, this dissertation takes no strong position on the distinction between “decisive” and 
“terminal.” In this case, what matters most is that the campaign was the most consequential. Spiller, 
“Six Propositions,” 18. 
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American Civil War) and it’s terminal campaign (i.e. Union offensive, spring-fall 1864).57 In these 
cases, the objective is to logically walk backwards in time from a successful war’s conclusion to the 
terminal campaign. This campaign’s outcome is linked to the successful end of the war through 
strategic effect, which is the ability of one side to “generate desired effect upon the future course of 
events.”58  
In most wars guided to successful conclusion by one side’s strategic efforts, one side 
generated net positive strategic effect during the terminal campaign, which led to the war’s 
outcome. Strategic effect is “the cumulative and sequential impact of strategic performance upon 
the course of events.” More broadly, “the immediate product of strategy is strategic effect. This 
effect is registered in the willingness or ability of the enemy to begin or continue the struggle.” 
Though strategic effect is “one among those mysterious qualities that cannot be observed and 
measured directly,” we are able to “find material evidence of its recent and current presence.”59 
After supreme commanders make judgments and then execute military strategy, their actions, or 
inactions, generate strategic effect. In sum: positive, neutral, and negative strategic effect comes as a 
result of relative judgments, which accumulate to influence policy accomplishment (or failure). 
Another point to consider is to eliminate structural (i.e. “guns, germs, or steel”) causes.60 
The researcher ought to show that both belligerents, particularly the losing side, had the ability and 
willingness to fight, important because “wars begin [and continue] not by accident, but with an 
agreement to fight, deliberately and with purpose.”61 At the beginning of the terminal campaign, 
both sides must be said to have had an opportunity, to prove that neither the war’s outcome or the 
terminal campaign was a forgone conclusion. 
“Opportunity” is defined here as a plausible way for one supreme commander to achieve a 
sustainable political outcome consistent with vital or survival national interests.62 This is important 
because this dissertation should demonstrate that the losers still had viable ways to some form of 
victory when entering the terminal campaign. 
                                                        
57 Alexander George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused 
Comparison,” in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy 
(New York: Free Press, 1979), 40.  
58 Gray, The Strategy Bridge, 251. 
59 Gray, The Strategy Bridge, 18, 81, 251. 
60 See Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1997). 
61 Spiller, “Six Propositions,” 10. 
62 Using Sherman Kent’s probability scale devised for the early Central Intelligence Agency, 
“plausible” in this case is defined as odds greater than “almost certainly not,” mathematically 
starting at a range of 7-12%, and likely higher. See Philip E. Tetlock and Dan Gardner, 
Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction (New York: Crown Publishing, 2015), 56.  
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To disprove any notion that the successful supreme commanders were “destined” to win, 
this dissertation will also engage in counterfactual historical work in an effort to consider how those 
losing supreme commanders might have won.63 Specifically, are there credible, scholarly historians 
that have advanced the argument that the outcome of the terminal campaign could have gone 
another way? If so, this means the losing supreme commander might have obtained a different 
outcome with another set of judgments. In short, the losing side could be said to have had 
“opportunity.” Of course, this opportunity must be in balance with another quality: fighting power. 
“Fighting power,” sometimes called “combat effectiveness,” can be either a broad or a 
narrow concept.64 Martin van Creveld has narrowly defined fighting power as the “sum total of 
mental qualities that make armies fight.” Alternately, this dissertation takes the term more broadly, 
in line with what van Creveld called the sum of an “army’s worth as a military instrument” which is 
“the quality and quantity of its equipment multiplied by those total mental qualities that make 
armies fight.”65 Thus, one might consider fighting power to be the sum total of combat ability: the 
entire physical, mental, and moral prowess of one side’s fighting forces. While numbers on either 
side might not be exactly equal, what matters most is that a combatant has the requisite fighting 
power for an opportunity to achieve victory. The object is sufficient capability and capacity to meet 
requirements and objectives, not necessarily some numerical figure equal to or matching the 
opponent’s material strength. 
The next step in studying a supreme commander’s efficacy is to determine precisely which 
judgments mattered most. Philip Tetlock has described such a method, which he calls Bayesian 
question clustering. Tetlock described a challenge with strategic prediction: often what gets asked is 
the “big question, but the big question can’t be scored. The little question doesn’t matter [as much] 
but it can be scored.”66 For example, if one wanted to know if there would be another Korean War 
next year, it would be incredibly difficult to determine, owing to the natural ambiguity of such a 
multifaceted problem. However, one could make relatively smaller predictions and judgments about 
North Korean intentions to go to war in the short term (i.e. will North Korea launch cyber-attacks 
in the next three months?). The advantage to the relatively smaller questions is they are objectively 
answerable. Tetlock compares Bayesian question clustering to the painting technique of pointillism: 
“dabbing tiny dots on the canvas, nothing more. Each dot alone adds little. But as the dots collect,                                                         
63 See What If? The World’s Foremost Military Historians Imagine What Might Have Been ed. Robert Cowley 
(New York: Berkley Books, 2000).  See also What Ifs? of American History: Eminent Historians Imagine 
What Might Have Been ed. Robert Cowley (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2003). 
64 Gray, The Strategy Bridge, 214. 
65 Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Wesport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1982), 3. 
66 Tetlock and Gardner, Superforecasting, 263, 262. 
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patterns emerge. With enough dots, an artist can produce anything from a vivid portrait to a 
sweeping landscape.”67  
 
 
 
Above, one can see an example of Bayesian question clustering with respect to the 
overarching challenges and strategies in 1776 faced by the Continental Army and British Army, 
underpinned by the key judgments and decisions each supreme commander had to make about how 
to succeed in their chosen approach. 
Once the critical judgments in the terminal campaign are identified, the dissertation uses 
focused, structured questions and process tracing to detect patterns.68 Each integral judgment first 
raised itself as a challenge; next, a choice was made; and finally, the clash of forces, which led to 
another set of challenges, repeating the cycle. This is the cycle of supreme command at war. 
By focusing on this process, we can evaluate the strategic effect of each supreme 
commander’s judgments and how they interacted, discerning, on balance against the other, whose 
judgment was superior, as well as other characteristics at play in these intense interactions. 
These judgments are available for review in the written record. The research focuses on 
quantifiable, falsifiable data to be found in primary source records (i.e. dispatches and memoranda). 
These are direct artifacts of judgment, which may be used to quantify and qualify how different 
supreme commanders thought about strategic judgments. As J.F.C. Fuller advised: What was “the 
governing reason for an action?”69 There were other individuals involved in the war effort who were 
facing the same questions and came to different conclusions. Thus, we know we are putting these 
supreme commanders in the context of their time because we can observe that others came to 
                                                        
67 Tetlock and Gardner, Superforecasting, 263 
68 George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused 
Comparison.” 
69 J.F.C. Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing 
Company, 1936), 78. 
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different judgment having witnessed the same situation. These were real choices with alternate 
options for the case study supreme commanders. 
Moreover, “in war against a competitive foe,” one side’s leadership must “outthink that 
foe…to be successful in outfighting him.”70 The fundamental point is that thought precedes action. 
The thoughts and judgments are recorded in the dispatches, then action follows, which produces 
observable results. Process tracing works because one can immediately observe the supreme 
commander’s judgments and results. This militates against the arguments of some international 
relations scholars, who claim, “there are no clear metrics to assess the costs and benefits of a 
particular [strategic] course of action, even in retrospect.”71 And yet, this is often how war works, as 
American Civil War General William T. Sherman wrote, quoting a friend, “Of course knowledge is 
power, we all know that: but mere knowledge is not power, it is simply possibility. Action is power, 
and its highest manifestation is action with knowledge.”72 Moreover, for supreme commanders, this 
“action” is undertaken with wide strategic considerations, as Aleksandr Svechin described the 
military “choice between two alternatives” as requiring a “rise to a strategic level of thinking.”73 
Within these cases, having identified the key judgments for each case, the dissertation then 
interrogates the judgments of each of the supreme commanders using primary source documents 
supplemented when necessary by appropriate secondary sources. 
These cases and findings are subject to limits. First, they are all high profile, pre-nuclear era, 
American, and likely will never be predictive until science finds a way into a person’s thoughts in 
real time. These cases are small-n and certainly not exhaustive and should be viewed as a starting 
point for further investigation of the supreme commanders’ important role and position. 
A second issue is this research is linguistically limited; the researcher speaks only one 
language and scholarly resources in German in the Eisenhower case study were inaccessible, though 
it must be noted that this did not pose a critical problem as the most important work for this 
particular research has been translated into English. 
George Reed, in his book on “toxic” leadership, has also pointed to another challenge in 
research, that of “leadership attribution bias.” The problem is that without care, researchers can 
“place unwarranted emphasis on individual characteristics to explain behavior rather than                                                         
70 Lloyd J. Matthews, “The Uniformed Intellectual And His Place in American Arms; Part I: Anti-
intellectualism In the Army Yesterday and Today,” Army Magazine (July 2002), 20. 
71 David M. Edelstein and Ronald R. Krebs, “Delusions of Grand Strategy: The Problem With 
Washington’s Planning Obsession” Foreign Affairs Vol. 94, No. 6 (November/December 2015), 111. 
72 William T. Sherman, “The Grand Strategy of the War of the Rebellion,” The Century Magazine 
(February 1888), 597. 
73 Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy, ed. Kent D. Lee (Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications, 1992), 
73. 
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considering external factors.”74 As this dissertation argues simply that supreme command matters as 
one factor among others, and not as a single causal factor in war outcomes, this potential pitfall 
seems reasonably mitigated. 
One other objection to studying a war’s outcome is “luck.” Though eliminating this real 
world variable cannot ever be complete, the structure of this particular dissertation should allay 
concerns that luck might have been the principal cause in these strategically successful outcomes. 
Luck in war occasionally provides temporary, tactical advantage, but the critical determinant 
remains the judgment to take advantage of short-term favorable circumstances. While luck may 
nudge battlefield outcomes somewhat, it does not win wars or bring about strategic success. 
Specifically, this dissertation considers relatively lengthy periods of time such that any 
temporary tactical advantage gained through luck or fortunate circumstance could not explain the 
outcome of a campaign or war. 75 
                                                        
74 George E. Reed, Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the U.S. Military (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 
2015), 9. 
75 Tetlock and Gardner, Superforecasting, 99. 
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2. The Characteristics of Exemplary Supreme Commanders 
 
2.1 The Supreme Commander’s Quest for Victory  
 
The supreme commander’s core objective is to achieve the state’s desires, or some better version 
of peace, which is most commonly translated as a quest for military victory. Multiple academic 
and military literature traditions have attempted to explain the attainment of successful war 
outcomes, several of which will be discussed in this chapter. This chapter finds supreme 
commanders’ can affect war outcomes, perhaps not in an independently causal way, yet this role 
is a major factor to consider in scholarly thinking about conflicts, which is why the supreme 
command position is merits study in international relations and beyond. 
 
2.2 What Causes Victory? 
 
To lay important groundwork, linguistically, “strategy” derives from the Greek word strategos (or 
strategoi) for “general.”76 Generals and supreme commanders are the functional agents of military 
strategy in an effort to generate favorable war outcomes. Supreme commanders employ 
strategies to achieve victory, or some other aim of the state. This links the term “strategy” with 
supreme command. 
An examination of supreme command begins with a larger class of literature that 
includes multiple fields of inquiry, like international relations, history, strategy, generalship, and 
senior military leadership. This is because, as Lawrence Freedman has written, a supreme 
commander must simultaneously consider factors as diverse as politics, engineering, sociology, 
psychology, geography, history, and economics to get the “best out of one’s own side,” and to 
defeat an adversary.77 So when evaluating supreme command, it is helpful to start with a single 
question that unites several disparate ideas on the subject: What causes victory? 
Some doubt it is even possible to guide a war to successful conclusion. Richard Betts 
wrote as much in a provocative article asking whether strategy is an “illusion.” Betts found 
“strategies cannot be evaluated because there are no agreed criteria for which are good or bad.”78 
                                                        
76 Robert Ayson, “Strategic Studies,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, eds. Chris 
Reut-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 559. 
77 Lawrence Freedman, “Does Strategic Studies have a Future?” in Strategy in the Contemporary 
World, 4th Edition, eds. John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 384-385. 
78 Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” International Security Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), 5.   
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Historian John Keegan goes even farther and has openly questioned if the same concept holds 
any value “at all.” 79 
Moreover, others have argued the practice of military strategy today is effectively 
paralyzed owing to fear of “complexity.”80 David Kilcullen has admitted to “days in the field” 
when he’s “felt a sense of dissonance about our reliance on ‘pure’ or binary theories.”81 These 
sentiments suggest war transcends a rational approach, a position that has deep roots. 
Eliot Cohen describes this as “strategic nihilism,” characterized by Leo Tolstoy’s classic 
War and Peace. Cohen relays principal character Prince Andrei Bolkonsky’s declaration that “there 
was not and could not be a science of war, and consequently no such thing as military genius.” 
Tolstoy, again speaking through Prince Andrei, states, “The best generals I have known were, in 
fact, stupid or absent-minded men.”82 The common theme amongst these several sources is that 
they find wars too chaotic for the purposeful employment of force to achieve policy goals. The 
problems are too complex, or simply too big and the means too small for supreme commanders 
to have an impact. And so, in this telling, supreme commanders would be unworthy of study. 
But others, across several disciplines, are not entirely convinced. Pulled together, they are 
a wide and varied group. Each has a different explanation for success: historians focus on 
leadership, international relations scholars point to structural causes, strategists often advise 
practical techniques for dealing with the enemy, and professional military literature offers 
qualitative description of the ways military leaders exert distinct influence. Properly harnessed, 
these different lines of literature can help us think through what causes victory and whether the 
supreme commander plays a significant role at war. 
Historians prefer personal, human explanations for successful war outcomes. To put it 
bluntly: people make choices and choices win wars. This argument proceeds by shining a 
spotlight on individuals’ ability to shape battles and wars. Biographies and autobiographies of 
military commanders and battle histories are popular. Another approach seeks out wisdom from 
the experience of senior military officers through either direct interviews or historical research. 
Two such examples include American Generalship: Character is Everything by Edgar Puryear and the 
                                                        
79 John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 7. 
80 Michael J. Gallagher, Joshua A. Geltzer, Sebastian L. v. Gorka, “The Complexity Trap,” 
Parameters Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring 2012), 5.  
81 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerilla (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 15. 
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emphasis on personal “temperament” by T. Harry Williams in McClellan, Sherman and Grant.83 An 
offshoot of this class of literature is the “Great Captain” or “Great Man” approach, which 
focuses entirely on the subjective characteristics of senior general officers.84 This approach finds 
that great victories spring from, in British Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery’s telling, the 
alchemic combination of “a man” and “a plan.”85 Historian Jeremy Black, in a public lecture 
titled, “How Washington Won,” ultimately provided a one-word answer: “leadership.”86 
In a Stanford University, Hoover Institution essay, the classicist Victor Davis Hanson 
penned: 
 
What factors decide wars? Luck? Fervent ideology? Preponderance of material resources? 
Or is advantage achieved by superior manpower and morale? In modern times, is victory 
found largely in lethal cutting-edge technology?87 
 
Hanson’s follow-on book, The Savior Generals, answers these questions and makes the argument 
that on “rare occasions, generals and the leadership of single individuals can still matter more 
than…seemingly inanimate forces.” Moreover, “when the planets line up,” some general officers 
“by their own genius or lack of it, themselves either win or lose wars.”88 Historians often believe 
maximum agency resides with the supreme commander. 
One of the strongest cases for this comes from Eliot Cohen, who has written much 
about the role of strategic leaders in achieving successful war outcomes. For example, Cohen has 
noted that British Field Marshal Sir William Slim’s battlefield excellence came from his 
                                                        
83 Edgar F. Puryear Jr., American Generalship, Character is Everything: The Art of Command (New 
York: Presidio Press, 2000). T. Harry Williams, McClellan Sherman and Grant (Chicago: Elephant 
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84 Margaret MacMillan, “History’s People: Personalities and the Past,” November 6, 2015, in The 
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85 Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present 
(New York: Liveright Publishing, 2013), 381. 
86 Jeremy Black, “How Washington Won,” October 3, 2015, at The New York Historical Society, 
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“fortitude, strength of character, and sheer intellectual capacity.”89 In another book, Cohen 
wrote that war outcomes do not come “as a product of masses of forces, strategic concepts, and 
technology,” and instead, Cohen argued, “it is personalities that often dictate outcomes.”90 He 
took this argument farther in yet another book, finding that four civilian leaders in particular 
were notable for their “active, harassing, interventionist probing of their military leaders about 
military matters,” which “did make the difference. Take away each leader, and one can easily 
imagine a very different outcome to ‘his’ conflict.”91 The limitation in this argument is that it is 
entirely subjective. What was the proper level of intervention? At what point might this help (or 
harassment) become harm? Cohen’s assessment is entirely reliant on an external, distant 
interpretation of the relationship, which is methodologically challenging at best. And what about 
the enemy? Does it seem logical that war’s outcome should only come about as the result of one 
side’s actions, particularly a president or prime minister heckling a military supreme commander? 
Cohen’s argument is subjective and therefore hard to scrutinize. Yet his analysis is 
equally intuitively valuable. The challenge is how to assess leadership in a more objective, yet still 
meaningful way. 
There have also been many attempts to apply social science rigor to determining war 
outcomes, especially understanding the role command plays. Martin van Creveld has written, 
“[f]rom Plato to NATO, the history of command in war consists essentially of an endless quest 
for certainty.”92 Social scientists similarly seek certainty of another kind. While the challenge to 
historians is often objectivity, the social scientist’s blind spot is human agency. The principal way 
social scientists attempt to study war in society is to use explicitly measurable characteristics. One 
example would be Ian Morris’s book, The Measure of Civilization.93 Morris uses “war-making 
capacity” as his way of determining war outcomes. He finds,  
 
comparisons of war-making capacity must come down to measuring the destructive power 
available to societies. By “destructive power” I mean the number of fighters they can field, 
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modified by the range and force of their weapons, the mass and speed with which they can 
deploy them, their defensive power, and their logistical capabilities.94 
  
Thus, the simple ability to destroy matters most. Supreme command does not matter, or, 
it only matters insomuch as the supreme commander is a very minor part of the data, algorithms, 
and formulas for optimal destruction. In this way, social science shrinks supreme command to a 
meaningless measure. 
Morris refers to retired military officer Trevor N. Dupuy’s development of the 
“Quantified Judgment Model,” a theory of combat that “employ[ed] no fewer than seventy-three 
variables.” 95 Dupuy had an eclectic, catholic set of interests, including the subject of military 
genius.96 Yet, the core of Dupuy’s academic work was to develop a “theory of combat,” which 
he defined as “the embodiment of a set of fundamental principles governing or explaining 
military combat, whose purpose is…to assist military commanders and planners to engage 
successfully in combat at any level.”97 As with Morris, this theory was quantitative, yet it went to 
a lower level of analysis and focused exclusively on tactical outcomes. Dupuy found that mass at 
the decisive point was the path to victory, as was counseled by Antoine de Jomini, the Swiss 
military officer that served under and wrote prolifically on Napoleon.98 
Morris, Dupuy, and Jomini all provide different variants on the broader preponderance 
claim, “that numerical superiority determines capability,” which has been well described by 
Stephen Biddle, and is worth considering in full:  
 
Many believe that states with larger populations, larger or more industrialized economies, 
larger militaries, or greater military expenditures should prevail in battle. This association of 
victory with material preponderance underlies the widespread perception that economic 
strength is a necessary precondition for military strength; that economic and military power 
are fungible; that economic decline leads to military weakness; and that economic policies 
merit co-equal treatment with political and military considerations in national strategy 
making. These perceptions are fundamental to the orthodox treatment of power in                                                         
94 Morris, The Measure of Civilization, 175. 
95 Morris, The Measure of Civilization, 174. 
96 Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War – the German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977). 
97 Trevor N. Dupuy, Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat (London: Leo Cooper, 1992), 
79. 
98 Antoine de Jomini, “Selection from Summary of the Art of War,” in The Sword and The Pen: 
Selections from the World’s Greatest Military Writings ed. Adrian Liddell Hart, prepared by Basil 
Liddell Hart (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1976), 145. 
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international relations theory. They are at the heart of hegemonic transition theory and the 
debate over relative gains stemming from international cooperation, and they define much of 
the realist/mercantilist position in international political economy. These beliefs also hold 
powerful policy implications for debates over the defense budget, the trade deficit, 
competitiveness, and long-range threat assessment for states like China, India, Russia, 
Germany, or Japan.99 
 
John Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism” represents this view, focusing solely on 
structural factors like material balances of national power which roundly exclude the role of the 
individual.100 Mearsheimer would not consider actor choice a significant variable worth study. 
There is an important corollary to preponderance: technology. One view holds the 
technology available to the entire system of nation states shifts the advantage to either offensive 
or defensive action. Separately, a dyadic approach finds that technology determines who wins, 
regardless of attack or defense.101 
Yet being bigger or more technologically advanced does not equate to better war 
outcomes. The United States was a larger, more powerful state than Vietnam or post-9/11 
opponents in Afghanistan or Iraq. Neither conflict demonstrates that raw material size or 
technological superiority cleanly translated to victory. While material factors are important, they 
are not sufficient to guarantee strategic success. 
Other international relations theories include Patricia Sullivan’s argument that war aims 
are the critical independent variable which cause war victories.102 Sullivan charges that selecting 
appropriate and achievable war aims is what distinguishes victory from defeat. But this 
explanation ignores the shifting nature of war aims over time. And Sullivan’s argument ignores 
enemy action, a clear limitation in a dynamic contest like war. 
Ivan Arreguin-Toft’s “Theory of Asymmetric Conflict” addresses the interaction of 
strategies, but is limited to cases of severely imbalanced forces (where one opponent was over 
five times materially stronger than the opponent). Arreguin-Toft’s model considers military 
strategy a single, inflexible binary choice as opposed to reality’s messier moving mosaic of 
                                                        
99 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), 14. 
100 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2001). 
101 Biddle, Military Power, 15, 16-17. 
102 Patricia L. Sullivan, Who Wins? Predicting Strategic Success and Failure in Armed Conflict (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 12-13. 
ML Cavanaugh 
On Supreme Command 
 
 24 
military and political decisions.103 This model only partially considers enemy interaction. An 
entire war’s strategy is simply coded either “0” or “1.” Such restrictive coding is unhelpful at 
understanding the key judgments within the conflict, not to mention those that changed over 
time. 
Strategists that bridge the gap between historical and social science scholarship have also 
tried tackling the thorny problem of studying and manufacturing successful war outcomes. Their 
common lens is the consideration of the enemy and how this interaction impacts strategy. 
Edward Luttwak has described strategy’s essential “paradox,” in which a bad road becomes a 
good road because it is bad and therefore the enemy does not expect the other side to use it.104 
Basil H. Liddell Hart counsels the “indirect” method.105 Hart’s “core philosophy” is that the aim 
should be to “bypass the enemy’s strengths” and win through “surprise and deception.”106 
The objection here is a devolution into a predictable game of unpredictability. To 
continually do what the enemy does not expect becomes, over time, a formula the enemy might 
learn to anticipate. 
Bevin Alexander has written two books on the subject: How Great Generals Win and Sun 
Tzu at Gettysburg: Ancient Military Wisdom in the Modern World. In How Great Generals Win, 
particularly, Alexander associates himself with Hart’s ideas.107 Against all foes, no matter what 
the challenge, this school of thought counsels to deceive, dislocate, and disarm to bring about 
victory. 
Similarly, military strategist John Boyd’s Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop is a 
“time-based theory of conflict” in which commanders select the “least-expected” action.108 The 
OODA Loop is a speedier version of Hart’s indirect approach, and so the same criticism applies: 
it is predictable because it prescribes action. More important, the speed with which one 
undertakes action does not matter if one has made the wrong decision. Also, while the OODA 
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Loop may be helpful at describing tactical effectiveness under certain circumstances, as it was 
inspired by one-on-one aerial combat, it cannot explain strategic gains because the OODA Loop 
is oriented to short and not strategic timeframes. 
In the same vein, Jeremy Black has described the critical distinction between tactial 
“output” and strategic “outcome.” Black notes the German army has been cited as statistically 
the most efficient army of the twentieth century (i.e. ratio of casualties inflicted versus sustained), 
yet was the same army that lost the two biggest wars of the 20th century.109 Tactical excellence 
does not necessarily win wars and so specifically tactical formulas would not seem helpful in 
determining strategic success. 
When considering these different approaches to understanding war outcomes, three 
broad categorical headings emerge: stuff, people, and ideas. 
There are flaws in each of these. Regarding “stuff” as causing war outcomes, this 
explanation clearly neglects the role of strategic choice, enemy will, and the endless interaction 
between the two sides that often generates yet-unknown opportunities for each side. Not to 
mention that more and better “stuff” has not resulted in desired outcomes for the United States 
in quite some time. “Ideas” also matter, but disembodied from arms and individuals with the 
wits and will to put them to use seems limited. And to proscribe a strategic approach, such as the 
OODA Loop, without tailored specificity to a particular enemy and conflict, likely cannot be 
what generates successful war outcomes. War outcomes generally do not turn out favorably for 
those with one-size-fits-all strategies. 
The least flawed of the three paths to understanding war outcomes is through “people.” 
There is always a human being with responsibility and authority for a particular war effort. This 
individual faces difficult decisions that are not made by anyone else. Of course, those that argue 
“people” are what causes war outcomes generally fall victim to criticism for subjectivity. Even 
the commonly used expression that classifies this type of explanation, or causal factor, the 
“Great Captain,” hints at the problem. If they were truly “Great,” then what is there to criticize? 
The challenge is to find methods of scholarly inquiry that focus on the role of the 
individual in a more objective way. Two recent books provide such a path.                                                         
109 Jeremy Black, “A Century of Conflict: War, 1914-2014,” April 11, 2015, at The New York 
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The first explains how nuanced decisions by tactical leaders can have an impact on 
battles. In order to explain the “relationship between force employment and combat outcomes,” 
Stephen Biddle set out to prove the value of force employment as the chief independent variable 
in explaining battlefield victories.110 His hybrid methodological approach came about because “it 
seemed intuitive that force employment should matter, and subjective assessments have long 
incorporated it” so he went about welding this to more objective measures so his work would be 
“more systematic and theoretically rigorous.”111 Essentially, Biddle took the arguments of 
historians and grafted them onto a falsifiable social science framework. Biddle found 
preponderance and technological superiority were not predictive; instead, how one engaged in 
force employment mattered greatly. 
The result was what Biddle described as the “modern system” of tactical and operational 
force employment.112 Biddle showed the modern system’s way of organizing, equipping, training, 
and using forces often determined battlefield victory. Biddle’s work shows the importance of 
incorporating human agency in studying combat outcomes. Of course, Biddle’s work focused on 
battle and tactical outcomes, while this dissertation’s aim is the study of supreme commanders 
and broader war outcomes. 
The second book is about how the unique attributes of individuals’ can impact war. 
Social scientists Michael Horowitz, Allan Stam, and Cali Ellis, in their book Why Leaders Fight, 
blend formal psychological variables, as observed in biographical data, with strategic decisions 
and outcomes at war, to generate an empirical theory about which international political leaders 
might more quickly resort to the use of force. Horowitz and his team argue powerfully that the 
“inclusion of psychological variables” for the leaders they study, including traits like age, military 
service, and family history, has value alongside more traditional measures like “material 
power.”113 
Leaders matter at war. In particular, supreme commanders matter because they are the 
single individual on one side of the war effort that has the greatest impact on how the military 
effort turns out. Supreme commanders may not be the single cause that determines strategic 
outcomes, yet, they merit scrutiny as one important factor among others in what happens at war. 
Supreme commanders often decide the biggest battlefield questions: how to fight, when to fight, 
who will fight, and, critically, where to fight.                                                         
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The challenge of studying supreme command in a more rigorous, objective way is a 
tough one. Because there are so few cases to pick from, especially with enough available 
scholarly material available to study in any reasonable depth, it is inevitable that such an 
approach will face criticism for being small-n and therefore holding no claim to universal 
applicability. 
However, any charge of selection bias might also be balanced by the advantages of 
detailed context; rich, robust, objective data, readily available in archives for any researcher 
willing to put forth the intellectual effort. 
Every explanation for what causes wartime success comes with attendant limitations. 
None is perfect. But it is sensible to consider the supreme commanders’ value as having a 
distinctly important influence on the outcome of wars. To do so will expand scholarship in a 
meaningful and useful way. 
 
2.3 How Should We Judge Supreme Commanders? 
 
Almost everyone has a favorite general, especially when it comes to great wars and big battles. As 
T. Harry Williams has written, rating “generals is a favorite American pastime” in which most 
people have “at least one candidate for greatness.” Yet, Williams laments,  
 
in all the din hardly ever do the contestants attempt to set up any standards by which to 
measure generalship. If we are ever to understand anything about the subject of military 
leadership in the Civil War, or in any war, we need to ask ourselves some questions about the 
qualities that go to make up generalship. Just how do you recognize a great general? Exactly 
what is it that makes a general great?114 
 
Williams writes, while there can be no “objective finality” and no “absolute standards,”  
 
Still we should ask the questions, and we should attempt to identify some of the qualities 
that mark the great general. It is probable that most people make the business of evaluation 
too simple or too complex. They make it too simple if they judge only by results: it is 
possible for a general to win a battle or campaign without himself being directly responsible 
for the outcome. They make it too complex if they decide on the basis of education, 
experience, and technical skill: these are important but never determining factors.115                                                          
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This attempt to identify great generals is certainly why there have been so many efforts to better 
understand generalship.116 
The historian Barbara Tuchman gave a lecture to the students at the U.S. Army War 
College in 1972. As she saw it, generalship could be broken into two categories: “personal 
leadership” and “professional capacity.” This second category “encompasses the ability to decide 
the objective, to plan, to organize, to direct, to draw on experience and to deploy all the 
knowledge and techniques in which the professional has been trained.”117 To Tuchman, there 
was a broad component, common to all leaders, as well as a specific component, limited only to 
generals. 
British military officers, often in short books written in the interwar period, seem to have 
been particularly interested in the study of supreme command and senior military figures. Major 
General J.F.C. Fuller’s Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure contended that youthfulness in a 
commander is desirable due to age’s impact on mental rigidity (i.e. he found younger supreme 
commanders, in their 40s, were best), and a few years later, Field Marshal Archibald Wavell’s 
Generals and Generalship reads like pushback in the other direction.118 
More recently, “Strategic Leadership of the Army Profession,” by Leonard Wong and 
Don M. Snider, described what the authors considered to be the six “Army strategic leader 
[meta]competencies”: identity, mental agility, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, world-
class warrior, and professional astuteness.”119 While these six characteristics state what a strategic 
leader should be, it makes no mention of what a strategic leader should specifically know and 
actually do while in command. And absent the word “warrior,” this list could apply to any 
successful human endeavor. It is too general to be of use. 
One might also find more of the same in the list from Mark Moyar’s A Question of 
Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq. Moyar’s book, about generalship and strategic 
leadership in counterinsurgency, includes a list of the “Ten Attributes of Effective 
Counterinsurgency Leaders.”120                                                         
116 For this chapter’s purposes, because the literature on supreme command is so thin, the 
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1. Initiative 
2. Flexibility 
3. Creativity 
4. Judgment  
5. Empathy 
6. Charisma 
7. Sociability 
8. Dedication 
9. Integrity 
10. Organization 
 
Milan Vego of the U.S. Naval War College, does the same for a similar topic on senior 
military leadership: 
 
Personality traits of [senior military commanders] include strong character, personal integrity, 
high intellect, sound judgment, courage, boldness, creativity, presence of mind, healthy 
ambition, humility, mental flexibility, foresight, mental agility, decisiveness, understanding of 
human nature, and the ability to communicate ideas clearly and succinctly.121 
 
Military literature on the senior-most officers and supreme commanders often involves 
lists of characteristics. The challenge becomes figuring out what differentiates these lists from 
successful traits in any other human endeavor, like business or child rearing. All these traits, to 
some extent, are subjective measures: How would one ever know if they are creative or flexible 
enough? Is the mere presence of some characteristic enough to satisfy the criteria and notch a 
victory? 
One other issue is that none of the above address or account for the presence of a willed 
opponent, in some ways the only marker that matters in a competition like war. And if one does 
not distinguish the particularities of war from other human activity, the result is 
mischaracterization. Consider retired general Stanley McChrystal’s suggestion on turning 
business executives into senior general officers: 
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I’ve dealt with a lot of chief executive officers who could walk in and be general officers in 
the military tomorrow. All we’d have to do is get them a uniform and a rank. They’d step in 
and it would be seamless—because they solve problems and they lead people.122 
 
McChrystal seems to believe generalship, and maybe even supreme command, is 
essentially a sort of universal and undifferentiated leadership. Interestingly, Milan Vego would 
likely disagree, having separately written that “the conduct of war is largely an art and not a 
science akin to a business activity.”123 It is safe to say Vego would not see a business-executive-
turned-general as likely to succeed. 
Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., has written an impressive account of generalship in which he 
conducted over one hundred “one-on-one personal interviews with four-star generals.” His 
objective was to “determine why these generals thought they were successful leaders” and he 
“concluded that there is a pattern to successful leadership.” Puryear found one theory of military 
strategic leadership to be the  
 
quality or trait approach, listing professional knowledge, decision, equity, humanity, loyalty, 
courage, consideration, integrity, selflessness, and character. But listing these qualities is not 
enough to describe a successful approach to leadership. These qualities need to be given life 
and meaning by describing them around the careers of men who have proven themselves as 
successful leaders in the greatest test of all, war.124 
 
So Puryear would add a sense of context to these lists of characteristics. Specifically, this 
considers how well these individuals functioned in action; he found one quality in particular 
stood out, described to him in an interview with General (and later president) Dwight D. 
Eisenhower: “making decisions is of the essence in leadership”125 
This echoes what stands out in Puryear’s research: judgment and decisions. Importantly, 
judgment is a relatively objective measure because after some event has concluded, one can 
backtrack and determine the relative judgment and how outcomes flowed from decisions. 
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Eliot Cohen has conducted similar research, yet with a deeper and narrower set of 
subjects. His book, Supreme Command, focused on politicians, presidents, and prime ministers at 
war, a separate but related field of inquiry because wartime political leaders must be so well 
connected to their military supreme commanders. These two roles operate in parallel and so 
Cohen’s material can be useful for this dissertation. 
Cohen found that “extreme circumstances” give us a window to better see the inner 
workings of supreme command.126 In short, tough times are as revealing to scholarship as they 
are dangerous to societies. 
Cohen highlighted the importance and value of communication. As “nations are led and 
ruled by words,” all Cohen’s case study subjects were experts at deploying “speech and writing 
beyond all but the most gifted orators and authors.” He found they also had physical courage, as 
well as the moral courage to “see things as they are, and not as one would like them to be,” and 
the ability to “persevere despite disappointments.”127 
In a passing reference on generalship, he found “no uniform standard for the selection 
of generals,” because “leadership is contextual” and so “much of the art of civilian leadership in 
wartime resides in the ability to judge context, and not only context but character.”128 This 
indicates the importance with which Cohen views human interactions and that those with 
exceptional interpersonal skills can often excel. 
Another strength, empathy, Cohen points to in a variety of ways. He mentions the ability 
to “intuit when others are even more wrong than oneself.” This in addition to “integrating” 
tactical and operational details into a war’s “grand themes.” Cohen also points to the importance 
of emotional equanimity, a “moderation,” and his study subjects “ability to discipline” their 
“passions” and their “understanding of when and how to counteract a trend.” Additionally, they 
had a “ruthlessness,” not just with enemies, but a “hardness” to contend with “wavering allies or 
internal opposition.”129 
Eliot Cohen’s work on political leadership in war may not translate equivalently to the 
military supreme commander’s challenge. However, the two activities are closely related, and at 
the top these two figures, one political and the other military, are often so closely joined that 
their personal characteristics may, at times, be almost indistinguishable from one another. 
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Alfred Thayer Mahan focused on another interpersonal trait. He once wrote that famed 
British Admiral Horatio Nelson owed his greatness as a military commander to “Faith,” but then 
walked this phrase back owing to the suggestion of a theological meaning, and instead opted to 
use “confidence” or “conviction” This he called the “bed-rock” on which military action is 
performed, the “solid substance of things which the man cannot see with his eyes, nor know by 
ordinary knowledge.” Mahan contrasted the average person’s “hesitations” with the “value and 
power of a faculty which reaches such certainty, reaches conviction, by processes which, indeed, 
are not irrational, but yet in their influence transcend reason.”130 
Mahan stands out for writing so firmly on behalf of a characteristic that might translate 
to something we know today as grit or focused determination. He counseled preparedness at 
war, the “sagacious appreciation of well-known facts,” yet was even more focused on a leader’s 
grittiness. While it was useful to have an “intellectual grasp and insight” in combat, Mahan 
thought that what matters at least as much is to “trust the inner light—to have faith—a power 
which dominates hesitation, and sustains action, in the most tremendous emergencies.”131 
 
2.4 Military Genius  
 
The phrase “military genius” is a definitional trap, a wicked problem in that there is no single, 
common definition of the term, and yet most can see its importance as one way of describing 
ideal supreme commanders. Even if disputed, few would dispute military genius’s importance as 
a concept. 
It can even be seductively dangerous. As an eighteen-year-old, Paraguayan leader 
Francisco Solano Lopez thought of himself as a military genius; the result was that his war 
against the much larger Triple Alliance of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay “decimated Paraguay, 
its infrastructure, and its people,” and “resulted in the death of almost 60 percent of its 
population and nine out of every ten males.”132 
It might also be one way to better understand supreme command. If the supreme 
commander’s core objective is to achieve victory for the state, whatever that might entail, then 
military genius is the superlative, ideal-type, highest achieving version of supreme command.                                                         
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This section traces the origins of genius, to Napoleon’s exceptional performance and 
Clausewitz’s subsequent description, to the modern military conception and how the term is 
used today. 
Harold Bloom has written about the distinction between “genius” and “talent.” Bloom 
tells readers, “A ‘talent’ classically was a weight or sum of money, and as such…necessarily 
limited. But ‘genius’, even in its linguistic origins, has no limits.”133 The term was first used by the 
Roman author Plautus, more than two millennia ago.134 Darrin McMahon reminds us,  
 
The word itself is Latin, and for the ancient Romans who first used it and then bequeathed 
the term to us, a genius was a guardian spirit, a god of one’s birth who accompanied 
individuals throughout life, connecting them to the divine.135 
 
Socrates and his ancient Greek contemporaries “believed in spirits hidden and 
unseen.”136 They called these daimones, which today would be considered an akin to “demons,” an 
expression that had not yet taken on a negative connotation. Bloom described them as an 
“attendant spirit for each person or place,” that “strongly influence[d]” each person for good or 
bad at different moments.137 Everyone had access to these inspirational forces, which were 
considered separate from the person, yet serving the individual by providing the gift of new 
ideas. 
Two hundred years on, Napoleon is still known as the “prime illustration of the type” 
and “provides a working definition of the ‘Romantic genius.’”138 Napoleon himself defined 
military genius as “the man who can do the average thing when all those around him are going 
crazy.”139 Darrin McMahon describes Napoleon as a new occurrence, because 
 
Napoleon overthrew centuries-old customs, traditions, and laws. A destroyer, he abolished 
kingdoms. A creator, he made them anew. Here was the basis of a powerful Romantic myth 
that was at once heir to the original genius of the eighteenth century and a genuine original. 
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Combining creativity with action, originality with deeds, the genius could be a poet of the 
political, remaking the world in his image. The genius could be a legislator of the world.140 
 
For these reasons, in a recent U.S. Naval War College lecture, Professor Kevin McCranie 
remarked that Carl von Clausewitz “patterned many of his ideas of genius on Napoleon.”141 
Modern popular historians continue to regularly comment on Napoleon’s success. Max 
Hastings recently cited Napoleon’s record of command as that of a “military genius,” and 
Andrew Roberts delves into statistics: “He got defeated [seven times]…but he won 46 of his 60 
battles” which Roberts called “an astounding achievement for anyone.”142 
It was not just the numbers that earned him acclaim, there was another factor at work. 
The concept of genius is often dependent on other people recognizing an individual as a 
“genius.” This is the “social dimension of the construction of genius.” Moreover, it seems on 
some level there is a human desire to believe in greatness, that “endowing others with genius” 
often “fills a need” in the masses.143 
Sometimes individuals and governments exploit this public neediness. Napoleon, for 
example, in 1797 while in command of the French army in Italy, used propaganda to present 
himself as a man who “flies like lightening and strikes like thunder,” and who was “everywhere 
and who sees everything.”144 
Basil H. Liddell Hart has written about this difference which he assessed as “determining 
the nature of genius, as distinct from fame.” Hart found “the imagination of mankind” is often 
“more impressed by the flash of a meteor than by the more permanent radiance of a star that 
stays remotely in the sky. The career that ends with a sudden descent to earth…has a more 
human appeal.” Moreover, “to ensure such fame, it is more important for a general to win 
victories than to gain the victory. As with an artist, his ultimate standing depends not on whether 
success crowned his career, but on the masterpieces he produced in practising his art.” This                                                         
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battle-winning flash and flair is why Hart finds in the American Civil War the generals Robert E. 
Lee, William T. Sherman, and Nathan Bedford Forrest are so often considered military 
geniuses.145 
Hart’s argument, unfortunately, did not finish with much to use in the way of study. He 
did not go beyond identification of the difference between genius and fame. While limited, 
Hart’s essay is still helpful in thinking through some of the underlying reasons why we see such a 
variance in who is considered a military genius. 
Carl von Clausewitz had much to write on the subject of military genius in Chapter 
Three, Book One of On War.146 There are several intellectual guideposts here that scholars might 
use to better understand exemplary military leadership, particularly because Clausewitz believed 
effective performance “especially at the level of strategic decision—is the product of genius.”147 
It is worth mention, again, that “military genius” here functions as a stand-in term for superlative 
supreme command. 
Clausewitz began this chapter by laying out the terms of his discussion: in “any complex 
activity,” if one is “outstanding” and makes “exceptional achievements,” they might be called a 
“genius.” He instructed, “we cannot restrict our discussion to genius proper, as a superlative 
degree of talent.” Instead we must “survey all those gifts of mind and temperament that in 
combination bear on military activity.” Clausewitz viewed military genius as an exception that 
“rarely occur[s] in an army.”148 
Clausewitz sketched out six characteristics that describe the ideal military genius. He 
assessed a military genius would be civilized, possess superior judgment, determination, sense for 
terrain and geography, would be the military supreme commander, and hold in mind a constant 
dual vision which simultaneously considers the interaction of policy and military forces. This 
section considers each of these characteristics in order. 
First, Clausewitz stated military genius would come from a “civilized society.” He wrote, 
these societies 
 
possess a warlike character to greater or lesser degree, and the more they develop it, the 
greater will be the number of men with military spirit in their armies. Possession of military 
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genius coincides with the higher degrees of civilization: the most highly developed societies 
produce the most brilliant soldiers, as the Romans and the French have shown us.149   
 
This dissertation focuses analysis on American supreme commanders, as historical and 
modern American society provides an ample supply of cases and, therefore, likely future utility. 
Clausewitz also crucially provides a description of the military genius’s judgment: 
 
If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two 
qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of 
the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.  
The first of these qualities is described by the French term, coup d’oeil; the second is 
determination.150 
 
In one lengthy sentence, Clausewitz lays out two tenets of military genius. The first is “a sensitive 
and discriminating judgment” that “can scent out the truth.” In the same chapter, in nearby 
passages, Clausewitz expounded on this characteristic as the possession of “superior insights,” 
“superior intellect,” and the “power of judgment,” which brings war to a “successful close.”151 
Cumulatively, this can be summed up as superior judgment (relative to an opponent). 
A determined will supports this superior judgment. Such “determination proceeds from a 
special type of mind, from a strong rather than a brilliant one.” Clausewitz augments this by 
remarking on balance, that a “strong spirit is not one that is simply capable of strong emotions, 
but one which retains its balance even in the presence of the strongest emotions, so that, despite 
the storms in the breast, insight and conviction are allowed the most subtle play, like the needle 
of the compass on a storm-tossed ship.” Raw mental horsepower is not enough, military genius 
is as much about conviction and balance than pure cognitive ability. This particular description 
provides a methodological challenge because it is subjective; Clausewitz acknowledges as much: 
“No matter how superbly a great commander operates, there is always a subjective element in his 
work.”152 
The next feature of military genius is the “relationship between warfare and terrain” 
which Clausewitz calls a “permanent factor.” Clausewitz wrote that mastery comes from “a sense of 
                                                        
149 Clausewitz, On War, 101. 
150 Clausewitz, On War, 102. 
151 Clausewitz, On War, 101, 111-112. 
152 Clausewitz, On War, 101. Tashjean, “Talking Point: The Ideal General of General von 
Clausewitz,” 76. Clausewitz, On War, 154. 
ML Cavanaugh 
On Supreme Command 
 
 37 
locality,” or, the “faculty of quickly and accurately grasping the topography of any area which enables a 
man to find his way about any time.” This gift comes from “imagination,” similar to a “poet or 
painter.” Years on, famous British wartime prime minister Winston Churchill would write, 
“painting a picture is like fighting a battle,” and that, “there must be that all-embracing view 
which presents the beginning and the end, the whole and each part, as one instantaneous 
impression retentively and untiringly held in the mind.”153 This is the ability to take distant, 
disparate parts and pieces and draw them all together in mind to form a comprehensive whole. 
On an even larger stage, a supreme commander “must aim at acquiring an overall 
knowledge of the configuration of a province, of an entire country. His mind must hold a vivid 
picture of the road-network, the river-lines and the mountain ranges, without ever losing a sense 
of his immediate surroundings.”154 Mental-spatial imagination, related to terrain, was clearly 
important to Clausewitz’s sense of military genius. 
Clausewitz also wrote there is a “major gulf” between “a general who leads the army as a 
whole” and the “senior generals immediately subordinate to him.”155 Due to this fact,  
 
Appropriate talent is needed at all levels if distinguished service is to be performed. But 
history and prosperity reserve the name of “genius” for those who have excelled in the 
highest positions—as [supreme commanders]—since here the demands for intellectual and 
moral powers are vastly greater.156  
 
Thus, Clausewitz believed military genius is for the supreme commander alone, while 
military talent describes aptitude and skill at the lower military ranks, because the challenges are 
so different. 
 
The higher the rank, the more the problems multiply, reaching their highest point in the 
supreme Commander. At this level, almost all solutions must be left to the imaginative 
intellect…when one comes to the effect of the engagement, where material successes turn 
into motives for further action, the intellect alone is decisive.157 
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Simultaneous consideration of the policy realm and military reality is the next 
characteristic. This duality functions simultaneously on dual tracks of policy awareness and the 
direction of strategic means. In Clausewitz’s conception, the military genius must be able to do 
both at the same time, possessing the “ability to see things simply, to identify the whole business 
of war…Only if the mind works in this comprehensive fashion can it achieve the freedom it 
needs to dominate events and not be dominated by them.158 
To reiterate, these are the six characteristics Clausewitz used to describe military genius: 
the person would come from a civilized society, wield superior judgment, would be calmed by a 
steely determination, have an intuition for terrain, would be the supreme commander of a 
polity’s military effort, and could keep a persistent focus on the twin considerations of policy 
desires and military realities. 
In his writing, Clausewitz was inconclusive on whether or not these six were either the 
result of education and experience, or some gift handed down from the heavens. 
At least one retired modern military general has advanced his own theory on military 
genius, Bob Scales, the former commandant of the U.S. Army War College. He finds four types 
of “strategic genius” in general officers. Scales considered George Patton and Stanley 
McChrystal “combat genius[es],” or, those “who fight beyond the plan” and “stay well ahead of 
the enemy in imaginative application of combat power.” Next, “political genius[es]” include 
Generals Colin Powell and David Petraeus, those who “know how to wield and meld the 
elements of military power with allies, coalition partners, and politicians.” Third, “institutional 
genius[es]” are those like Generals Peter Chiarelli and Creighton Abrams, leaders “brilliant” in 
their “ability to manage a very large institution and represent its equities in tune with the needs 
of the nation.” And lastly, “anticipatory genius[es]” are those gifted with “the unique ability to 
think in time, to imagine conceptually where the nature and character of war is headed.” This 
ability, according to Scales, “seems to be inherited rather than learned” and “is the most rare and 
precious of all four attributes and the one least likely to be developed through any predictable 
pattern.”159 
Scales’ list is helpful, but these stove-piped categories are open to charges that these are 
merely different contexts in which commanders might display genius. Sometimes, generals and 
supreme commanders fit different descriptions at different times. For example, Washington had 
to possess some institutional ability to develop the Continental Army as it was being fought in an                                                         
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active war. He also required the ability to anticipate his enemy to survive. Washington exchanged 
orders and messages with a great variety of political leaders while on campaign, including the 
leadership of the Continental Congress, powerful state governors, and Native American tribes 
that if handled poorly, would have had a disastrous impact on his war effort. Lastly, he was close 
to the fighting at times and certainly demonstrated his combat abilities at several pivotal 
moments. The development of rigid criteria may be more suited to a modern context, but for a 
project that seeks to better understand successful supreme command, such an artificial division 
of the functions of a supreme commander would be a distraction from the other, more 
important criteria (i.e. how well they did against their opponent and whether they secured their 
war aims).  
 
2.5 The Characteristics of Exemplary Supreme Commanders 
 
It seems appropriate to return to historian T. Harry Williams’s key question, “Just how do you 
recognize a great general?”160 It is important to develop some characteristics and apply some 
criteria to use in better understanding supreme commanders. 
In suit, historian Thomas Goss has suggested the best approach is to consider a supreme 
commander’s “overall impact on the war effort—a balanced assessment of the consequences of 
his service, command decisions, and leadership on the achievement of the nation’s war aims.”161 
In this rendering, supreme command is best seen as a broad strategic nudge, a contribution to a 
larger enterprise, as opposed to narrower tactical measures that focus on battlefield wins. 
Another, much older writer, who addressed the same is August Ruehle von Lilienstern, 
who wrote in 1818: 
 
Every war and every [military] operation is based on Wherefore? And Why?, a purpose and 
a cause, which will give a specific character and a definite direction to each of its actions. 
The individual operations have military purposes, the war as a whole always has a 
final political purpose, i.e. the war is engaged and carried out in order to achieve the political 
purposes which the State power has decided upon, according to its internal and external 
national conditions. The operations only serve to make possible the final purpose of the 
war. Whatever is achieved in these individual operations is not the ultimate purpose in itself, 
but only a means or a step towards the final purpose, a condition for the possibility of                                                         
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attaining this final purpose. If the success of these operations does not leaded to the 
[realization] of the political purposes, if indeed they clash with them, or do not further their 
attainment, they are pointless, however brilliant and exemplary their achievement may 
[otherwise] have been.162 
 
This description points to the fact that the duel against an opponent is an important part 
of war, but it is not necessarily the same as the pursuit of the war’s purpose. For example, a war’s 
purpose may be to achieve a new, more defensible border with another country, which is not the 
same as the fighting the adversary’s army. As such, though performance in the duel matters, it is 
better to judge actions at war in relation to both the supreme commander’s contest against an 
enemy and the supreme commander’s ability to bring about the desired result. 
The issue with Gross and von Lillienstern is that they provide measures so big that we 
may be unable to distinguish them from other factors. So the goal is to find measures that look 
more directly at the process that would logically lead to these outcomes. 
After considering all this chapter’s previous ideas, there are several characteristics this 
dissertation will focus on to judge the supreme commanders in the case study. To harness these 
ideas, this dissertation will look to the U.S. Army’s manual on leadership, which business author 
Peter Drucker reportedly once called the “single best document written” on the subject.163 
Today, the U.S. Army’s manual on leadership includes three key attributes of a leader: 
character, presence, and intellect. (It also includes three outputs, or competencies: a leader leads 
others, develops people, and achieves objectives.)164 
First, the intellect is the “mental tendencies or resources,” which go to making a leader 
“mentally agile” and “good at judgment.”165 Eisenhower, Clausewitz, and Puryear confirm the 
importance of judgment, which might be represented by one’s “mind.” 
Second, character comprises the “factors internal and central to a leader,” including 
“demonstration of values” such as: loyalty, duty, respect, honor, empathy for others, and 
discipline.166 Researcher Daniel Goleman has found that all effective leaders “have a high degree 
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of what has come to be known as emotional intelligence.”167 This includes “social skills” for 
navigating interpersonal relationships, which he says can be strengthened over time through 
“practice” and “feedback from colleagues or coaches.”168 These skills can be summed up under 
the umbrella term “empathy” (or, put another way, “heart”). Mahan wrote that this individual 
tact and diplomacy was important in a senior officer.169 
Third, presence is a “leader’s appearance” and “demeanor,” including the demonstration 
of “military and professional bearing, fitness, confidence, and resilience.”170 Modern psychologist 
and researcher Angela Duckworth has written extensively on this as “grit.” She has found 
 
no matter the domain, the highly successful had a kind of ferocious determination that 
played out in two ways. First, these exemplars were usually resilient and hardworking. 
Second, they knew in a very, very deep way what it was they wanted. They not only had 
determination, they had direction…It was this combination of passion and perseverance 
that made high achievers special. In a word, they had grit.171 
 
Her test, graded on a “Grit Scale,” has been an “astoundingly reliable predictor” of those that 
complete West Point basic training, U.S. Army Special Forces qualification, and those “who were 
more likely to get further in their formal schooling.” 172 Thus, “grit,” a directional determination, 
as opposed to a more general-purpose determination, is a useful shorthand for several of the 
characteristics under “presence.” 
Judgment, empathy, and grit: these are the three key characteristics, representative of a 
wider set of important factors, of exemplary generalship and supreme command. These are what 
will be used to evaluate the supreme commander in action, by blending formal characteristics 
observed from biographical data with observed judgments and behaviors evidenced 
contemporaneously.173
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3. George Washington 
 
3.1 Strategic Context in 1776 
 
How did General George Washington defeat the materially superior British army, led by General 
William Howe, in the early years of the American War of Independence? Particularly when the 
British held nearly every military, monetary, and political advantage possible?174 Even more 
impressive, Washington’s colonists had to start completely from scratch, with nothing, to take 
on perhaps the best trained military force in the world at the time.175 
1776 was a particularly difficult year for the American side, punctuated by Thomas 
Paine’s immortal opening line from his pamphlet, The Crisis: “These are the times that try men’s 
souls.”176 Paine penned these in late November 1776, while with the Continental Army, as they 
faced much more experienced British soldiers, whose average age was twenty-eight, with seven 
years under his ammunition belt; an American troop was roughly twenty and had less than six 
months of soldiering.177 The sheer size of the British invasion force was overwhelming: 32,000 
soldiers, 10,000 sailors, and 400 ships—larger than the biggest city in America at the time.178 
That same month, Washington’s units reported a total of just over 16,000 effectives in the 
region.179 
How did Washington survive 1776 to ultimately succeed in the war? Considering such a 
material imbalance, this case demonstrates that while traditional head-to-head material strength 
matters, it is not a sufficient condition for success. Having more guns is useful and occasionally 
overwhelming, yet what matters more is if one side has enough guns to deal with the enemy and 
still obtain their policy aim. This case showcases this material sufficiency, as Washington 
commanded far fewer resources than Howe. 
The British supreme commander in the American War of Independence in 1776 was 
General William Howe. A career military officer, he and his principal subordinates (Generals                                                         174 Jeremy Black, “How Washington Won,” October 3, 2015, at The New York Historical Society, 
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Henry Clinton and John Burgoyne) were considered three of the finest officers in the British 
army, selected from among 119 candidates. To put a finer point on it, General Howe was 
selected for command over 110 senior officers, in part owing to his service in North America 
during the French and Indian War (also known as the Seven Years War). At the time, General 
Burgoyne wrote that the American war command required “a genius of the first class,” fitting, 
because some contemporaries described General Howe as a “military genius.”180 
The British king also dispatched Howe’s brother, Admiral Richard Howe, to command 
the naval part of this joint command. With such a close personal relationship, this meant the 
operations between the army and navy would be much more seamless and promised a great 
advantage in strategic mobility and amphibious assaults along the great eastern seaboard.181 Even 
General George Washington respected Howe as an opponent, and wrote in a letter to a friend 
on December 26, 1775: “[Howe is the] most formidable enemy America has.”182 
General George Washington took command of the Americans on June 16, 1775, at the 
age of 43, having fought with the British as a lieutenant colonel in the French and Indian War 
and with years of experience in managing a large plantation in Virginia.183 He had been 
considered by many a top-notch soldier in his home state of Virginia during this earlier conflict, 
while others considered Washington’s earlier performance poor and deemed him 
inexperienced.184 
The American war effort presented a difficult task, to create an entire military while 
fighting a superior adversary.185 For this reason, Washington had to function at all levels of war, 
even more so than perhaps any other general in American history (including the other supreme 
commanders in this study).186 While he was certainly imperfect, he did possess a broad vision, 
understood the wider, strategic ramifications of the conflict, and worked exceedingly hard to 
maintain alliances while at war. Washington scholar Edward Lengel has written that “without 
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George Washington there could have been no victory in the Revolutionary War, no United 
States.”187 As a supreme commander, Washington could hardly have faced a more difficult task. 
The war’s geography was a challenge for both sides.  
 
Roads, the few there were, were mere trails snaking torturously through the forests. Rivers 
were not bridged…all the large towns were seaports… perhaps the single most significant 
geographical factor in George III’s rebellious New World provinces was the sparseness of 
population.188  
 
While Philadelphia was the British empire’s second largest city to London itself, “Only three 
others (Boston, New York, Charleston) had populations of over 10,000.” The total American 
population was 2.5 million people, spread out over an 1100-mile range.189 Waging war across 
such a large area, without adequate road networks, was a significant challenge for both sides, and 
ultimately provided a distinct advantage in strategic mobility to British seapower. 
On October 26, 1775, following initial battles at Lexington and Bunker Hill, British King 
George III outlined his intentions at Parliament for bringing his American colonial subjects back 
into line: 
 
The rebellious war…is manifestly carried on for the purpose of establishing an independent 
empire. I need not dwell upon the fatal effects of the success of such a plan. The object is 
too important, the spirit of the British nation too high, the resources with which God hath 
blessed her too numerous, to give up so many colonies which she has planted with great 
industry, nursed with great tenderness, encouraged with many commercial advantages, and 
protected and defended at much expense of blood and treasure.190 
 
King George III believed it wise “to put a speedy end” to the conflict by increasing his 
military forces in the colonies, and, “When the unhappy and deluded multitude, against whom 
this force will be directed, shall become sensible of their error, I shall be ready to receive the 
misled with tenderness and mercy.” Thus he offered a promise to authorize “certain persons” to 
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grant pardons “upon the spot” in America.191 His minister in charge of the war effort in 
America, Lord George Germain, concurred that a “decisive blow” was necessary.192 
Britain aimed for a negotiated accommodation, a settlement, and would achieve it by 
applying pressure and coercive measures to get the colonists to return to their previous political 
relationship with the government in London.193 This pacification through pressure strategy 
posed a tricky calculation: how to calibrate the pressure correctly? 
The British considered several strategies. First there was a blockade, but Admiral Richard 
Howe had advised against it because it would be beyond the scope of even the world’s mightiest 
navy. Another was a deliberate scheme of terror, which had been used in previous pacification 
efforts in Scotland and Ireland, but this went against General Howe’s sense of honor, and he 
thought it would ultimately not succeed. Third was an approach second-in-command General 
Henry Clinton advised, which was a continuous pursuit of the rebels, to seek the Continental 
Army’s destruction. General Howe disapproved, because he thought to do so would offer only a 
pyrrhic victory, tactical success at the cost of complete strategic consumption. Another was an 
ink-spot strategy, or the selection and seizure of key terrain, followed by a gradual expansion 
until it meant the end of the rebellion. This was a problematic option because it would take such 
a long time.194 
The most promising option was to take hold of the key river lines, in particular the 
Hudson River, because to do so would deny mobility to the rebels and it would cut off the most 
rebellious colonies from the rest of the country, which might create an opportunity to defeat the 
rebels piece by piece.195 This option seemed to offer the best choice, particularly when paired 
with General Howe’s belief that to support British loyalists in America would promise great 
dividends. Consider an assessment Howe wrote to his constituents: “I may safely assert that the 
insurgents are very few, in comparison of the whole people.”196 
On April 23, 1776, General Howe wrote to Lord Germain to lay out his strategic vision 
for the campaign: “the army at the opening of the campaign, being in force, would probably by 
rapid movements bring the rebels to an action upon equal terms, before they could cover 
themselves by works of any significance.” Howe desired a rapid, overwhelming strike in order to                                                         
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gain what he ultimately wanted: “a decisive action…as the most effectual means to terminate this 
expensive war.”197 His greatest worry was that the Americans would be able to completely avoid 
battle and deny the British the opportunity to end the war quickly.198 
Howe’s campaign ideas nested well with Lord Germain’s vision for the war effort: “As 
there is not common sense in protracting a war of this sort, I should be for exerting the utmost 
force of this Kingdom to finish the rebellion in one campaign.”199 
Just two days later, on April 25, 1776, Howe wrote again to Germain explaining more on 
his views of the coming campaign.   
 
New York being the greater object of the two [compared to Rhode Island], and the 
possession of it more extensive in its consequences…[therefore, New York] will be my 
principal aim when enabled to proceed thither by a sufficient supply of provisions, since 
both services cannot be undertaken with the present force, and it is become highly 
necessary that the first exertion of the army should be directed to the most important 
purposes, to check the spirit which the evacuation of Boston will naturally raise among the 
rebels.200 
 
New York was Howe’s “principal aim” in the 1776 campaign. He reasoned that speed and 
maneuver were of the essence, and predicted that his opponent would attempt to protract the 
war by using extensive defensive positions. 
In January 1776, Howe assessed he needed 20,000 soldiers.201 His request was granted 
and nearly doubled: Howe received 32,000 soldiers and 10,000 sailors in the summer of 1776.202 
Several months later, on June 8, 1776, in writing to Lord Germain, Howe showed deep gratitude 
for these resources: “I cannot take my leave from your Lordship without expressing my utter 
amazement at the decisive and masterly strokes for carrying such extensive plans into immediate 
execution.”203 Howe himself judged he had received sufficient resources to meet his needs for 
the 1776 campaign. 
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By comparison, the American policy goal seemed less difficult, as mere survival is always 
somewhat easier than for another country, Britain in this case, to entirely conquer another 
society.204 The American bar was somewhat lower than the British objective. 
To achieve this, the Americans considered a number of different strategies. The first was 
a privateer war, to use economic strikes to deter the British, but this was unlikely to succeed on a 
scale necessary to influence London. The second, favored by Major General Horatio Gates, was 
a deep Fabian retreat, to tire and wear out British ground forces. Theoretically appealing, this 
option was politically unworkable because it left civilian colonists completely unprotected. Yet 
another was Major General Charles Lee’s irregular fighting units, independently operating in 
many units, each with small numbers. For a time, General George Washington wrote favorably 
about a “war of posts,” which was an effort to use favorable, static defensive terrain to deny the 
British a fair fight on common ground. A variant of this was the offensive-defensive, which 
meant targeted tactical offensives paired with a strategic orientation toward defense. Last was the 
option to defend everywhere, every bit of the American colonies, which was as impossible 
militarily as it was favored politically. In the end, Washington employed parts of all these 
strategies at different times in different situations; he tailored his strategies and choices to fit the 
constantly evolving scenarios.205   
3.2 The 1776 Campaign’s Strategic Effect 
 
The 1776 fighting season that ran from the summer of 1776 and into early 1777 was the terminal 
campaign of the American War of Independence. Simply put, the British never had another 
opportunity to militarily or strategically defeat the Americans. This was the moment of 
maximum danger for the American side. The British would never again have as many resources 
in terms of men or materiel, and they never would have the same opportunity to defeat General 
George Washington’s Continental Army. 
1776 proved the Continental Army was a viable military force and could deny British 
military success and terrain. Insurgencies often succeed by denying success to others. 
Washington’s survival and battle victories at Trenton and Princeton (in New Jersey) in this 
terminal campaign enabled several other positive strategic effects which had a sudden and 
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strategic impact on the war.206 From this point on, the war changed. The British could no longer 
try to convince the colonists to come back; they now had to conquer the colonies.207 
There were several consequential strategic effects that came as the result of this 
campaign that registered an impact on the British ability and willingness to keep up the fight. 
First, the victories had an immense psychological impact: the Loyalist Nicholas Cresswell wrote 
that before Washington’s two victories in New Jersey, the colonists “had given up the cause for 
lost,” but then “their late successes have turned the scale and now they are all liberty mad 
again.”208 
Second, Washington was able to use his enhanced credibility to appeal to state 
governors, who were the key gatekeepers in getting soldiers, to request more troops for the 
Continental Army.209 
Washington’s victories also enabled him to continue momentum with the soldiers who 
remained and those motivated by victories to take part in guerilla operations. Washington had 
considered such “Partizan” operations as early as a Council of War on July 12, 1776.210 And he 
had been acquainted with the French Capitaine de Jeney’s book, The Partisan: or, the Art of Making 
War in Detachment.211 Following his victories at Trenton and Princeton, Washington waged war in 
small detachment against the British and wrote to Major General Philip Schuyler on February 23, 
1777, about these operations and their place in the wider war effort: “I do not apprehend 
however that this Petit Guerre will be continued long. I think Matters will be transacted upon a 
larger Scale.”212 
In short, Washington counseled that guerilla operations were useful, but would have 
limits. Yet, he did use them to success and by winter’s end, the cumulative impact was that Howe 
had lost half his forces in the area.213 One illustrative example: for the British commander at 
Trenton to get a letter to his comrades in Princeton, he had to send fifty guards to protect the 
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message. With such a hostile environment, the British and their German allies were at an 
information and intelligence disadvantage. Then, later that summer, the British effort finally 
ended in New Jersey: on June 25, 1777, General Howe withdrew all his troops from New Jersey, 
which ceded the colony to the rebels.214 
Washington then generated a proclamation which pardoned all those colonists that had 
declared allegiance to the British, which caused New Jersey to renounce the British and support 
the rebellion.215 In essence, by surviving and winning battles in New Jersey, Washington ended 
the widespread belief in British dominant strength and restored the rebellion’s credibility with 
the colonists.216 
The strategic effect from Washington’s 1776 victories had immense negative impact on 
British planning for the following year. Howe’s response to the losses in New Jersey doomed the 
British northern force, under General John Burgoyne, in 1777.217 
Before Trenton and Princeton, on November 30, 1776, Howe outlined to Lord George 
Germain a plan that envisioned a significant force marching north from New York-New Jersey 
to link up with another British force moving south from Canada led by General John Burgoyne. 
This original plan included a sequel which was to be a winter campaign in the south (Georgia 
and South Carolina). Howe’s plan reached London on December 30, 1776 and was designed to 
cooperate with Burgoyne’s force.218 Howe’s plan of record with the British government was in 
place, as of late December 1776, which was, again, before the battles of Trenton and Princeton. 
However, after the defeats at Trenton and Princeton, Howe suddenly changed his plan 
completely, and now aimed to capture Philadelphia, the seat of the Continental Congress.219  
Howe informed Germain that he did not think his previously planned approach was viable after 
the winter defeats in New Jersey:  
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I do not now see a prospect of terminating the war but by a general action, and I am aware 
of the difficulties in our way to obtain it, as the Enemy moves with so much more celerity 
than we possibly can with our foreign troops who are too much attached to their baggage.220 
   
Yet Howe’s letter of January 20, 1777, with the radical change in plan, did not arrive in 
London until February 23, 1777. On February 28, 1777, Burgoyne, while in London, sent 
Germain a plan that proposed he move south from Canada into New York, eventually to link up 
with other British forces.221 
On this point Germain merits blame, because on February 23, he read Howe’s changed 
plan for the 1777 campaign season, and on February 28, Germain read a dispatch from 
Burgoyne which clearly indicated serious disharmony between the two plans. German had 
ordered Howe to work with Burgoyne, yet, at this point in late February, Germain failed to 
coordinate the actions of the two major British forces in the colonies.222 
Instead of one unified campaign, the British fought two entirely separate, disconnected 
campaigns in 1777. Had British forces operated in conjunction with one another, with such 
mighty resources, and the bulk of the navy at their disposal, Howe and Burgoyne might have 
defeated the rebels one piece at a time.223 Washington’s victories at Trenton and Princeton 
forced this disunity on the British campaign for 1777. 
In reading about this forced miscommunication, one is struck by the strategic challenge 
inherent in distant British communications. One historian found that dispatches across the ocean 
were habitually a month or more out of date upon receipt.224 Another uncovered that in one 
period during the war, the bulk of 63 dispatches between senior commanders in America and 
political leaders in London took between two and three months.225 Washington took advantage 
of this distance and generated positive strategic effect when he forced Howe to significantly 
change his plans for 1777, which led to miscommunication and a seriously disjointed British 
campaign. 
Neutralized in New Jersey, in 1777, Howe, who knew such vast war resources would 
quickly dry up, was desperate for a speedy victory and so lunged at the opportunity to take 
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Philadelphia.226 By going it alone, and not supporting Burgoyne, Howe condemned Burgoyne to 
lose his entire force at Saratoga.227 
Most importantly, the British loss at Saratoga brought the French into the war on the 
side of the Americans and Continental Army. Charles Gravier, the Comte de Vergennes, French 
minister and secretary of state, provided material assistance to the Americans as early as May 
1776. After the American victory at Saratoga, the French decided to extend diplomatic 
recognition and a formal alliance.228 French support to the Americans later expanded to include 
Spain in 1779 and the Netherlands in 1781.229 
Here, one can see the causal link between the terminal campaign and the war’s outcome. 
Washington guided the Continental Army to survival, forced this chain of events on his 
adversary, and earned the international support that ultimately enabled victory. Washington’s 
1776-1777 campaign was successful both in the near term and long term effort toward ultimate 
victory in the war. 
 
3.3 Could the British have won? 
 
Was the outcome per-ordained? Could General Howe have won this campaign? Could the 
British have won this war? 
Historians Piers Mackesy, James Scudieri, and Jeremy Black all agree there was no 
inevitability to the American victory.230 
Moreover, if there ever was a chance at British victory, it would have come during the 
summer and fall of 1776; looking backward, we can see that Howe never had another 
opportunity to destroy the Continental Army.231 
Historian Dave Palmer has found that there were several potential outcomes to the 
contest,  
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Had British leadership been better or American leadership less astute, the war could well 
have ended differently. Who can guess what might have happened? Perhaps Britain would 
have held onto portions of the provinces. Maybe rebel diehards, defeated in the colonies, 
would have carved out a redoubt in the forest vastness beyond the Appalachians. One can 
imagine the colonies’ accepting semi-independent dominion status or, having lost their 
unity, breaking up into several small countries across a Balkanized North America, 
squabbling among themselves and unable to resist European meddling. It is entirely 
conceivable that the patriots might not have achieved either of their two goals. Indeed, at 
several points in the struggle they should have expected to achieve far less than they 
eventually did.232 
 
Multiple historians testify there was no inevitability in this contest; particularly in the 
1776 to early 1777-time period, the best bet would have been on the British.233 Moreover, the 
British commanders, especially Howe, were competent, sharp leaders, wholly different from the 
blunderers that occasionally show up in popular media and film.234 
So to believe the war’s outcome was inevitable, as well as the 1776 campaign, is to do so 
against the weight of historical evidence (as well as the 140,000 documents in the George 
Washington Papers).235 
The participants themselves were unconfident of the campaign and war’s result. 
Washington’s subordinate, Major General Nathanael Greene, wrote to John Adams of the 
Continental Congress on June 2, 1776 about his personal sense the war’s outcome was “very 
uncertain.”236 
This comment pales in comparison to what Washington himself wrote to his aide, 
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Reed, in January 1776: “the reflection upon my Situation, & that of                                                         
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this Army, produces many an uneasy hour when all around me are wrapped in Sleep. Few People 
know the Predicament we are In, on a thousand Accts.”237 
Or on September 30, 1776, when Washington wrote: “such is my situation that if I were 
to wish the bitterest curse to an enemy on this side of the grave, I should put him in stead with 
my feelings.”238 And on December 17, 1776, after Washington decided on the attack on Trenton, 
he wrote to his cousin and estate manager to “have my Papers in such a Situation as to remove 
as a short notice,” so unsure was Washington of the attack’s outcome.239 Washington himself 
was not confident of the outcome. 
Sometimes wars are won because they are not lost. Washington avoided defeat at the 
point at which it was most likely to happen and kept the American war effort alive with victories 
in New Jersey. The strategic effect from this campaign caused the French entry into the war. 
While there was still much fighting left after this campaign, this was the last British opportunity 
to secure their policy aims. By studying this critical period of time, we can see the important 
impact that superior judgments from a supreme commander can have. 
 
3.4 Washington: defend New York? versus Howe: attack armies or cities? 
 
Washington: defend New York? 
 
This section identifies the 1776 campaign’s most important judgments on both sides, as well as 
the thinking behind each decision, which brought on the strategic effect and the war’s ultimate 
outcome. The 1776 campaign included no single silver bullet, but several judgments reviewed in 
pairs and in context can help better understand what differentiates the successful supreme 
commander from an unsuccessful adversary. A researcher can learn what was on the mind of 
each supreme commander by studying available primary source documents (i.e. dispatches, 
memoranda). 
The first consequential decisions surrounded New York: should the Continental Army 
attempt to hold the city with such an enormous British expeditionary force approaching the 
harbor? For Howe, the initial decision was broader: should his large invasion force target rebel                                                         
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armies or key cities (e.g. New York)? These two decisions can be paired together, in part for 
temporal reasons. The pairing of these judgments determined there would be a Battle of Long 
Island (alternatively referred to by some historians as the Battle of Brooklyn), as well as how it 
would turn out. By choosing to attack Long Island instead of using his overwhelming seapower 
to cut off the rebels at multiple chokepoints around the city (particularly the northern part of 
modern-day Manhattan), the British enabled Washington to evacuate a significant portion of his 
force from encirclement. 
The bulk of the Continental Army was in New York in the late spring of 1776. The 
Americans had not yet declared independence from Britain, and fear of the coming British 
invasion of New York drove the speed of the political movement toward independence.240 John 
Adams called New York the “nexus of the Northern and Southern Colonies,” noting it was “key 
to the whole Continent, as it is a Passage to Canada, to the Great Lakes, and to all the Indian 
Nations.”241 As such, Washington and the Congress agreed this location must be defended. 
While there were clear difficulties to defending this key terrain, Washington made his military 
disagreements in an agreeable manner which fit one who saw himself as subordinate to the 
Continental Congress. By doing so, Washington legitimized the government he sought to 
protect.242 By working well with and keeping his political leadership in the Continental Congress 
informed, Washington helped to develop a sense of coherence and unity in the fledgling 
government. 
Major General Charles Lee had been sent ahead to supervise New York’s defensive 
preparations, and wrote on February 19, 1776 to Washington: “what to do with the City, I own 
puzzles me, it is so encircle’d with deep navigable water, that whoever commands the Sea must 
command the Town”243 Moreover, ten days later, Lee wrote again to Washington of his struggles 
making any progress on the city’s defenses:  
 
[Our] force including the Minute Men, amounts to about seventeen hundred Men as to the 
Town, having few hands and the necessary duty being hard—I have been able to effect 
little…it was absolutely impossible to be moulded into any thing which coud annoy their 
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Ships—as We are surrounded by navigable Waters, I consider enclos’d Works as rather 
dangerous.244 
 
Despite this concern, defending New York was never a real question. In late May and 
early June, the Continental Congress called Washington to Philadelphia for a conference on 
military strategy. Unfortunately, the defense of New York was such a given that it was never 
even discussed.245 
The British sent an immense armada across the sea, landing on June 29 and July 12, 
1776: 
 
[It was] the largest British expedition ever sent across the Atlantic. Two-thirds of the total 
British army and 45 percent of the Royal Navy were serving in America and the Caribbean. 
There were some four hundred ships of varying sizes in New York. The combined invading 
force was greater than the estimated 30,000 population of Philadelphia, the largest city in 
America. A seventy-four-gun ship alone had at least 600 crew members and larger vessels 
had even more.246 
 
The total British force numbered over 42,000.247 This was enormous by the standards of the day, 
larger than New York City itself. 
With his decision to hold New York, George Washington’s strategy was tailored to fit 
political needs, as well as military concerns.248 His 16,000 effective soldiers were organized in five 
divisions: three divisions defending what’s today known as Manhattan, a fourth at the northern 
tip of modern Manhattan (at Fort Washington), and a fifth to the south east on Long Island and 
Brooklyn Heights.249 
So why stay? If defensive positions held, he might bleed British attackers; Washington 
also considered this might be a pivotal battle; and to meet American political and morale 
needs.250 
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Washington believed deeply in the cause, with a particularly stirring set of General 
Orders on the impending British attack on July 2, 1776: 
 
The time is now near at hand which must probably determine, whether Americans are to be, 
Freemen, or Slaves; whether they are to have any property they can call their own; whether 
their Houses, and Farms, are to be pillaged and destroyed, and they consigned to a State of 
Wretchedness from which no human efforts will probably deliver them. The fate of unborn 
Millions will now depend, under God, on the Courage and Conduct of this army—Our 
cruel and unrelenting Enemy leaves us no choice but a brave resistance, or the most abject 
submission; this is all we can expect—We have therefore to resolve to conquer or die: Our 
own Country’s Honor, all call upon us for a vigorous and manly exertion, and if we now 
shamefully fail, we shall become infamous to the whole world—Let us therefore rely upon 
the goodness of the Cause, and the aid of the supreme Being, in whose hands Victory is, to 
animate and encourage us to great and noble Actions—The Eyes of all our Countrymen are 
now upon us, and we shall have their blessings, and praises, if happily we are the 
instruments of saving them from the Tyranny meditated against them. Let us therefore 
animate and encourage each other, and shew the whole world, that a Freeman contending 
for Liberty on his own ground is superior to any slavish mercenary on earth.251  
 
One week later, on July 9, 1776, Washington received from the Continental Congress the 
formal Declaration of Independence, to be read aloud to all troops.252 This finally signified the 
separate existence of an American government, which arrived at nearly the same moment the 
military threat arrived in the form of an enormous British invasion force. The following day, on 
July 10, 1776, Washington wrote to John Hancock positively about the prospects for New 
York’s defense:  
 
If our Troops will behave well, which I hope will be the case, having every thing to contend 
for that Freemen hold dear, they will have to wade through much blood & Slaughter before 
they can carry any part of our Works, If they carry ’em at all, and at best be in possession of 
a melancholy and mournfull victory.253 
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Washington knew the British were coming and his initial assessment was a victory 
through a defense designed to grind the enemy down, though he considered a pre-emptive 
attack. On July 12 Washington called a Council of War to consider “a general Attack upon the 
Enemy’s Quarters” on Staten Island, which was rejected unanimously.254 The waiting continued, 
and Washington wrote to Hancock on August 12, 1776 that he was without knowledge or “any 
further Intelligence of [British invasion] designs.”255 However, this lack of knowledge did not 
unnerve Washington enough to withdrawal, and he stayed in position to fight. Then, on August 
27, the British decisively defeated the Continental Army at the Battle of Long Island, which was 
the largest battle ever in North America at that point. The British lost 59 soldiers killed, 267 
wounded, and 31 missing, with 5 Hessians killed and 26 Hessians wounded; the Americans lost 
300 killed and over one thousand captured (including three general officers).256  
 
Howe: attack armies or cities? 
 
The major question facing General William Howe was whether the priority was to destroy the 
Continental Army, or to take key American terrain?257 This challenge would play itself out over 
the issue of how to approach New York. 
From Howe’s perspective, New York was a Loyalist hotbed and therefore a location 
where it would be relatively easier to secure local support. Howe also knew that the end of the 
rebellion would necessarily meant a political accommodation, and a return to some form of 
loyalty. So, instead of aiming to end the Continental Army, Howe opted to seize cities and 
terrain.258 
This issue formed the basis for the disagreement between Howe and his second-in-
command, General Henry Clinton. Clinton believed the British could trap and annihilate the 
Continental Army. Howe believed this was the wrong course of action, that instead the better 
move was to defeat but not completely destroy the Continental Army. And so the strategic 
objective became New York and not Washington’s army.259 
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Howe then avoided aggressive action against the Continental Army, a judgment that was 
criticized immediately. Continental Army Major General Israel Putnam said of Howe at the time: 
“General Howe is either our friend or no general…[Howe] had our whole army in his 
power…Had he instantly followed up his victory [at Long Island] the consequences to the cause 
of liberty must have been dreadful.”260 
Clinton firmly believed the center of the rebellion was Washington’s army itself. In his 
post war writings he described three moments in this time period when Howe disregarded this 
advice.261 
Clinton’s views, as the British second-in-command, are important. Just after the war, 
Clinton wrote about his preference to seal the Continental Army off on York Island (modern 
day Manhattan) after the victory at Long Island, by cutting off the Continental’s only escape 
route (to the north), in September 1776.262 
 
Observing that summer was passing away fast…[I] propose[d] to the Commander in Chief 
the landing of a sufficient corps at Spuyten Duyvil in order to lay hold of the strong 
eminence adjoining, for the purpose of commanding the important pass of Kings Bridge 
and thereby embarrassing the rebel operations. It might also, with the assistance of our 
armed vessels, have possibly put it in our power to cut off the retreat of many of the enemy 
on the attack of York Island…he afterward told me he had no intention of acting 
offensively before the arrival of the Hessians, nor did he think it advisable to stir a day’s 
march from his cantonments before the troops had their camp equipage.263 
 
Clinton favored far more aggressive action than Howe. After the encounter described 
above, and having taken Fort Washington (the farthest northern tip of modern Manhattan), on 
November 16, 1776 Clinton said he “received orders” to take “command of an expedition 
against Rhode Island.”264 This was at precisely the moment when the Continental Army was 
down to their lowest total in the campaign, with less than 3,000 effective men.265 While Howe 
judged it was time to reallocate resources to take another port city, an action that affirms Howe’s 
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preference for positions, Clinton said he “never approved” of such a side effort because Clinton 
wanted to go after Washington’s remaining army. However, according to Clinton, the navy 
“wanted a winter station,” and so “every other consideration must give way.” On November 26, 
Clinton left from the main force in New York-New Jersey, to take Newport, Rhode Island.266 
Though no smoking gun exists regarding Howe’s relative passivity, his own 1779 
testimony records his view that his “most essential duty” was to carefully commit his troops 
because a loss by his army “could not speedily, nor easily, be repaired.”267 Moreover, we can see 
Howe’s thoughts on the limits of British military efforts in correspondence with Lord Germain 
on April 26, 1776: 
 
[T]here not being the least prospect of conciliating this continent unless its armies are 
roughly dealt with; and I confess my apprehensions that such an event will not readily be 
brought about, the rebels get on apace, and knowing their advantages, in having the whole 
country, as it were, at their disposal, they will not readily be brought into a situation where 
the King’s troops can meet them upon equal terms. Their armies retiring a few miles back 
from the navigable rivers, ours cannot follow them.268  
 
While Howe believed it was important to be hard on the Continental Army, he did not 
believe he could bring the bulk of the Continental Army to battle. Yet there was one serious gap.  
General Howe, through his brother’s fleet, had a massive naval advantage over the rebels, and 
New York was dominated by navigable waterways on all sides. This meant whoever commanded 
the sea commanded the land. British Royal Navy Captain George Collier, commander of the 
Rainbow in the armada just outside New York harbor, believed Howe had missed such an 
opportunity to trap the Americans after the Battle of Long Island. Collier wondered why the 
British navy had not been positioned in the East River to cut off the American retreat, which 
Collier wrote he was “in constant expectation of being ordered to do” because it would have 
meant that “not a man would have escaped from Long Island.” Moreover, by failing to have 
done so, Collier predicted, the Americans would “protract the war, Heaven knows how long.”269 
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Collier was not the only person who saw this as a mistake. Charles Stedman, a British 
military officer, who after the war wrote a history of these events, believed that to have trapped 
the Americans on Long Island was both possible and would have been “a most decisive 
victory.”270 Stedman made a simple, yet powerful critical statement: “Had any armed ships been 
stationed there, it would have been impossible for [the Continental Army] to have made their 
escape…had only a single frigate been stationed in the East River, they [the Continentals] must 
have surrendered.”271 It is hard to escape the verdict that Howe could have pinned and wiped 
out the Continental Army in August 1776, and that he missed this opportunity.  
 
In Summary 
 
In considering the above, Washington exercised relatively poor judgment related to the use of 
force. His challenge was to defend New York against a vastly superior British invasion force. 
Congress ordered him to hold the position, while Major General Charles Lee had advised against 
it for geographic considerations. The more correct military decision would have been 
withdrawal. Because he did not take this option, Washington lost a significant amount of troops 
at the Battle of Long Island. 
Yet, Washington’s choice also privileged respect for and dedication to unity with the 
rebellion’s political arm, the Continental Congress, which can be seen in his dispatches. In 
carrying on such correspondence, and in light of his deferential attitude toward the political 
leadership, he enhanced the trust relationship between the vital political and military organs of 
the rebellion. 
Howe’s moves were tactically successful but strategically incomplete. General Clinton 
advised that Howe should pursue the entrapment and destruction of the Continental Army, 
while Howe was skeptical he would ever get the chance and made judgments that privileged the 
pursuit of territorial objectives (e.g. key cities). While Howe achieved his tactical aim to defeat 
Continental Army forces in New York’s approaches, he missed an opportunity to secure the 
strategically significant degradation or destruction of the Continental Army.272  
 
3.5 Washington’s withdrawal from New York versus Howe’s conduct of pardon offers 
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Washington’s withdrawal from New York 
 
General Howe believed his show of supremacy at the Battle of Long Island would cow the 
rebels into negotiation. Through his brother and naval commander, Admiral Richard Howe, 
General Howe pursued diplomacy through a July 13, 1776 letter to Washington, and a peace 
conference on September 11, 1776. Neither bore fruit, and Washington used this prolonged 
period of fruitless peace attempts to consider and ultimately decide to leave New York in 
September with the Continental Congress’s blessing. Washington withdrew from New York and 
then across New Jersey. 
The loss at the Battle of Long Island forced Washington to call a Council of War on 
August 29, 1776, during which it was asked whether the Americans should “leave Long Island 
[and Brooklyn]” and “remove the Army to New York” (modern day Manhattan), which was 
agreed to unanimously.273 
But the movement from Brooklyn and Long Island to modern day Manhattan still left 
open the question of broader withdrawal from New York; Washington wrote to John Hancock, 
leader of the Continental Congress, on September 2, 1776:  
 
Our situation is truly distressing…The Militia…almost by whole Regiments and by 
Companies at a time are running away when fronted by a well appointed Enemy, superior in 
number to our whole collected force…I am obliged to confess my want of confidence in 
the Generality of the Troops. 
[We must have a] permanent, standing Army I mean One to exist during the 
War…Men who have been free and subject to no control cannot be reduced to order in an 
Instant…Our number of men at present fit for duty are under 20,000—they were so by the 
last returns and best accounts I could get after the Engagement on Long Island—since 
which Numbers have deserted… 
It is painfull and extremely grating to me to give such unfavourable accounts, but It 
would be criminal to conceal the truth at so critical a juncture—Every power I possess shall 
be exerted to serve the Cause, & my first wish is, that whatever may be the event, the 
Congress will do me the Justice to think so. If we should be obliged to abandon this Town, 
ought It to stand as Winter Quarters for the Enemy? They would derive great conveniences 
from It on the one hand—and much property would be destroyed on the other—It is an 
important question, but will admit of but little time for deliberation—At present I dare say 
the Enemy mean to preserve It if they can—If Congress therefore should resolve upon the                                                         
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destruction of It, the Resolution should be a profound secret as the knowledge of It will 
make a Capital change in their plans.274 
 
Washington, plainly and respectfully, put the challenge of holding New York to his 
civilian leadership. First, he explained, militiamen were running away and the army must have 
better trained soldiers. Second, he described the purely military difficulties in holding New York. 
And last, most important, he prepared his leadership for the potential loss of New York, while at 
the same time he intimated he understood the political risks of rendering the city uninhabitable 
to the British. Washington subordinated himself to the Congress, all while expressing the military 
situation. 
Hancock wrote back the next day, on September 3, 1776, “that Congress having taken 
your Letter” into “Consideration, came to a Resolution, in a Committee of the whole House, 
that no Damage should be done to the City of New York.275 This no-burn decision was likely 
made for political reasons, but did not specifically address Washington’s potential military 
withdrawal from the city. 
Continental Army Major General Nathanael Greene wrote a long memorandum to 
General Washington on September 5, 1776, which addressed all these issues: 
 
The Object under consideration, is whether a General and speedy retreat from this Island is 
Necessary or not. to me it appears the only Eligible plan to oppose the Enemy successfully 
and secure our selves from disgrace…It has been agreed that the City of Newyork would 
not be Tenable if the Enimy got possession of Long Island & Govenors Island. they are 
now in possession of both these places… 
The City and Island of Newyork, are no Objects for us, we are not to bring them in 
Competition with the General Interest of America. Part of the Army already has met with a 
defeat, the Country is struck with a pannick, any Cappital loss at this time may ruin the 
cause. Tis our business to study to avoid any considerable misfortune. And to take post 
where the Enemy will be Obligd to fight us and not we them… 
I give it as my Oppinion that a General and speedy Retreat is absolutely necessary 
and that the honnor and Interest of America requires it. I would burn the City & 
subburbs—and that for the following Reasons—If the Enemy gets possession of the City, 
we never can Recover the Possession, without a superior Naval force to theirs. It will                                                         
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deprive the Enemy of An Opportunity of Barracking their whole Army together which if 
they could do would be a very great security. It will deprive them of a general Market. the 
price of things would prove a temptation to our people to supply them for the sake of the 
gain, in direct violation of the Laws of their Country. All these Advantages would Result 
from the destruction of the City.276 
  
 Greene pointed out an ugly truth: to defend New York would jeopardize the entire 
army.277 Greene’s reason for the advantages of leaving and burning the city were local and 
military in nature. This judgment would privilege military effectiveness, which considers only 
what is proximately best for the army and the fighting forces. But Greene did not interact with 
political figures as much, nor was he beholden to Congress the same way as Washington. 
Washington had stark dilemma: Greene’s military argument balanced against Hancock’s 
political judgment that represented Congress’s will. To burn the city might provide military 
advantage, but it would also have political repercussions that would reverberate beyond New 
York. What would the people of Philadelphia feel as the British army approached that city? 
Would Philadelphians cast their loyalty away from the Continental Congress and to the British if 
they believed they would be put to the torch like those in New York? If the battle was for the 
people, then burning cities, though invariably helpful in the short term, might not be a war-
winning strategy. 
Following Greene’s letter, Washington convened a Council of War on September 7, 
1776, and reported the results in a dispatch to John Hancock on September 8, 1776 (this being 
the only public record of the event).278 
 
It is now extremely obvious from all Intelligence…they mean to inclose us on the Island of 
New York…Having therefore their System unfolded to us, It became an important 
consideration how It could be most successfully opposed—On every side there is a choice 
of difficulties, & every measure on our part, (however painfull the reflection is from 
experience) to be formed with some apprehension that all our Troops will not do their duty. 
In deliberating on this great Question, it was impossible to forget that History—our own 
experience—the advice of our ablest Friends in Europe—The fears of the Enemy, and even 
the Declarations of Congress demonstrate that on our side the War should be defensive, It                                                         
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has been even called a War of posts, that we should on all occasions avoid a general Action 
or put anything to the risque unless compelled by a necessity into which we ought never to 
be drawn. The Arguments on which such a System was founded were deemed unanswerable 
& experience has given her sanction—With these views & being fully persuaded that It 
would be presumption to draw out our young Troops into open Ground against their 
superiors both in number and discipline, I have never spared the Spade & Pickax: I confess 
I have not found that readiness to defend even strong posts at all hazards which is necessary 
to derive the greatest benefit from them.279  
 
In this passage, Washington described his belief the British had landed to trap the 
Continental Army. Of course, hindsight makes clear Howe had a more nuanced objective. But 
from this logic Washington balanced his understanding of the situation against his knowledge of 
the Continental soldiers’ inability to face the British in a fight, which counseled a defensive 
posture would be preferable. However, Washington wrote that defense was not a good option in 
this specific position: 
 
The honour of making a brave defence does not seem to be a sufficient stimulus when the 
success is very doubtfull and the falling into the Enemy’s hands probable: But I doubt not 
this will be gradually attained. We are now in a strong post but not an Impregnable one, nay 
acknowledged by every man of Judgement to be untenable unless the Enemy will make the 
Attack upon Lines when they can avoid It… 
…[to fight here would put the Army’s fate] on the Hazard of making a successfull 
defence in the City or the issue of an Engagement out of It—On the other hand to abandon 
a City which has been by some deemed defensible and on whose Works much Labor has 
been bestowed has a tendency to dispirit the Troops and enfeeble our Cause: It has also 
been considered as the Key to the Northern Country.280 
 
Washington hedged his bet and acknowledged how important the city was to the 
Continental Congress, but he also explained the serious problems with holding the city. He 
charted a middle course to offset the two prevailing considerations, military and political, and 
kept one boot in the city and one out, seemingly in an effort to balance the two opposing 
challenges:                                                          
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I have also removed from the City All the Stores & Ammunition except what was absolutely 
necessary for Its defence and made every Other disposition that did not essentially interfere 
with that Object, carefully keeping in view untill It should be absolutely determined on full 
consideration, how far the City was to be defended at all events… 
All agreed the Town would not be tenable If the Enemy resolved to bombard & 
cannonade It—But the difficulty attending a removal operated so strongly, that a course was 
taken between abandoning It totally & concentring our whole strength for Its defence… 
It was concluded to Arrange the Army under Three Divisions, 5000 to remain for 
the defence of the City, 9000 to Kingsbridge & Its dependancies as well to possess & secure 
those posts as to be ready to attack the Enemy who are moving Eastward on Long Island, If 
they should attempt to land on this side—The remainder to occupy the intermediate space 
& support either—That the Sick should be immediately removed to Orange Town, and 
Barracks prepared at Kingsbridge with all expedition to cover the Troops.281 
 
Washington laid the groundwork for a prepared withdrawal. Lastly, in the same dispatch, 
Washington delicately explained his subordinates’ opposition arguments, including Major 
General Nathanael Greene’s, to abandon the city.   
 
There were some Genl Officers in whose Judgemt and opinion much confidence is to be 
reposed, that were for a total and immediate removal from the City, urging the great danger 
of One part of the Army being cut off before the other can support It, the Extremities 
being at least Sixteen miles apart—that our Army when collected is inferior to the 
Enemy’s—that they can move with their whole force to any point of attack & consequently 
must succeed by weight of Numbers if they have only a part to oppose them—That by 
removing from hence we deprive the Enemy of the Advantage of their Ships which will 
make at least one half of the force to attack the Town—That we should keep the Enemy at 
Bay—put nothing to the hazard but at all events keep the Army together which may be 
recruited another Year, that the unspent Stores will also be preserved & in this case the 
heavy Artillery can also be secured—But they were overruled by a Majority who thought for 
the present a part of our force might be kept here and attempt to maintain the City a while 
longer.282 
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Washington recorded the minority view starkly, but clearly mentions in closing that these 
views were overruled by the Council of War. Then, at the end of the dispatch, Washington 
offered what appeared to be his own personal sense of the matter. 
 
I am sensible a retreating Army is encircled with difficulties, that the declining an 
Engagement subjects a General to reproach and that the Common cause may be affected by 
the discouragement It may throw over the minds of many. Nor am I insensible of the 
contrary Effects if a brilliant stroke could be made with any probability of Success, 
especially after our Loss upon Long Island—But when the Fate of America may be at Stake 
on the Issue, when the wisdom of Cooler moments & experienced men have decided that 
we should protract the War, if possible, I cannot think it safe or wise to adopt a different 
System when the Season for Action draws so near a Close—That the Enemy mean to 
winter in New York there can be no doubt—that with such an Armament they can drive us 
out is equally clear. The Congress having resolved that It should not be destroyed nothing 
seems to remain but to determine the time of their taking possession—It is our Interest & 
wish to prolong It as much as possible provided the delay does not affect our future 
measures.283  
 
Washington’s words, particularly the last few sentences, were meant to prepare the 
Congress for an evacuation of New York. If Washington could not hold New York, he would 
relinquish it in such a way as to maintain Congress’s trust and confidence, as well as that of his 
general officer subordinates. This manner of judgment promoted internal cohesion and unity. 
On September 11, 1776, the same day Admiral Richard Howe met with representatives 
from the Continental Congress, a group of Washington’s subordinate generals called for a 
reconsideration of the finding from the previous Council of War (from September 7, 1776) in 
which the decision had been to keep some troops in the city while others left.284 This Council of 
War on September 12, 1776 rescinded the previous decision, and approved the “city’s 
evacuation.”285 On September 14, 1776, Washington wrote to Hancock on his decision: 
 
I have been duly honored with your favor of the 10th with the Resolution of Congress 
which accompanied It, and thank them for the confidence they repose in my Judgement                                                         
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respecting the evacuation of the City. I could wish to maintain It, Because I know It to be 
of Importance, But I am fully convinced that It cannot be done, and that an attempt for 
that purpose if persevered in, might & most certainly would, be attended with consequences 
the most fatal and alarming in their nature. Sensible of this, Several of the Genl Officers 
since the determination of the Council mentioned in my last, petitioned that a Second 
Council might be called to reconsider the propositions which had been before them upon 
the Subject. accordingly I called One on the 12th when a large Majority not only determined 
a removal of the Army prudent but absolutely necessary.286 
 
From September 8 to 14, 1776, Washington amended his judgment from a partial hold 
on New York to a decision to leave the city. Washington left behind some officers to spy in the 
soon-to-be British-occupied territory. This included the young Yale graduate, Captain Nathan 
Hale, who disguised himself as a Dutch schoolteacher, was quickly caught as a spy, and executed 
without trial on September 24, 1776.287 This shows how quickly the British had full control of 
New York; within days, the British were able to find, identify, and execute a spy among the 
population. By the end of September, even with reinforcements, Washington was down to just 
under 15,000 men fit for duty, while Howe still had well over 40,000 men.288  
 
Howe’s conduct of pardon offers 
 
The British estimate of opposition was that the rebellion’s epicenter was Massachusetts.289 By 
instead focusing on New York, and efforts at pardons, such conciliatory measures fit the 
assessment in British Major General James Robertson’s comment: “I never had the idea of 
subduing the Americans, I meant to assist the good Americans to subdue the bad ones.”290 The 
major British strategic effort was to aid the Loyalists in defeating the rebels. It was an estimate 
General William Howe surely agreed with, having written the non-loyalists were “very few, in 
comparison of the whole people.”291 
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The Howe brothers had received the authority to negotiate peace with the Colonials (and 
records reflect that Admiral Richard Howe forwarded King George III’s written instructions for 
peace negotiations to General William Howe on June 22, 1776).292 Admiral Richard Howe,  
 
wanted the peace commission to have wide-ranging powers to grant pardons and to offer 
concessions as well as to consist solely of himself and his brother. He was opposed by the 
secretary of state for the American Department, Lord George Germain, who threatened 
resignation rather than allow such discretionary authority to the Howe brothers and wanted 
pardons restricted to those who swore oaths of allegiance, with no additional concessions.293 
 
There were two encounters that provide evidence of the importance General Howe’s 
command placed in this approach. The first came on July 13, 1776, when the British, shortly 
after landing in New York, attempted contact with General Washington. However, the British 
refused to refer to Washington by his formal title (e.g. “General”) as doing so would legitimize 
him as an actual combatant instead of a traitorous criminal.294 The Americans refused to accept 
diplomatic correspondence addressed to “Mister Washington” or “Geo. Washington etc. etc. 
etc.” on the grounds that to accept would deny the Continental claim to legitimacy.295 
As Washington wrote to John Hancock and the Continental Congress of the incident, “I 
would not upon any occasion sacrifice Essentials to Punctilio, but in this Instance, the Opinion 
of Others concurring with my own, I deemed It a duty to my Country and my appointment to 
insist upon that respect which in any other than a public view I would willingly have waived.”296 
The couriers met in rowboats, but this first attempt at a meaningful dialogue between the 
combatants never got past a visual encounter and they never talked.297 Germain’s instructions 
had forbidden talks that treated the rebels as equal, as well to hold off until the Continental 
Army put down their weapons.298 This meant negotiations could only happen after the 
Continental Army was entirely defeated, a condition that undercut any meaningful effort at 
negotiation.                                                         
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In between pardon attempts, Henry Strachey, secretary to both General William Howe 
and Admiral Richard Howe for matters pertaining to American pardons, wrote to a friend on 
September 3, 1776, following the Battle of Long Island, in which he provided a vision of a 
Continental Army’s fracture: 
 
As their Regiments are from almost every Province on the Continent, it is probable that 
many of them may begin to look towards their respective homes, and contend for the 
Recovery of those Liberties which have been most grievously invaded by the Tyranny of 
their own Countrymen, under the Pretext of preserving them from the imaginary 
Apprehensions of ours. Of New Jersey (which Your Map will tell you is close upon our left) 
we know little ... but as we are so near them, and the superiority of the King's Forces is now 
beyond a doubt with them, it is hardly to be supposed that these People will leave their own 
Province, and go to the Protection of the Neighbours...I should conjecture that a very few 
Weeks will afford us great light into future Events.299 
 
With such an assumption present at the highest levels of the British command, it is 
understandable why General Howe continued to offer pardons. He thought the end was near. 
On September 11, 1776, the only official gathering, before the end of the war, between 
the two adversaries occurred.300 However, the newly signed Declaration of Independence 
blocked all discussion, as it was not recognized by King George III, the document kept 
negotiations from meaningful progress. The American party included Benjamin Franklin, John 
Adams, and John Rutledge (of South Carolina), who were all met by Admiral Richard Howe.301 
Admiral Howe told the three men: “When an American falls, England feels it. Is there no way of 
trading back this step of Independency, and opening the door to a full discussion?”302 However, 
such peace was unlikely, as the guidance from Britain was the pardons were only to be issued “to 
such of our subjects as shall deserve our Royal Mercy,” and the Declaration of Independence put 
any and all rebels outside that particular calculation.303 
Howe’s theory was that the loss and withdrawal of the Continental Army from Long 
Island would provide incentive to cut a deal with the British.304 Of course, even with that as the 
prevailing belief, there was some doubt the Americans would take the deal, as Strachey wrote on                                                         
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September 3, “[The Americans] might at this moment have peace and happiness, but they insist 
upon having their brains knocked out first.”305 
Strachey was right: the American delegation considered the loss at Long Island a 
temporary setback, even as General Washington evacuated New York. Howe wrote on 
September 25, 1776, his assessment that the negotiation was not likely to work: “I must here 
add, that I found the Americans not so well disposed to join us, and to serve us as I had been 
taught to expect; that I thought our farther progress for the present, precarious.”306 
The British attempt to use dominant terrain-taking to encourage pardons and peace 
continued with one more dramatic move.307 On November 30, 1776, Admiral Richard Howe 
offered a sixty-day period where he would pardon those who swore obedience to King George 
III. On December 28, 1776, in a letter to his wife, Strachey described the pardons progress: “The 
Proclamation of the 30th. of last Month has reformed a Croud of Culprits, and I cannot deliver 
out of the King's Pardons so fast as they are claimed. But till the Time is expired (60 Days) we 
cannot know fully the Effect of that Measure.”308 While initially, roughly 5,000 signed the 
pardon, ultimately, after the victories at Trenton and Princeton, the Americans renounced this 
forced oath. Upon hearing the news of the Continental victories in New Jersey, Strachey issued a 
verdict on the pardon process: “the completion of the work of peace appears still at an 
unmeasurable distance…[the Americans] still continue obstinate.”309  
 
In Summary 
 
Washington’s challenge was to manage the fallout from the defeat at the Battle of Long Island. 
Specifically, should the Continental Army stand in New York, conduct a strategic withdrawal, or 
even burn the city to deny it to the British? Washington hedged for several days; he took in the 
opinions of his chief subordinates as well as the wishes of Congress. Ultimately, Washington’s 
judgment on the use of force to achieve his policy goal was accurate in this case, in that the 
strategic withdrawal kept the Continental Army in the war and avoided being trapped on 
Manhattan and in New York. Additionally, with respect to his ability to find coherence amongst 
several different political and military considerations, between Major General Nathanael 
Greene’s desire to burn New York and the Continental Congress desiring the opposite,                                                         
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Washington was able to connect with all parties and compromise in a way as to make the 
withdrawal from New York palatable to them all. 
Considering initial success, Howe’s challenge was to determine whether to press the 
military campaign or focus on political negotiation. In contrast to Clinton’s desire for aggressive 
pursuit, Howe’s strategy attempted to persuade, and was ultimately unsuccessful.310 He assumed 
the opposition was smaller than it was; Howe underestimated the size of the rebellion and 
Washington’s ability to convince others to join.311 In sum, Howe’s judgment to pursue political 
negotiation and peace agreements over other available alternatives had no impact on the military 
contest or the balance of political and military forces. Of course, it could be said the November 
30, 1776 proclamation showed promise for a time in New Jersey, but was quickly reversed with 
Washington’s gains in late 1776 and early 1777. In the final analysis, the effort bore no strategic 
fruit and cost time and effort which could have been allocated elsewhere. 
 
3.6 Howe’s campaign culmination versus Washington’s attack at Trenton and Princeton 
 
Howe’s campaign culmination 
 
In late October and November, General Howe enjoyed battlefield victories at White Plains 
(north of modern New York City) and Fort Washington (the immediate northern approach to 
New York City). At White Plains, Howe held the field and caused the Continental Army to 
expedite their retreat from New York and into New Jersey. Howe explained: 
 
On the 28th of October the engagement at the White-Plains took place. It has been asserted, 
that, by my not attacking the lines on the day of action, I lost an opportunity of destroying 
the rebel army… 
The committee must give me credit when I assure them, that I have political 
reasons, and no other, for declining to explain why that assault was not made. Upon a 
minute enquiry those reasons might, if necessary, be brought out in evidence at the bar. If, 
however, the assault had been made, and the lines carried, the enemy would have got off 
without much loss, and no way had we, that I could ever learn, of cutting off their retreat by 
the Croton Bridge. I cannot conceive the foundation of such an idea. By forcing the lines 
we should undoubtedly have gained a more brilliant advantage, some baggage, and some 
provisions; but we had no reason to suppose that the rebel army could have been destroyed.                                                         
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The ground in their rear was such that they could with, for securing their retreat, which 
indeed seemed to be their principal object. And, Sir, I do not hesitate to confess, that if I 
could by manoevre remove an enemy from a very advantageous position, without hazarding 
the consequences of an attack, where the point to be carried was not adequate to the loss of 
men to be expected from the enterprise, I should certainly adopt that cautionary conduct, in 
the hopes of meeting my adversary upon more equal terms.312  
 
Howe consistently argued that gradual pressure was the key to victory. Particularly in this 
case, he believed that to push the Continental Army too hard would result in negative blowback 
to his own forces and the wider effort. In short, by investing more soldiers than the situation 
called for, his sense was he would have risked more than he could hope to gain. Instead, Howe 
preferred maneuver to chase the Continental Army into submission. In this limited objective he 
was successful; for example, he took over 2,800 American prisoners of war at Fort Washington 
on November 16, 1776.313 Numerically damaging, this event also had a psychological impact on 
the supreme commander as he helplessly watched his enemy bayonet and bludgeon to death 
many American soldiers from across the river at Fort Lee (on the modern New Jersey 
Palisades).314 Washington was so devastated he turned from his subordinates and wept.315 
By mid-December, Howe had Washington on the run and chose to culminate the 
campaign and sent his troops to winter quarters in villages across New Jersey, in addition to New 
York City and Newport.316 This decision went directly against his second-in-command’s advice, 
General Henry Clinton, who wrote: “upon [Howe’s] hinting to me his intention of running a 
chain of posts across east Jersey, I took the liberty of cautioning him against the possibility of its 
being broken in upon in the winter…I even advised him, after having pushed Washington to the 
utmost, if he could not succeed in taking his army, to evacuate the Jersies altogether.”317 
Recorded after the war as this was, it ought to raise some skepticism. But Howe’s own testimony 
corroborates Clinton’s characterization. Howe wrote: 
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But it has been objected to me that I ought not to have intrusted the important port of 
Trenton to the Hessian troops. My answer to this, if clearly understood, will I think be 
satisfactory, Military men will certainly understand it. The left, Sir, was the post of the 
Hessians in the line, and had I changed it upon this occasion it must have been considered a 
disgrace, since the same situation held in the cantonments as in the camp. And it probably 
would have created jealousies between the Hessian and British troops, which it was my duty 
carefully to prevent. 
[The Hessian commanders, Colonel Donop and Colonel Rall] both had timely 
information of the intended attack: The numbers of the enemy, I was credibly informed, did 
not exceed 3000, and if Colonel Rall had obeyed the orders I sent to him for the erecting of 
redoubts, I am confident his post would not have been taken. 
I would ask those who object to this part of the distribution, where could the 
Hessian troops have been better employed than in the defence of a post? In the last war 
they were esteemed not unequal to any troops in Prince Ferdinands’s army, and I should do 
them much injustice were I not to say they were in very high order in America.318 
My principal object in so great an extension of the cantonments was to afford 
protection to the inhabitants, that they might experience the difference between his 
majesty’s government, and that to which they were subject from the rebel leaders. For, Sir, 
although some persons condemn me for having endeavored to conciliate his majesty’s 
rebellious subjects, by taking every means to prevent the destruction of the country, instead 
of irritating them by a contrary mode of proceeding, yet am I, from many reasons, satisfied 
in my own mind that I acted in that particular for the benefit of the king’s service. 
[While others wanted me to conduct] acts of great severity [, such is not the proper 
conduct of a] commander in chief.319 
 
One can see an effort at coherence in Howe’s priorities. His thoughts prioritized the 
preservation of an international coalition in a forward deployed area. He trusted the Hessians in 
his formation, although, we can see that others (e.g. Clinton) second-guessed this decision. Also, 
Howe judged this was the most prudent course of action to assist the local population in 
nudging the fence-sitting Americans back into loyalty to the British. He sought to demonstrate 
the superiority of the British government to the local population. 
On December 1, when the Continental Army made its way out of Newark, New Jersey 
southward, Lieutenant (later president) James Monroe counted three thousand men left in 
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Washington’s ranks.320 Washington worried the British might corner his forces against the 
Delaware River as he withdrew to the south. At one point, the pursuit was extremely close, with 
Washington’s rear elements leaving merely one hour before British forces arrived in Princeton 
on the afternoon of December 7, 1776.321 
On December 8, 1776, next to the Delaware River, Howe ended his pursuit. Then on 
December 13, 1776, Howe drafted winter orders to garrison his troops. Howe personally chose 
the sites, and placed three brigades in towns approximately six miles apart, to maximize forage 
and minimize time for mutual reinforcement. Colonel Johann Rall’s three Hessian regiments that 
had fought well in the campaign were placed closest to enemy forces. Howe judged the 
campaign over for the winter and the Americans were done fighting until the weather 
improved.322 
Contemporary British military officer Charles Stedman found fault not just in the 
decision to suspend the campaign, but also the judgment on the apportionment of British and 
Hessian forces. Stedman argued “the chain of communication” for the British side, from the 
Delaware River back to Hackensack, “was too extensive, and the cantonments too remote from 
each other.” Next, and crucially, “foreign troops ought not to have been stationed either at 
Trenton or Bordenton” as “they lay nearest to the enemy.” Stedman stated the problem with the 
Hessian troops in this location was they understood “nothing of the language” and therefore 
“were unable to obtain proper intelligence, and instead of conciliating the affections, made 
themselves particularly disagreeable to the natives, by pillaging them.”323 
Broadly, plundering was common in New Jersey, and according to British Major General 
James Robertson, the result was “the people of New Jersey took up their weapons and began to 
fight back.”324 
In sum, Stedman levied strong criticism against Howe: 
 
Men of plain sense could not understand why the [supreme commander], at the head of 
thirty thousand veteran troops, should suffer an undisciplined army, not amounting to a 
sixth part of his own numbers, to remain in a province so lately in his firm possession; and 
not only to remain there, but to compel him to abandon that province.325                                                         
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Though one can see Howe’s reasonableness at work, one can also see the limits in his judgments 
in not finishing the Continental Army when he had the ability and resources to do so. The 
decision to suspend the campaign and to station his forces in such close proximity to the 
remnants of Washington’s main body were judgments that are questionable. 
To be sure, Howe had limitations and mitigating circumstances: he had to attack an 
enemy far from his home base of supply over tough terrain.326 However, while this rationale may 
be suitable for explaining the general challenge Howe faced, it does not absolve him of 
responsibility for the disastrous results that came from his choice to culminate the pursuit (and 
Washington’s subsequent counterattack). 
It helps to numerically specify the culmination point. Over time, the American force was 
bled down significantly. The Continental Army had roughly 19,000 effective soldiers on August 
27, 1776, and by November 28 had fewer than 3,000.327 At the same time, the British fielded 
roughly 32,000 in their ground forces on August 27, and in early January (the closest in time a 
credible estimate is available), despite strategic consumption to hold newly taken territory, the 
British had roughly 14,000 soldiers in the vicinity of New Jersey.328 
Howe’s forces, having been within one hour of the withered Continental Army on 
December 7, 1776, allowed the Continental Army to reconnect with militias and other forces to 
bring its strength up from 3,000 to 6,500 on the eve of the attack on Trenton, and by the follow-
on attack at Princeton, Washington had 7,500 effective soldiers.329 
For approximately two months, in November and December 1776, Howe had a better 
than four-to-one advantage in troop strength; Washington picked up some militia to lower the 
gap to two-and-a-half-to-one in early January 1777. However, Howe negated his own numerical 
advantage through his use of small, separate garrisons in New Jersey, which made an exceptional 
opportunity for Washington. This also shows the period of maximal danger, running from late 
November to early December, when Howe’s British forces had significantly superior numbers 
and the ability to run down, find, and finish the Continental Army.  
 
Washington’s attack at Trenton and Princeton 
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On September 30, 1776, General George Washington wrote to his cousin and home manager, 
Lund Washington, on the status of his forces and summed up his growing sense of despair: “In 
confidence I tell you that I never was in such an unhappy, divided state since I was born.”330 
In the Washington archive, there are records for 44 separate Councils of War which 
Washington convened in the course of his military career, one of which occurred after a defeat in 
the Battle of White Plains, on November 6, 1776, which “unanimously agreed” to “throw a 
Body of Troops into the Jerseys immediately.”331 Having withdrawn from New York, this was 
the step Washington’s forces took to move into New Jersey. 
At this point Washington wrote to his brother, John Augustine Washington, on 
November 6 and November 19, 1776; the earlier part of the letter, begun on November 6, 
described General Washington’s assessment of what happened at White Plains, that the loss 
occurred was not of great significance.332 
Then, on November 19, Washington continued the same letter from Hackensack, New 
Jersey.  He described the loss of Fort Washington, which Washington felt badly about as he had 
disagreed with the decision, which he had allowed his subordinate, Major General Nathanael 
Greene, to make; Washington ended the letter with a noteworthy, somber line, “I am wearied 
almost to death with the retrog[r]ade Motions of things.”333 
On December 10, 1776, Washington again described the strategic situation to his cousin 
and estate manager, Lund Washington: 
 
I wish to Heaven it was in my power to give you a more favourable Acct of our situation … 
My numbers, till joind by the Philadelphia Militia did not exceed 3000 Men fit for duty—
now we may be about 5000 to oppose Howes whole Army, that part of it excepted which 
said under the Comd. of General Clinton. I tremble for Philadelphia, nothing in my opinion 
but General Lee’s speedy arrival, who has been long expected, tho still at a distance (with 
about 3000 Men) can save it. We have brought over, and destroyed, all the Boats we could 
lay our hands on, upon the Jersey Shore for many Miles above and below this place; but it is 
next to impossible to guard a Shore for 60 Miles with less than half the Enemys numbers; 
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when by force, or Stratagem they may suddenly attempt a passage in many different 
places.334 
 
If this was not bleak enough, on December 13, one of Washington’s subordinates 
reported Major General Charles Lee, widely considered the most capable general in the 
Continental Army, was captured by the British.335 
On December 14, Washington raised the potential for attack for the first time, as part of 
a description of his military predicament to Connecticut Governor Jonathan Trumbull.  
 
[The enemy across from us] want of means of transportation has hitherto hindered the 
Enemy from making any attempt to cross the Delaware, and I hope, unless the course of 
the seasons entirely changes, that the weather will soon prevent their making use of Boats, if 
they should build them. 
Whereas by coming on they may, in conjunction with my present Forces and that 
under Genl Lee enable us to attempt a stroke upon the Forces of the Enemy, who lay a 
good deal scattered, and to all appearance, in a state of security. A lucky blow in this 
Quarter would be fatal to them, and would most certainly raise the spirits of the People, 
which are quite sunk by our late misfortunes.336 [Note: Though Lee was captured, his forces 
were not and continued to move to support Washington’s main body of troops.] 
 
This is the first written evidence of Washington’s decision to attack British forces. On 
December 7, British forces were within one hour of Washington’s retreating columns. On 
December 8, Howe decided to suspend the campaign for the season, and put his order out to 
garrison for the winter on December 13. On the same day, Washington learned of Lee’s capture, 
and on December 14, 1776, Washington wrote to Governor Trumbull and assessed the enemy as 
“scattered” and a “blow…would be fatal” to the British. 
Even if Washington assessed it was time “to attempt a stroke upon the Forces of the 
Enemy,” he also wrote to Lund Washington on December 17, 1776, with a pessimistic message: 
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Our Cause has also receivd a severe blow in the Captivity of General Lee—Unhappy Man! 
taken by his own Imprudence! 
[Y]our immagination can scarce extend to a situation more distressing than mine—
Our only dependance now, is upon the Speedy Inlistment of a New Army; if this fails us, I 
think the game will be pretty well up, as from disaffection, and want of spirit & fortitude, 
the Inhabitants instead of resistance, are offering Submission, & taking protections from 
Genl Howe in Jersey.337 
 
In this, Washington presented the doubts he had not shown to Governor Trumbull. This 
was a message Washington repeated, in near desperation for more authority to build a larger 
army, to John Hancock on December 20, 1776: 
 
[T]en days more will put an end to the existence of our Army…[we have made] a mistaken 
dependance upon Militia, [and they] have been the Origin of all our misfortunes, and the 
great accumulation of our Debt… 
[T]he Enemy are daily gathering strength from the disaffected; This strength, like a 
Snowball by rolling, will increase…could any thing but the River Delaware have saved 
Philadelphia?... 
[The militia] leave [us] at last at a critical moment. These Sir, are the men, I am to 
depend upon, Ten days hence…In my judgement this is not a time to stand upon expence 
— our funds are the only Objects of consideration.338 
 
Washington stated he required the authority to reenlist soldiers with financial bonuses. In 
the end, the twin victories at Trenton and Princeton helped propel the Continental Congress to 
give Washington the power to build the army he had requested.339 The reasoned arguments 
Washington put to in writing had their desired effect in maintaining the Continental Army as an 
able fighting force. The two efforts reinforced one another: military wins brought political 
support; political support brought soldiers; soldiers brought military wins. At the same time, 
Washington dealt with the next course of action against the British at Trenton, he concerned 
himself with force structure issues that later became crucial to the continued existence of the 
Continental Army.                                                         
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On December 21, 1776, Pennsylvania Governor Robert Morris wrote a secretive, veiled 
expression of support for Washington’s impending attack against Trenton and offered “Joyfull 
tidings,” as well as “sincere prayers for Success.”340 
Not privy to the plan for attack yet, Washington’s aide Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Reed 
wrote to Washington on December 22, 1776, and independently made the case for some attack, 
which by then, unbeknownst to Reed, had already been determined: 
 
[S]omething must be attempted to revive our expiring Credit give our Cause some Degree 
of Reputation… the scattered divided State of the Enemy affords us a fair Oppy of trying 
what our Men will do when called to an offensive Attack…Something must be attempted 
before the 60 Days expires which the Commissioners have allowed.341 
 
This message makes clear the British sixty-day pardon deadline had an impact on 
Continental Army decisions and was likely a factor in the decision to act. Washington responded 
to Reed the next day, on December 23, and informed him of the attack: 
 
The bearer is sent…to inform you that Christmas day at Night, one hour before day is the 
time fixed upon for our Attempt on Trenton. For heaven’s sake keep this to yourself, as the 
discovery of it may prove fatal to us, our numbers, sorry I am to say, being less than I had 
any conception of—but necessity, dire necessity will—nay must justify any Attempt. 
If I had not been fully convinced before of the Enemys designs I have now ample 
testimony of their Intentions to attack Philadelphia so soon as the Ice will afford the means 
of conveyance. 
P.S. I have orderd our Men to be provided with three days Provisions ready 
Cook’d; with which, and their Blankets they are to March, for if we are successful which 
heaven grant & other Circumstances favour we may push on.342 
 
Washington acknowledged the attack was necessary; but also in the post script he stated 
clearly that he was prepared to continue the attack beyond Trenton, foreshadowing his next 
move on Princeton. 
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On December 24, Washington wrote to commanders in the Connecticut and 
Massachusetts militias to “press” and “march forward with as much expedition as possible to 
this place or wherever my Head Quarters may be.”343 Washington anticipated he would be on 
the move, even post-Trenton, as otherwise he would simply have given them a single specific 
location. This provides further evidence Washington planned a follow-on attack. 
The same day, December 24, 1776, Washington wrote to John Hancock in what must 
have been by then a familiar caustic tone: 
 
That I should dwell upon the subject of our distresses cannot be more disagreable to 
Congress than it is painfull to myself. 
[V]ery few of the men have inlisted…amounting in the whole at this time from 
Fourteen to Fifteen hundred effective men. This handfull and such Militia as may chuse to 
join me will then compose our Army… 
Genl Howe has a number of Troops cantoned in the Towns bordering on & near 
the Delaware, his intentions to pass as soon as the ice is sufficiently formed—to invade 
Pensylvania and possess himself of Philadelphia if possible. To guard against his designs & 
the execution of them shall employ my every exertion, but how is this to be done?... 
The inclosed Letter from the Paymaster Genl will shew the state of the military 
Chest and the necessity of a large and immediate supply of Cash. The advances to the 
Officers for bounty and the recruiting service are great, besides the Regiments at the 
expiration of this Month, will require payment of their claims.344 
 
Again, this speaks to Washington’s great, continual concern: the development of a 
sustainable, capable, professional military force. At the same time, Washington was also 
concerned about diplomacy, in this case, with Native American tribes; he wrote on December 
24, 1776: 
 
Our Enemy the King of Great Britain endeavoured to Stir up all the Indians from Canada 
to South Carolina Against Us, But our Bretheren of the Six Nations and their Allies the 
Shawanese and Delewares would not hearken to the Advice of the Messengers sent among 
them but kept fast hold of our Ancient Covenant Chain; The Cherokees and the Southern 
Tribes were foolish enough to listen to them, and to take up the Hatchet Against us, Upon                                                         
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this our Warriours went into their Country, burnt their Houses, destroyed their Corn, and 
Oblidged them to sue for peace and give Hostages for their future Good Behaviour. 
Now Brothers never lett the Kings Wicked Councellors turn your Hearts Against 
Me and your Bretheren of this Country...345 
 
This was defense diplomacy, deterrence through threat, and international relations; 
Washington policed up potentially wayward allies and ensured his organization kept coherent 
unity and suffered no fallouts to the British. 
On December 25, the day of execution, Washington wrote in his General Orders: “Each 
Brigade to be furnish’d with two good Guides” and they ought to be prepared to spike artillery 
pieces and drag off cannon. Advance guards were to “make prisoners of all going in or coming 
out of Town.” And, above all, “a profound silence to be enjoyn’d & no man to quit his Ranks on 
the pain of Death.”346 The same day Washington wrote to Colonel John Cadwalader at 6:00 p.m., 
“Notwithstanding the discouraging Accounts I have received from Col Reed of what might be 
expected from the Operations below, I am determined, as the night is favourable, to cross the 
River, & make the attack upon Trenton in the Morning. If you can do nothing real, at least create 
as great a diversion as possible.”347 
Washington’s week-and-a-half from December 25, 1776 to January 4, 1777, is rightly 
considered one of the most successful in all of recorded military history. On December 25, he 
led 1,400 men to attack the 1,400 Hessians in garrison at Trenton. The other intended American 
support columns were held back by weather, but Washington’s force did hit the garrison from 
two sides, the Hessians were caught off guard; Washington’s men sustained only four wounded, 
and captured 948 Hessians and killed or wounded another 114. The following week Washington 
attacked and defeated the enemy’s garrison at Princeton, where Washington took thirty soldiers 
and fourteen officers as casualties, and believed he captured or killed 500 to 600, against losses 
Howe estimated at 276.348 
 
3.7 Campaign Judgments, 1776 
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General Howe’s challenge was to build on tactical military success from August to November 
1776, and determine the best way to terminate the war. General Clinton counseled continued 
pursuit, or at least to consolidate forces to avoid distributed attacks designed to defeat the British 
in detail. From these options, Howe’s choice was to culminate and garrison his forces in 
relatively small detachments across New Jersey to show the Americans the extent of British 
control over the land. This choice was shown to be inaccurate through the twin losses at 
Trenton and Princeton. Moreover, this judgment ultimately degraded British unity of effort in 
the 1777 campaign, and resulted in French entry into the war which ended British sea 
supremacy.349 
Washington’s challenge was to determine what course of action to pursue, having lost 
multiple battles from August to November 1776. Considering the Continental Army’s relative 
resource imbalance when compared to the British, Washington could have culminated his 
campaign as Howe did. Yet he attacked. Washington’s choice to attack at Trenton and Princeton 
was correct and immensely significant as a military success. In addition, he executed the 
judgment and action while maintaining a wide lens, as shown in his dispatches leading up to the 
twin attacks, which ensured the political and military aspects to the campaign were in harmony.  
 
3.8 Final Assessment and Formal Characteristics 
 
This section considers two critical aspects of Washington’s observed characteristics: his 
judgment and the thinking that underpinned his decisions; and the formal characteristics that can 
be observed from his life that likely had an impact on his judgment (i.e. education, experiences, 
personal characteristics, and post-war life). 
While General George Washington certainly was not perfect, as previous material shows, 
there is no shortage of writers and historians that have concluded his performance in supreme 
command displayed military genius.350 
But why? What accounts for this lofty characterization? Some believe it comes from his 
instinct for power, and how to use it.351 Others argue it was a judgment that was not clouded by 
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extraneous concepts and ideas.352 Still others might believe it was more than judgment, rather, it 
was a keen sense of decision when given a perplexing problem by others.353 
So what can be learned from Washington’s thinking in terms of this judgment, as well as 
his empathy and grit? 
It is helpful to review Howe’s judgments and decisions, as they are they are the standard 
against which we might judge Washington. From the campaign’s opening moments, Howe 
believed the rebels were few in number and could be convinced by a show of strength to submit. 
Howe did not seek to annihilate the Continental Army, or even a direct attack to reduce their 
material resources (though he did capture a good amount of terrain during the campaign, 
particularly in New York). Howe sought instead to exhaust the rebels’ willingness to fight and 
prosecute the war; to show them they had no avenue to win against such an enormous and 
professional army and navy. So even when Howe had an opportunity to encircle and destroy the 
Continental Army, he did not take it, and his preferred course of action was three attempts at 
pardons and peace offers. These judgments reveal Howe’s larger war strategy, and, importantly, 
the critical conditions against which Washington had to fight. 
Washington prioritized survival for his force; in that, a strategy of exhaustion was his 
only real option. His best course was to try to convince the British forces and government that 
their efforts in America would come to no avail or at such a high price it would not be worth the 
effort. 
The nearness of the Continental Congress meant Washington had to trade daily 
messages with his own key political figures, and so he had to navigate their needs and desires. 
This engagement was a significant part of his decision-making with respect to New York; both 
to stay in and defend the city in July and August 1776, and when, and how, to leave in 
September 1776. He also had to manage hard feelings from key subordinates, as when some of 
Washington’s best generals argued for the destruction of the city as a way of indirectly harming 
the British war effort. Navigating this issue was difficult for Washington for both political and 
military command reasons, but paid dividends in both ways because he gained the trust and 
confidence of the Continental Congress, as well as maintained the loyalty of his key 
subordinates. 
In evaluating Washington’s judgment, historian Jeremy Black adopts a fairly narrow view, 
calling Washington “a good political general, rather like Eisenhower. We’re not talking about the 
most astute reader of terrain or topography, and indeed as a battlefield commander he gets it                                                         
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wrong at Long Island.”354 Criticisms like this divide and conquer; they derisively dismiss the 
importance of working within a democratic political system as a senior military figure and 
simultaneously hammer away at a single tactical flaw. But supreme command is broader than 
either of these; supreme command is both about the ability to make correct judgments about the 
use of force, as well as coherent judgments with respect to maintaining political-military unity of 
effort. And the only measure that truly matters when in supreme command is cumulative, 
relative performance. In this case, the ledger speaks for itself: Washington bested Howe in the 
1776 campaign and into the early days of 1777, survived the greatest threat to the fledgling 
American war effort, and ultimately won the war. And the twin intangible traits Washington 
displayed the most in this effort, empathy and grit, can be seen in several of the campaign’s 
important moments. 
Exemplary supreme command demands an exceptional sense of empathy. This manifests 
itself in several ways: externally toward opponents, but also internally, amongst allies, peers, 
subordinates, and political elites. Washington showed this trait many times over. 
His defense of New York was a decision made specifically in support of his republican 
government and in appropriate deference to political figures.355 Washington’s initial decision to 
stay and hold New York as well as his thoughtful dispatches explaining his position and looming 
threats, show a supreme commander with an superior sense of emotional intelligence in holding 
onto the trust of his political leadership. 
Then, though possessing a natural orientation toward aggressive action, Washington 
withdrew his forces from New York when the circumstances changed. He listened to his 
subordinate generals and others, evidenced by his numerous councils of war. He presented 
opposing and dissenting subordinate views as an honest broker. He never held back from those 
that disagreed with him, and early in the war he told a key staff officer: “I can bear to hear of 
imputed or real errors” and “the man who wishes to stand well in the opinion of others must do 
this, because he is thereby enabled to correct his faults or remove his prejudices.”356 Washington 
listened to others, which benefitted his campaign and war efforts. 
Washington was empathetic on several levels, sometimes at once. During this campaign, 
he showed himself able to hold an omni-directional perspective, which can be seen in his 
dispatches not just to members of Congress, but also state governors, Native American chiefs, 
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militia leaders, in addition to the normal variety of subordinate generals and military 
commanders. He was clearly concerned with many issues beyond the battlefield. 
While Washington wrote that it would give him “infinite pleasure to afford protection to 
every individual and to every Spot of Ground in the whole of the United States,” he knew full-
well he could not due to resource constraints and instead often took pains to courteously explain 
why he was unable to meet such requests.357 He spoke plainly and politely with politicians of all 
types, and earned their trust. 
Empathy is an important characteristic in supreme command, but so is grit. And grit 
manifests itself differently; it has two parts as a personal dedication to a broad course of action, 
as well as commitment to specific decisions even against withering criticism and opposition. 
We can see these both with Washington in this campaign. As to his personal dedication 
despite doubts, Washington’s decision to attack at Trenton and Princeton in spite of his 
immense personal uncertainty shows his grit. Reading the flurry of dispatches shows just how 
concerned he was that the effort would not succeed, yet he kept these worries to himself and 
projected confidence. Second, his decision to withdraw from New York, while supported by 
many of his subordinate generals, was an action that he took despite knowing the reputational 
costs for such a decision. And, his insistence that the British use his formal title in their peace 
negotiations in July 1776 punctuated his personal commitment to the cause of American 
independence. Above all else, he maintained his focus on the goal of a separate and independent 
country.358 
There were also moments of grit in his decision-making with respect to specific choices. 
On assuming position in New York, Major General Charles Lee had informed Washington 
about how difficult it would be to defend a peninsula surrounded by navigable waters against the 
British navy. Yet, at that point, Washington’s guidance from Congress was clear: hold New York. 
And so he stuck to that decision. Also, similarly difficult, when Washington decided to leave 
New York, the Congress asked him not to burn it, against the wishes of a large contingent of his 
subordinates. Again, Washington held to a tough decision.  
 
Formal Characteristics 
 
What might researchers take from Washington’s formal life characteristics?                                                         
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First, Washington was self-educated to a degree hard to comprehend in the modern era. 
As a wealthy person said to be one of the richest in America at the time, his personal library was 
vast and diverse.359 Though not exhaustive, a short list of the books and general subjects there at 
the time of his death helpfully provides a glimpse into his effort in understanding the world 
around him: 
 
An Encyclopedia, Principles of Taxation, a book on animal husbandry, Langley on Gardening, a 
book on horse diseases, Edward Gibbon’s The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman 
Empire, books of poetry, Georges Louis Leclerc Buffon’s Natural History, histories of 
Louisiana, Spain and Ireland, Shakespeare, Don Quixote, a book on projectiles, Walter 
Minto’s Theory of Planets, Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, a book on arithmetic, a Bible, a 
book on architecture, a book on Native American tribes in America, a book on international 
commerce, a book on international and several on domestic and criminal law, a book on 
geography and several atlases, on Seneca the Roman philosopher, on agriculture.360  
 
Washington was also well-read when it came to military subjects (again, not a full list, but 
enough to make a point): 
 
A book on the French Marshal Maurice de Saxe on a new model for the French army, a 
book on national defense, a book on the French Revolution, An Essay on the Art of War by 
the French Count Turpin (translated by Captain Joseph Otway), Walter Harte’s history of 
Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus, a book by John Muller on fortifications, essays on field 
artillery by John Anderson, and a treatise on military discipline.361  
 
Perhaps most important and interesting, Washington had a lot of books and library 
entries related to his British opponents, including: 
 
General Henry Clinton’s book The American Rebellion: Sir Henry Clinton’s Narrative of His 
Campaigns, 1775-1782, a book on the reign of George III, an entry titled a “List of Military 
officers British & Irish in 1777,” another was “Advice of Officers of the British Army,” and 
another “List of Officers under Sr. Wm. Howe in America.”362                                                          
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In surveying such intellectual width and depth, one cannot help but be struck by 
Washington’s commitment to self-study.363 In amplifying this point, in the very last political 
letter he wrote before his death, Washington advocated that building an American military 
academy was “of primary importance to this country.”364 
Of course, Washington’s life and military experiences include his uneven performance as 
a 22-year-old officer on his mission into the American frontier in 1754, from which his journal 
entries would be published for public consumption.365 Beyond this early publication, Washington 
was a prolific writer, both for professional reasons and due to his personal ability to 
communicate with the written word. Multiple historians have attested that for Washington, letter 
writing and distant communication was a key part of his command.366 
As to specifics, Washington received command of the Continental Army at age 43, and 
was 44 during the campaign in this study. Compared with modern times, this seems very young, 
as military officer’s today take much longer to ascend to such a rank. As to his temperament, 
several historians mentioned his aloofness.367 Washington has also been described as having an 
enormous temper, a distinct streak of pessimism, was occasionally disposed to tears, though he 
held all these in with a remarkable degree of self-control.368 
After the war, of course, he was to become the first president of the United States, an 
honor that spoke to his interpersonal skills as well as the honor his countrymen afforded him in 
the wake of his military victory that safeguarded the country’s birth. 
In the end, Washington was never simply one thing. Objectively, his judgment was 
superior to General William Howe’s. And, evaluating Washington more generally, Edward 
Lengel has said it best in pointing out that Washington’s success came, 
 
not so much because he excelled in any particular area—there were better strategists, 
tacticians, administrators, and politicians among his contemporaries—but because he 
possessed all of the qualities his country required, and in perfect combination. To survive its 
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difficult birth, America did not just need a courageous soldier, a savvy politician, a hard-
working manager, a charismatic leader, a principled believer in democracy, or an intelligent 
general; it needed all of these things, and in one man. George Washington was that man. No 
one else could have taken his place.369 
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4. Ulysses S. Grant 
 
4.1 Strategic Context in 1864 
 
Just weeks before the American Civil War’s beginning, president-elect Abraham Lincoln gave a 
speech to the New Jersey state legislature in Trenton in February 1861, the site of General 
George Washington’s great victory in December 1776. Reflecting on the Revolutionary War, 
Lincoln said, 
 
There must have been something more than common that those men struggled 
for…something even more than National Independence…something that held out a great 
promise to all the people of the world for all time to come. I am exceedingly anxious that 
the Union, the Constitution, and the liberties of the people shall be perpetuated in 
accordance with the original idea for which that struggle was made.370  
 
Both sides in the American Civil War, North and South, invoked the Revolutionary 
War’s spirit, as well as the exploits of the nation’s patriot forefathers. 
The stakes in the Civil War were certainly as high. Without Lincoln’s reelection in 1864, 
and a potential war-ending compromise, some have observed the United States modernity 
knows would have devolved into at least two, and maybe more, separate countries.371 To depict 
such factionalism, a modern geographer has depicted the logical extension of disunion with a 
map that lists all state partition and secession proposals, which would have resulted in an 
ungovernable 124 “states.”372 
Why did the United States stay intact? The Northern victory in the war, certainly; but 
what specific reasons helped put the war on course to turn out as it did? One important 
consideration must be the Union’s successful military campaign waged in 1864. And the 
judgments and decisions made by the supreme commander of that military force: Ulysses S. 
Grant. 
                                                        
370 Lincoln quoted in James McPherson, Tried By War: Abraham Lincoln As Commander In Chief 
(New York: The Penguin Press, 2008), 1-2. Abraham Lincoln, The Collected Works of Abraham 
Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 1:509-510.  
371 David Allan Johnson, Decided on the Battlefield: Grant, Sherman, Lincoln and the Election of 1864 
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2012), 261. 
372 Andrew Shears, “From Absaroka to Yazoo: The United States That Could Have been,” 
(December 8, 2011). Text and graphic, accessed February 26, 2015,  
http://andrewshears.com/2011/12/08/the-united-states-that-couldve-been/. 
ML Cavanaugh 
On Supreme Command 
 
 90 
Before Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant took supreme command of all Union 
armies, there had been eight men in key Union Army military leadership roles: Winfield Scott, 
George McClellan, and Henry Halleck as generals-in-chief; in addition, there were five 
commanders in critical roles leading the bulk of forces in the primary eastern theater: Irvin 
McDowell, Ambrose Burnside, John Pope, Joseph Hooker, and George Meade. With varying 
opportunities, some more and some less, none of these generals were able to secure strategic 
victory. As Lincoln wrote, “No general yet found can face the arithmetic, but the end of the war 
will be at hand when he shall be discovered.”373 
By 1864, the Confederates held a large, contiguous piece of terrain in the American 
South, including all the South’s major cities except the Mississippi port cities of New Orleans 
and Vicksburg. In part, the South was still intact because these eight Union military commanders 
did not make significant inroads against the Confederacy. 
How was it that Grant succeeded when so many before had failed? At the beginning of 
1864, Grant recalled that in the principal eastern theater of the war, “the opposing forces stood 
in substantially the same relations towards each other” as in 1861.374 As Assistant Secretary of 
War Charles Dana put it, after he was placed in supreme command, “Grant in eleven months 
secured the prize with less loss than his predecessors suffered in failing to win it during a 
struggle of three years.”375 Grant stopped Lee’s army and held it at bay, enabled other Union 
commanders to aggressively pursue gains, and brought unity to the Union war effort that 
ultimately earned the victory in under a single year.376 
Not only that, but over the course of the war, Grant as a military commander forced 
three Confederate armies to surrender: at Fort Donelson (1862), Vicksburg (1863), and at 
Appomattox (1865).377 Grant was, if nothing else, effective. 
Yet popular culture tells a different story, that of the butcher that merely had more men 
to sacrifice to gain victory.378 Or, more recently, from a popular television series: “Do you know                                                         
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how Grant defeated Lee? He had more men. That’s all. He was willing to let them die. It was 
butchery, not strategy, which won the war.”379 This argument, advanced in different forms by 
messengers as diverse as President Lincoln’s wife, Mary Todd Lincoln, and the purveyors of the 
famous “Lost Cause” myth, in sympathy with the South, who advanced the “momentum of 
numbers” explanation for the South’s loss as early as 1866.380 In this telling, Grant did nothing. 
Numbers determined the result, plain and simple. 
Of course, numbers did matter. Grant’s 1864 campaign features a relatively superior 
opponent in material terms, struggling to compel an abnormally powerful, large landholding 
insurgency into acquiescence. In the end, the United States accomplished the two pillars of its 
war policy: preserve the Union and purge slavery. This result was accomplished by military 
action. The real question is how Grant was able to secure it. 
Both sides had advantages and disadvantages. The Union comprised twenty states with 
approximately twenty-two million people, 500,000 of whom were slaves at the war’s outset.381 
Nine million people lived in the eleven Confederate states that seceded, roughly one-third of 
which were slaves. Approximately two million men fought for the Union, about half of all 
citizens that were of military age and available to serve; some three-fourths of all white Southern 
males served in the Confederate military, for a total of approximately one million in arms. This 
distinct Union manpower advantage carried over into material resources, and they enjoyed 
advantages in nearly all resources needed for making war.382 
While the Union had a large industrial resource base and greater depth for recruiting 
soldiers, it also kept hold of a functioning political party system that could make national 
decisions. Parties apportioned power and made decisions, while the Confederacy had yet to 
create and develop a system to make judgments on political and strategic matters. Despite all 
these advantages, of course, the war’s outcome was never to be decided by an accounting of 
supplies.383 People matter, as do the decisions they make.                                                         
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Grant’s opponent was Confederate General Robert E. Lee, a West Point graduate, 
second in his Class of 1829. While there he was famously studious, never having earned a 
demerit for bad or improper behavior, and was a regular visitor at the library. While a cadet, he 
checked out: 
 
Bland’s Algebraical Problems, Bonnycastle’s Elements of Geometry, [Machiavelli’s] Art of War, 
Moliere, Duane’s Military Dictionary, Atkinson’s Epitome of Navigation, Chastelleux’s Travels in 
North America in 1780, 1781, and 1782, Garden’s Anecdotes of the Revolutionary War in America, 
Dufour’s Memorial pour les Travaux de Guerre, the North American Review, Vols. 21, 12, 18, 
Voltaire’s Ses Oeuvres Complete, Vols. 3, 4, 6, 10, 14, 16, the Westminster Review, Vols. 1, 2, 
Hamilton’s Works, Vol 2, Martin’s Elements of Optics, Pemberton’s View of Newton’s Philosophy, 
Ferguson’s Astronomy, Vols. 1 & 2, Bullet’s Architecture Practique, Bonaparte’s Sés Mémoires 
écrits par Montholon et Gourgard, Vol. 2, 3, Segur, Phillipe de, Histoire de Napoleon de la Grande, 
Armée pendant 1812, Sherburne’s Life and Character of Paul Jones384 
 
Lee served in the Mexican War and had other important commands before the Civil 
War. Famously, as the war began, he turned down a senior Union Army command to avoid 
raising his sword against his home state of Virginia. Lee’s life represented a passion and 
dedication to his state.385 
While Jefferson Davis was the Confederacy’s president, Robert E. Lee was its supreme 
commander. After a stint advising President Jefferson Davis from Confederate headquarters in 
Richmond, Lee took command of the Army of Northern Virginia on June 1, 1862 and held the 
position until the end of the war. While technically Lee did not become the Confederacy’s 
“general-in-chief” (the term used in those days for a supreme commander) until late in the war, 
this was merely an after-the-fact affirmation of a widely agreed upon truth: Lee was the most 
important military decision-maker in the Confederacy from 1862 until the war’s end in 1865.386 
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Writers have professed the “genius” of Robert E. Lee.387 Historians rate his performance 
in the Overland Campaign well, equal parts aggressive and competent in a tough situation. 388 
Moreover, at the height of the campaign, he was venerated. This can be seen in the diary of one 
of the senior surgeons that served under Lee, who called Lee a “genius” while fighting in 
Virginia on July 30, 1864, and that “No man on this continent or any other now fills so large an 
important a place to so many people.”389 Moreover, an Irish visitor to Richmond wrote in early 
1865 that Lee was “the idol of his soldiers & the Hope of His Country…[T]he prestige which 
surrounds his person & the almost fanatical belief in his judgement & capacity…is the one idea 
of an entire people.”390 Lee was well regarded at the time, and still is today. 
Grant was a more national figure. Born in Ohio, he grew up in Missouri and Illinois, and 
felt at home anywhere in the United States his wife was.391 Grant attended West Point, and 
graduated in the middle of his Class of 1843.392 After fighting in the Mexican War, and service in 
remote Northern California, Grant left the army in the 1850s and he re-enlisted when the war 
began. His early service in the American Civil War was characterized by success in the Western 
Theater: he forced a Confederate Army to surrender at Fort Donelson in 1862, was surprised at, 
and ultimately fought to a draw at Shiloh in Tennessee, and forced a second Confederate Army 
to surrender at Vicksburg, Mississippi, on July 4, 1863. 
In March, 1864, following a political argument in Washington over revival of the rank of 
“lieutenant general,” Grant was elevated to this rank and the supreme command of all Union 
armies.393 This title was necessary for Grant to outrank the other major generals in the Union 
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Army who had been senior by date of rank (i.e. they had reached the rank of major general 
earlier and therefore technically outranked him). Though President Abraham Lincoln conferred 
the honor on Grant in March, the political posturing gave Grant time in January and February 
1864 to consider plans for the upcoming year’s campaign. 
During the first months of 1864, Grant thought about how he would achieve the 
North’s war aims to keep the Union and end the practice of slavery. The Union’s military 
strategies to achieve these two aims had changed over time. The first was colloquially referred to 
as the “Anaconda Plan,” in which Mexican War hero and general-in-chief, Brevet Lieutenant 
General Winfield Scott advised the president to blockade the entire South from the Atlantic 
Ocean and Mississippi River, to be followed by a methodical, southward-rolling, ground 
campaign. This was rejected early, owing to its slowness and political infeasibility. Next, Major 
General George B. McClellan followed Scott in supreme command, and thrust his support 
behind a campaign to take the enemy’s capital at Richmond, Virginia, in which McClellan would 
build up a massive army to seize the Confederate capitol in 1862. But while McClellan stuck to 
this strategic concept into 1863, it was never fully activated, and so never achieved its aim. Grant 
would opt for a different strategy. 
Over time, some have deliberately diminished Grant’s abilities as a supreme commander 
due to his close proximity to the well-regarded President Abraham Lincoln and the brilliant 
Major General William T. Sherman. But there are two episodes from this campaign that 
demonstrate Grant’s ultimate judgment authority on strategic and military matters. 
While Lincoln was involved in strategic matters, he deferred judgment to Grant on 
nearly every major issue relating to the military campaign. Later in life, when asked about a visit 
Lincoln made to Grant’s headquarters’ toward the end of the war, and whether or not Lincoln 
was actually the one directing the army at that time, Grant said he had been the one to invite 
Lincoln, and that, habitually, “I merely told [Lincoln] what I had done, not what I meant to 
do.”394 
One example from the campaign is that when Grant wanted to remove Major General 
Nathaniel Banks from command, who was a friend and political ally of Lincoln’s, Lincoln 
allowed Grant the leeway to make the final determination with regard to Banks. And, with tact, 
Grant came up with a  
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compromise that would leave Banks in administrative command of the Department of the 
Gulf but would place Maj. Gen. Edward R.S. Canby in field command of the army. Lincoln 
was agreeable—especially since he needed Banks to carry out his reconstruction policy in 
Louisiana.395  
 
In this, Lincoln allowed Grant the ultimate decision, and Grant showed a deft understanding of 
political realities in an election year, and both came to better know the other’s style of leadership. 
This mattered in October 1864, when Grant approved Sherman’s march from the 
recently-taken Atlanta to the coast (the “March to the Sea”); Grant wrote to Sherman: “If you 
are satisfied the trip to the sea-coast can be made…you may make it, destroying all the railroad 
south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you think best.”396 
Lincoln disagreed with the move, but let Grant decide. Over the course of the next 
month, Grant and Sherman conducted dispatches that further refined their objectives. Sherman 
wrote to Grant on November 6, 1864, just days before Lincoln’s re-election:  
 
I propose to act in such a manner against the material resources of the South as utterly to 
negative [sic] Davis boasted threat and promises of protection…If we can march a well-
appointed army right through his territory, it is a demonstration to the world, foreign and 
domestic, that we have a power which Davis cannot resist. This may not be war, but rather 
statesmanship. 
 
Importantly, Sherman’s efforts were always in support of Grant’s larger effort, and 
Sherman wrote to Grant that his own efforts “would have a material effect upon [Grant’s] 
campaign in Virginia.”397 This cooperation was invaluable. 
The long 1864 campaign, running from May into the late fall, encompasses the narrower 
time period that most historians consider the “Overland Campaign” (which ran from May to                                                         
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June 1864).398 The two forces grappled over this entire period, and when viewed all the way 
through Lincoln’s re-election in November, this longer time horizon provides a more 
comprehensive view into understanding why the war turned out as it did. 
During this time, Grant held a material advantage over Lee. But Lee had the benefit of 
acting on the defensive, and had local knowledge of the terrain which favored his objectives, 
particularly several rivers that forced Grant’s Union to ford and cross.399 Lee knew his men, 
having already spent two years at the helm of the Army of Northern Virginia. Grant was new to 
the Eastern Theater, with all his prior service having come in the West. 
The Union had a much more difficult military and political objective to achieve: a 
victorious Union had to seize and hold territory in the South, and the Confederacy was 
enormous (750,000 square miles). The tactical and operational geography favored the defenders, 
and the defenders had a deeper military tradition than the North, particularly in its seven state-
level military academies.400 
With respect to tactical and operational military measurements, the Union was stronger 
in the Eastern Theater. In 1864, in the Army of the Potomac, Grant enjoyed a “significant, if not 
overwhelming, numerical advantage, fielding 95,583 infantry, 15,298 cavalry, 8,000 artillerymen 
and 274 guns. Putting aside [the] sick and those used up in garrisons, Grant had an ‘effective’ 
force of 101,895.”401 And yet, large as this was, it was smaller than the Union force Major 
General Joseph Hooker had put in the field the previous year. Hooker’s Army of the Potomac 
held a greater than two-to-one advantage in May 1863, yet was defeated by Lee’s Army of 
Northern Virginia at Chancellorsville.402 
This time, roughly one year later with Chancellorsville behind him, in May 1864, “Lee 
could count on 57,811 infantry and gunners and 8,543 cavalry, plus 200 guns, giving him an 
‘effective’ strength of 61,025 men.”403 Lee was outnumbered one-and-two-thirds-to-one in 1864, 
which was not as bad as it had been the year prior when he had beaten Hooker at 
Chancellorsville. 
Lee was the condition that Grant had to contend with as he fought in 1864, and he was 
indeed a formidable opponent.404 The greatest divergence between the two was age and health. 
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Grant was younger, at age 42, while Lee was 57.405 Health-wise, Grant was in better shape after 
several years at war, while the conflict was starting to take a toll on Lee.406 Though both 
continued in supreme command to the end of the war, Lee was affected, physically, by the hard 
campaigning and took ill at one point during the fighting at the Battle of the North Anna 
(River), in late May 1864.407 
Confederate States of America President Jefferson Davis set the opposition’s policy 
objectives. Davis’s government was determined to secede from the United States to form several 
independently sovereign republics to maintain the institution of slavery beyond the writ of the 
U.S. government.408 As such, the Confederate military objective was merely to survive, a lower 
bar than the one the Union would have to clear. A Confederate defensive war on home terrain 
was hardly an easy victory for the Union.409 At the war’s beginning, the Confederate military 
strategy was a cordon defense, an attempt to ring the entirety of Confederate territory in an 
effort to deny completely Union access to Southern land. This quickly fell of its own weight, 
because it was impossible for Confederate military resources to defend everywhere. This cordon 
strategy was adopted for political purposes, and subsequently discarded for military ones. 
What emerged later during Lee’s command was the “offensive defensive” strategy: 
tactically offensive thrusts designed to support a wider strategic defensive.410 The challenge was 
timing, precisely when to assume the offensive and when to adopt the defensive. For example, 
when Lee took command in June 1862 with the Union Army of the Potomac at the gates of 
Richmond, Lee attacked Union Major General George McClellan’s forces in the Seven Days 
Battles and pushed the Army of the Potomac out of the Richmond area. From there, Lee 
attacked north and defeated Major General John Pope’s force at the Second Battle of Bull Run 
in August 1862, and continued to strike north until ultimately being fought to a stalemate at 
Antietam, Maryland, in September 1862. Beginning in 1862 and all the way until 1864, Lee 
fought several offensive tactical raids, designed to strike the opponent into abandoning the 
Union’s pro-Union and anti-slavery policy, which was a strategically defensive objective.  
 
4.2 The 1864 Campaign’s Strategic Effect 
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In May 1864, both the Union and Confederacy still had the opportunity to achieve their version 
of victory. The Confederates had control over nearly all their territory; the Union had yet to 
reestablish significant control over the South. By mid-November 1864, with Lee pinned down, 
Atlanta and the Shenandoah Valley in Union possession, all of which supported President 
Lincoln’s election victory and second term ahead, there was no more potential for a Confederate 
victory. Grant’s successful campaign in 1864 caused this change in the war. 
The campaign in 1864 was the war’s terminal campaign because it denied the 
Confederates their last opportunity at victory. Never again did the Confederacy have a chance to 
secure its war aims. All that remained in 1865 was the Battle of Five Forks and a few minor 
skirmishes on the periphery on the way to the Confederate surrender at Appomattox Court 
House in April 1865. 
At the beginning of the campaign, things had not improved much over the course of the 
war for the United States, and by 1864’s spring, the Union had lost nearly 150,000 casualties in 
Virginia in fighting the Confederates to a draw.411 
By the end of the campaign, Grant denied Lee the ability to fight offensively by holding 
Lee’s forces down in Richmond and Petersburg, Virginia.412 Lee could no longer pursue his 
preferred strategy, the offensive-defensive, because Grant removed Lee’s ability to fight 
offensively. Moreover, Grant’s extreme, continuous pressure forced Lee into tough, unappealing 
choices on the road to Confederate defeat.413 
Grant’s effort also imposed significant costs on the Army of Northern Virginia that were 
simply impossible to replace, which Lee knew. Lee wrote to Confederate Secretary of War James 
Seddon, on August 23, 1864, on the impact of Grant’s attrition: 
  
The subject of recruiting the ranks of our army is growing in importance and has occupied 
much of my attention. Unless some measures can be devised to replace our losses, the 
consequences may be disastrous…Our numbers [are] daily decreasing…Without some 
increase in our strength, I cannot see how we are to escape the natural military 
consequences of the enemy’s numerical superiority.414 
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This was written in late August, after the heavy fighting in May and June, and well into 
the summer stalemate in the trenches around Petersburg and Richmond. Shortly thereafter, Lee 
wrote to President Davis, on September 2, 1864: 
 
I beg leave to call your attention to the importance of…vigorous measures to increase the 
strength of our armies…As matters now stand, we have no troops disposable to meet 
movements of the enemy or strike where opportunity presents, without taking them from 
the trenches or exposing some important point.415 
 
Second, Grant’s judgment for broad, simultaneous action enabled Major General 
William T. Sherman to operate with impunity in the wider South, and Major General Philip 
Sheridan to bring havoc to the Shenandoah Valley. Grant’s choices directly enabled both 
Sherman’s taking of Atlanta on September 2, 1864, as well as Sheridan’s having shut down the 
Shenandoah Valley as a great source of Confederacy’s supply and strength, as well as their 
highway for invasion of the North.416 Sherman and Sheridan wrested the initiative from the 
South.417 Grant’s efforts also fit within the political realities of the time, the requirement to 
defend Washington and to squeeze Lee with the right amount of pressure that would harm the 
Confederates while sufficiently sustaining the morale of the Northern public so they would re-
elect Lincoln to a second term.418 
 
4.3 Could the Confederates have won?  
 
Could this 1864 campaign have gone the other way? Moreover, was the outcome materially pre-
ordained? Was the South doomed to lose? 
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Some make this argument that it was just numbers. In short, because the North had a 
numerical advantage, they were destined to win. These arguments are typically made by those 
that charge Grant was a “butcher” because of the amount of soldiers the Union lost in the 
course of the campaign, which did indeed cause morale to drop in the North.419 
Grant’s immediate critics, such as Edward Pollard, author of 1866’s The Lost Cause, wrote 
that Grant “contained no spark of military genius,” had “no strategy,” and that Grant “proposed 
to decide it by mere competition in the sacrifice of human life.” This echoed Southerners 
confidence in Grant’s ineptitude during the campaign: On May 10, 1864, the Richmond Examiner 
opined if Grant ever got to Richmond, he would command the mere “ruins of an army,” while 
Lee’s adjutant wrote at the time that Grant was “beating his head against a wall.”420 These 
criticisms of Grant suggest his efforts were more about math than strategy. Some also go so far 
as to explain this numerical imbalance was the entire cause of Northern victory.421 
In short, the Union’s resources overwhelmed the Confederates. Material strength won 
the day; might made right. Fortunately, this is not the only recorded judgment on the American 
Civil War; others have looked into causes for victory and defeat and come to different 
conclusions. 
A panel of six award-winning historians convened in 2006 to discuss the question, 
“Could the Confederacy Have Won the Civil War?”422 All six answered in the affirmative. 
Pulitzer Prize-winning Civil War historian James McPherson wrote, “The odds in favor of 
Confederate victory were greater than those in favor of American victory over Britain in 
1776.”423 Another stated that Confederate defeat was certain only after Lincoln’s re-election.424 
What reasons do these historians have to make such claims? 
First, the Confederacy might have won if they could have worn down the will of the 
Northern people; specifically, this would have manifested itself in the Northern voters rejecting 
Lincoln in the election of 1864.425 
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Another important moment that could have gone for the Confederates was Confederate 
Lieutenant General Jubal Early’s raid on Washington in July 1864, which might have frightened 
the Northern people and government more if the raid had been successful.426 
Perhaps the most compelling counterpoint to the inevitability of the Confederacy’s loss 
comes from Lincoln’s own assessment. After the Army of the Potomac’s tactical defeat at Cold 
Harbor in early June 1864, Lincoln’s many political rivals, some inside his own cabinet, started 
pushing to unseat him as the Republican nomination.427 Through July and into August, this fact 
sat with Lincoln, until he prepared a memorandum for his cabinet on August 23:  
 
This morning, and for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this 
Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to co-operate with the 
President elect, as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will 
have secured his election on such ground that he can not possibly save it afterwards.428 
 
Lincoln himself thought he would lose the coming election, despite the advantages that came 
along with being the larger power. What made Lincoln so fearful the Confederacy might win? 
At the time, he knew there were several reasons the Confederates had a chance to win. 
The first was that the Confederacy was still optimistic, which Lincoln would have known 
through various forms of intelligence, and at this point in the war, there was still a strong 
Southern faith in Robert E. Lee’s battlefield skill.429 Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia’s morale 
was as high as it had been when it fought at the Battle of Gettysburg in July, 1863.430 This, 
despite the fact that the Army of Northern Virginia was rationed to “¼ pound of meat and 11/8 
pounds of flour per day” in the period leading up to the campaign.431 While bleak to modern 
eyes, it was common for food to be rationed during war. Yet, an important fact remains that 
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Confederate supply never failed during the entire course of the war.432 Confederate forces in the 
field never ran out of food or bullets. 
By fighting on friendly territory, Lee also enjoyed an intelligence advantage on his 
adversary.433 The Confederates other positives, like the defense.434 Owing to the imbalance in 
firepower over maneuver and communications during the Civil War, defense was typically much 
stronger. The Confederates built their strategy around this fact. Confederate Lieutenant General 
James Longstreet predicted, “if we can break up the enemy’s arrangements early, and throw him 
back, he will not be able to recover his position or his morale until the Presidential election is 
over, and then we shall have a new President to treat with.”435 
The United States government, and Ulysses S. Grant, had an advantage in 1864, if for no 
other reason than they had an established government. However, it must be said that while the 
North had greater resources, they also had the greater burden to attack into the South to 
militarily defeat the insurgency and recapture enemy-held territory. The critical question is 
whether the Confederates possessed the wherewithal to convert their military ability, or fighting 
power, into the outcome they sought. 
In such an assessment, simple head-to-head number counts focus on the measurable to 
the exclusion of the important. The Confederacy was never prepared to simply give in because 
their cause paled in paper comparison to the Union. While Lee’s forces were numerically inferior 
to Grant’s, Lee and the Confederates had enough fighting strength to achieve their desired result 
(i.e. survival). More importantly, Lee had opportunities to strike to achieve his objectives. And, 
in the longer view, numbers do not decide wars436 
 
4.4 Grant: Simultaneous Pressure versus Lee: Offensive Defensive 
 
Grant: Simultaneous Pressure 
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Lieutenant General Ulysses Grant’s first key judgment, at the campaign’s beginning, was to apply 
simultaneous concentric pressure and attack the Confederates on all fronts until the end of the 
war. He said his “general plan” was for all Union armies, “acting as a unit,” to “concentrate all 
the force possible against the Confederate armies in the field.”437 He used the largest Union 
force in the field to tie down the largest Confederate force, which was Lee’s army. Grant 
assessed this force to be the Confederacy’s central source of strength. While Grant appreciated 
his opponent, he was not awestruck by Robert E. Lee as other Union officers were.438 
In addition to direct attack, Grant brought an indirect fight to the Confederates. Grant 
used Major General George G. Meade’s Army of the Potomac to pave the way for Major 
General William T. Sherman and Major General Philip Sheridan, among others, to strike at the 
rest of the Confederate’s ability to make war.439 In contrast, Lee continued to focus his defensive 
efforts at protecting Richmond as a Confederate source of strength. 
Just before assuming his role as supreme commander of the Union Army, Lieutenant 
General Grant engaged in dialogue with Major General Henry Halleck on war plans as Halleck 
acted as the president’s military aide. From the initial concept phase, Grant advocated for 
maneuver against the Confederacy through North Carolina. The initial concept Grant proposed 
to Halleck in January 1864 was to abandon a direct move on Richmond, instead, “I would 
suggest Raleigh, [North Carolina], as the objective point and Suffolk [Virginia] as the starting 
point.” Grant provided several reasons to support a strike on North Carolina as opposed to a 
direct move on Richmond. First, it would “force an evacuation of Virginia.” Secondly, the 
armies “could live upon the country and would reduce the stores of the enemy.” Most 
important, it would seize the initiative from the Confederates and “blockade Wilmington, the 
port now of more value to the enemy than all the balance of their sea-coast.”440 This plan looked 
to broaden the Eastern Theater to get around Lee’s advantages in Virginia.441 However, despite 
its military value, political challenges doomed the North Carolina option. 442 
When Major General Henry Halleck responded, Halleck concurred that he had “never 
considered Richmond as the necessary objective point of the Army of the Potomac; that point is 
Lee’s army.” However, Halleck assessed that if Grant were to 
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uncover Washington and the Potomac River, and all the force which Lee can collect will be 
moved north, and the popular sentiment will compel the Government to bring back the 
army in North Carolina to defend Washington, Baltimore, Harrisburg, and Philadelphia. I 
think Lee would tomorrow exchange Richmond, Raleigh, and Wilmington for the 
possession of either of the aforementioned cities.443   
 
Halleck anticipated Lee’s desire to take the offense. However, as shown later in this 
chapter, Halleck was incorrect about Lee’s willingness to trade Richmond for Washington. Over 
and again during the campaign, Lee stated his personal dread at the potential of losing 
Richmond, as Lee wrote mid-campaign in a letter to his wife: “I begrudge every step [Grant] 
makes towards Richmond.”444 This statement, along with others like it, suggests Lee would not 
have traded Richmond for Washington. 
Then Halleck raised the central question for Grant: “The overthrow of Lee’s army being 
the object of operations, here, the question arises, how can we best attain it?” 
Halleck argued for a direct assault on Lee; his logic: 
 
all our available forces in the east should be concentrated against Lee’s army…We can here, 
or between here and Richmond, concentrate against him more men than anywhere else. If 
we cannot defeat him here with our combined force, we cannot hope to do so elsewhere 
with a divided army.445 
 
Halleck called for a concentrated attack against Lee’s army with all the forces available in 
the Eastern Theater. This was the difference between Halleck and Grant’s strategic approach. 
Grant wanted everything moving, swarming, from all angles and positions, while Halleck wanted 
a single effort in a single theater. Broad attrition versus focused attack. 
The telling exchange between Halleck and Grant continued; Halleck acted as a trusted 
agent to President Lincoln, as Halleck was in Washington with the president and Grant was in 
the field with the army. Grant presented Halleck a second plan: simultaneous pressure on all 
Confederate forces. As Grant explained, “It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me 
to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together and 
somewhat toward a common center.”446 
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More specifically, in a dispatch which described this to Major General William T. 
Sherman, Grant set forth his plans: Major General Nathaniel Banks would move against Mobile, 
Alabama (this was one month prior to Banks being sacked for not moving fast enough on 
Mobile); Major General Benjamin Butler would head to attack Richmond via Virginia’s 
peninsula; Grant was to accompany Major General George G. Meade’s Army of the Potomac 
(with Major General Ambrose Burnside’s Corps attached) to “operate directly against Lee’s army 
wherever it may be found”; Major General Franz Sigel and Brigadier General George Crook 
were to clear the Shenandoah Valley; and finally, to Sherman, Grant wrote: “You I propose to 
move against Johnston’s army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy’s country 
as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.”447 Grant’s orders 
ended with a command similar to his earlier conceptual discussion: “So far as practicable, all the 
Armies are to move together and towards one common center.”448 
Grant worked within the political constraints and context. This plan for simultaneous 
concentric pressure responded to two critical concerns, those related to troop strength and 
political factors. Grant’s plan depended on the North’s superior manpower and resource edge 
over the Confederacy by using synchronized offensives designed to grind Confederate resources 
down and denying the Confederates the ability to reinforce their armies.449 
Grant sought to balance military actions with political imperatives. Military victories had 
to sustain a war weary Northern electorate, while at the same time avoid horrifying the same 
electorate to the degree they might support a negotiated peace, and so Grant walked a tightrope 
between military and political gains.450 Grant could not tilt too far in one direction, because to do 
so would jeopardize the other, and vice versa. Grant had to strike a coherent balance between 
the military and political fronts. 
When the campaign began with the first fighting in the Battle of the Wilderness on May 
4, 1864, Lee had developed his own philosophy about how to move forward, which was 
characteristically offensive. As early as February 3, 1864, Lee described taking “the initiative,” to                                                         
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“derange [Union] plans & embarrass them.”451 This was Lee’s first strategic decision in the 
campaign: to accept the fight Grant desired. Lee felt, in March 1864, that his best option was to 
“concentrate wherever they are going to attack us.”452 Lee chose to fight in the Wilderness and 
engage in the campaign on terms that Grant dictated. When the battle was over, Lee’s casualties 
were around 11,125, while “Grant sustained much heavier losses, of 17,666.”453 
Despite this tactical setback, Grant chose to use Meade’s Army of the Potomac to 
continue to grind down Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. In addition to the decision to employ 
simultaneous concentric pressure in the broader campaign, there was one addendum: the attack 
must also be persistent. Perhaps the most eloquent description of this decision comes from 
Grant’s contemporary, Major General William T. Sherman: 
 
On the night of May 7th [1864] both parties paused, appalled by the fearful slaughter; but 
General Grant commanded “Forward by the left flank.” That was, in my judgment, the 
supreme moment of his life: undismayed, with a full comprehension of the importance of 
the work in which he was engaged, feeling as keen a sympathy for his dead and wounded as 
any one, and without stopping to count his numbers, he gave his orders calmly, specifically, 
and absolutely – “Forward to Spotsylvania.”454 
 
Knowing what to do is one thing; the act of doing is another. That same morning, Grant 
had spoken to a reporter, and said, “If you see the President, tell him, from me, that, whatever 
happens, there will be no turning back.”455 
At the conclusion of the Battle of the Wilderness, it is important to observe Grant was in 
nearly the exact situation Major General Joseph Hooker was in one year earlier on the same 
terrain, yet   
 
Hooker had treated his loss in the Wilderness as a defeat. Grant lost more troops in the 
Wilderness, but rather than retreat he pushed on. Defensively-minded commanders such as 
McClellan, Burnside, Hooker, and Meade considered as defeats setbacks that Grant 
shrugged off as mere tactical reverses. It was this new way of thinking that got the Army of                                                         
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the Potomac through stalemates at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna, and Cold 
Harbor, and on to victory.456 
 
Hooker’s Army of the Potomac had outnumbered Lee by a full two-to-one margin, and 
still, Lee defeated Hooker on nearly the same soil at the Battle of Chancellorsville in May 1863. 
Hooker’s casualty figures were roughly the same as Grant’s in the Battle of the Wilderness, but 
Hooker chose instead to end his offensive, while Grant persisted in 1864. Even Lincoln, to his 
personal secretary, admired Grant’s fortitude: “I believe if any other general had been at the 
head of that army it would now have been on this side of the Rapidan. It is the dogged 
pertinacity of Grant that wins.”457 
Yet, this was not the last time the campaign would stall. In fact, the campaign ground to 
a halt at the Battle of Cold Harbor in early June, where “Grant suffered slightly more than 6,000 
casualties, while Lee took about 1,000 to 1,500.”458 Grant hit a wall and he wrote, “without a 
greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make all cannot be accomplished” that he had 
originally hoped for.459 
When this roadblock in June 1864 stopped progress, Grant rethought the campaign. 
There was no way to continue in the same manner, partially because, as Grant wrote to his 
father, the Confederates were “always on the defensive and strongly intrenched.”460 Grant 
turned back to his original plan, the attempt to strike at the Confederate center of gravity from 
an indirect approach.461 Grant wrote to Halleck: 
 
My idea from the start has been to beat Lee’s Army, if possible, North of Richmond, then 
after destroying his lines of communication North of the James river to transfer the Army 
to the South side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him South if he should retreat… 
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 They act purely on the defensive, behind breast works, or feebly on the offensive 
immediately in front of them and where, in case of repulse, they can instantly retire behind 
them.462 
 
Grant’s new objective, as he wrote after crossing to the south side of the James River, 
was to “cut off all sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by [their water-borne 
logistical lines].”463 Attrition would continue, but if he could not whittle away Confederate 
soldiers in their main army while they were in defensive positions surrounding Richmond and 
Petersburg, he would do so against the rail and supply networks that fed those two Southern 
stronghold cities. 
At the same time, Grant employed Major General William T. Sherman and Major 
General Philip Sheridan in key supporting efforts. Grant used Sherman and Sheridan to raid and 
harass, a full-press on all sides and from all directions that forced the Confederates into a 
strategic bind. On May 9, 1864, Grant supported (against Army of the Potomac commander 
Major General George G. Meade’s desires) a mission that sent Sheridan and over 10,000 
cavalrymen on a raid against Confederate cavalry and Richmond.464 The object of this move, in 
Grant’s words, was “three-fold,” 
 
First, if successfully executed, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting off his line 
of supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his own use supplies in 
store in the rear and coming up. Second, he would draw the enemy’s cavalry after him, and 
thus better protect our flanks, rear and trains than by remaining with the army. Third, his 
absence would save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from Fredericksburg, 
which had now become our base.465 
 
Importantly, Sheridan’s attack resulted in the death of celebrated Confederate cavalry 
commander, Major General J.E.B. Stuart. Sheridan’s cavalry had such an effect on Confederate 
forces that Lee wrote to Confederate President Jefferson Davis on July 5, 1864, on the impact of 
losing so much cavalry: “The subject of recruiting and keeping up our cavalry force, has 
occupied much of my thoughts, especially since the opening of the present campaign…[because 
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of this,] I cannot but entertain serious apprehensions about the safety of our southern 
communications.”466 
Sheridan’s success provided another opportunity after Grant met with President 
Abraham Lincoln on July 31, 1864. Grant ordered Sheridan “to put himself south of the enemy 
and follow [the Confederates] to the death. Wherever the enemy goes let ou[r] troops go also.”467 
Sheridan now became the commander of a new army, including about 45,000 soldiers, which 
consisted of the “Sixth Corps, Hunter’s Eighth Corps, two divisions of the Nineteenth Corps 
lately from Louisiana, and three divisions of cavalry.”468 While Halleck did not support this 
decision, Lincoln thought it “exactly right,” and wrote as much to Grant on August 3, 1864, yet, 
Lincoln noted that “it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day, and 
hour, and force it.”469 Lincoln supported the aggressive instincts of his supreme commander. 
During September and October, Sheridan’s forces tore apart the Shenandoah Valley.470 When he 
was finished cleaning out the Shenandoah Valley, Sheridan had done as he had promised, and 
there was “little in it for man or beast.”471 These raids were important supporting efforts to the 
main effort in Virginia and the broader continuous pressure on all Confederate forces. 
Sherman, of course, also brought chaos to Georgia, and cut a path of destruction that 
was sixty miles wide at some points. Sherman attacked the Confederate desire to wage ware. 
Ultimately, mere days after the former Union commander George McClellan accepted the 
Democratic Party’s nomination to run for president against Lincoln, Sherman took Atlanta on 
September 2, 1864.472 
The Union public viewed cities as important markers on the road to victory. Sherman’s 
tactical triumph in Atlanta was perceived as strategic success for Grant’s plan and the Lincoln 
administration. The specifics of where the Confederacy had fallen was not as important as the 
fact that it had fallen somewhere. Of course, this did not satisfy Grant, who sent a dispatch to 
Sherman one week later: “We want to keep the enemy continually pressed to the end of the 
war…the end cannot be distant.”473 Consistent as ever, Grant wanted persistent, simultaneous, 
concentric pressure. 
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Two of Grant’s dispatches, one to Sherman and one to Sheridan, show how Grant 
viewed these supporting efforts. The first, Grant wrote to Sherman in October 1864: “In case 
you go south I would not propose holding any thing south of Chattanooga…Destroy in such 
case all of military value in Atlanta.”474 The same month, Grant wrote to Sheridan: “What I want 
is for you to threate[n] the Va. Central rail-road & Canal…If you make the enemy hold a force 
equal to your own for the protection of those thoroughfares it will accomplish nearly as much as 
their destruction.”475 The two messages show how Grant’s central strategic concept was to aim 
not for territory, but to erode and attrit the enemy’s willingness and ability to continue the fight. 
Grant’s judgment for simultaneous concentric pressure imposed several strategically 
important issues on Lee. First, it forced Lee to request and draw reinforcements from other 
Confederate armies. Lee’s casualties were “so significant that units from elsewhere totaling 
24,495 men had come to reinforce him. These reinforcements to Lee weakened critical areas to 
which Sherman would be heading, and the South was now essentially out of reinforcements.”476 
Significant numbers of irreplaceable Confederate soldiers in South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, 
and in the Shenandoah Valley were shipped off to resupply Lee.477 Lee played into Grant’s 
attrition strategy. The more forces Lee requested, the more Lee consumed, the closer the 
Confederacy was to the end. 
Not only did Grant’s campaign judgment consume Lee’s forces, Grant’s effort also 
consumed Lee’s key subordinates. Lee lost cavalry commander and close confidant Major 
General J.E.B. Stuart in the campaign (killed, May 12, 1864), along with Lieutenant General 
James Longstreet (severely wounded, May 6), Lieutenant General A.P. Hill (illness, May 8), and 
Lieutenant General Richard Ewell (forced out of command, May 27) and in the end, Lee seemed 
to be fighting on his own.478 It happened fast, and in only the first eight days of fighting in early 
May, the Army of Northern Virginia had lost “better than one-third of its corps, division, and 
brigade commanders…while its adversary [had lost] barely half as many, 10 out of 69.”479 This 
was a direct result of Grant’s judgment. 
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Starting with the Battle of the Wilderness, Grant quickly accomplished the pinning of 
Lee’s army.480 Beyond that, Grant threatened the last bargaining chip the Confederacy had for 
compelling the Union into some negotiated settlement, its field armies.481 This imperative forced 
Lee into a defensive at Petersburg, and Lee was forced to protect both his government and two 
key communications hubs. After Grant’s several offensives played out, Lee was left to hold onto 
his last railroad network.482 Lee’s twin imperatives, to protect his army and protect the 
Confederacy’s critical infrastructure, meant that the Confederacy and Lee had no offensive 
capability after this point of the war. Grant’s attrition campaign had been successful against the 
Confederates. 
It must be acknowledged that Grant lost roughly 55,000 soldiers from May through early 
June 1864 (called by some “The Forty Days” of the Overland Campaign), which is a limited time 
period with the most intense casualties from 1864.483 Lee over that same period lost 33,000. 
However, in relative comparison, Grant’s losses were only about 45 percent of the force he 
crossed the Rapidan with, while Lee lost over 50 percent of his men.484 
Another scholar charges 47 percent losses to Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia and losses 
of 22 of its 58 generals; compared to a “militarily tolerable” 43 percent losses for the Army of 
the Potomac, under Grant, in the head-to-head with Lee.485 Yet even this match is misleading, 
because it does not account for the broader strategic picture. But in just this tactical exchange, 
we can see Grant’s ruthless military efficiency. More specifically, to look to the impact on a 
single unit, “Grant’s attacks just about wrecked Ewell’s Second Corps” who “started the 
campaign with 17,000 troops and had only 6,000 left after the first two battles [of the Wilderness 
and Spotsylvania].”486 Ewell was relieved of command shortly thereafter. 
At the same time, Northern civilians assessed the military campaign, and planned their 
political votes accordingly for 1864’s election. This political reality forced an uncomfortable 
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scrutiny on Grant’s campaign, as Americans had never seen such casualties in such a short 
period of time.487 
Aware of the severity of the campaign’s casualty figures, Grant himself wrote,  
 
[The defeat of the Confederates] was not to be accomplished, however, without as 
desperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed; not to be consummated in a day, a week, 
a month, or a single season. The losses inflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe; 
but the armies now confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a period 
of three years, with immense losses…and neither had made any real progress toward 
accomplishing the final end…[this campaign] was destined to result in heavier losses, to 
both armies, in a given time, than any previously suffered; but the carnage was to be limited 
to a single year, and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at the beginning 
in that time.488 
 
Grant was aware of the campaign’s cost, and deemed it worthwhile to achieve the result. 
And while it is clear Grant’s casualties stretched the limits of political tolerability, in hindsight, 
the final ledger tilts toward Grant. This was more than just an attritional campaign; it denied Lee 
his favored strategy and his last chance at achieving his war aim.489 This should not be forgotten. 
Grant himself described his “plan” was “to take the initiative” from Lee, and to dictate the terms 
of the engagement, to hold the initiative, was quite an accomplishment against a commander as 
talented as Lee.490  
 
Lee: Offensive Defensive 
 
General Robert E. Lee’s role has always been the most written about part of the Confederate 
war effort. He was revered on the same high plateau as America’s earliest patriot founders, as 
revered by some as George Washington.491 And at the end of the war, one of Lee’s generals 
assessed Lee had essentially been the animating figure behind the Confederate cause: Henry A. 
Wise told Lee on April 6, 1865, there “has been no country, general, for a year or more. You are 
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the country to these men. They have fought for you.”492 To some, Lee was something even more 
than a supreme commander. 
This star power came at a strategic cost. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia became a 
symbol, a focus for the Union war in the East, a target for the Army of the Potomac to strike at, 
while Lee himself considered the city of Richmond the enemy’s primary target. By the end of the 
war, Lee had soaked up the lion’s share of resources as the main Confederate effort, yet he was 
still wedded to the notion he ought to fight offensively to defend Richmond from the Union’s 
Army of the Potomac. 
Lee placed great faith in his ability to erode the North’s will to fight. One example is the 
letter he wrote to his wife from Fredericksburg, Virginia, just prior to the Battle of 
Chancellorsville on April 19, 1863: 
 
If we can baffle them in their various designs this year & our people are true to our cause & 
not so devoted to themselves & their own aggrandizement, I think our success will be 
certain…If successful this year, next fall there will be a great change in public opinion at the 
North. The Republicans will be destroyed & I think the friends of peace will become so 
strong as that the next administration will go in on that basis. We have only therefore to 
resist manfully.493 
 
This passage represents the theoretical core of his offensive-defensive strategy: limited 
tactical and operational offensive raids, designed to strike the Northern will to fight, which 
would also go to enable a successful strategic defensive. Though Lee wrote about this earlier in 
the war and executed this during the Battles of Antietam (in Maryland, September 1862) and 
Gettysburg (through Virginia and into Pennsylvania, in May-July 1863) raids, he maintained it 
was the proper course into 1864, and wrote as much to President Jefferson Davis on February 3, 
1864, 
 
The approach of spring causes me to consider with anxiety the probable action of the 
enemy and the possible operations of ours in the ensuing campaign. If we could take the 
initiative & fall upon them unexpectedly we might derange their plans & embarrass them 
the whole summer. …If I could draw Longstreet secretly & rapidly to me I might succeed 
in forcing Genl Meade back to Washington, & exciting sufficient apprehension, at least for                                                         
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their own position, to weaken any movement against ours…We are not in a condition & 
never have been, in my opinion, to invade the enemy’s country with a prospect of 
permanent benefit. But we can alarm & embarrass him to some extent & thus prevent his 
undertaking anything of magnitude against us.494 
 
Lee requested more Confederate assets because he believed he could spoil any Northern 
attack, no matter the size, and by beating the North on the battlefield, win the strategic victory. 
Lee’s fundamental instinct in the campaign was “aggressive.”495 
Lee also harbored an assumption about Northern capabilities, seen in Lee’s dispatch to 
Confederate President Jefferson Davis, just before the Battle of the Wilderness, on April 5, 
1864: 
 
All the information I receive tends to show that the great effort of the enemy in this 
campaign will be made in Virginia. Nothing as yet has been discovered to develop their 
plan…The tone of the Northern papers, as well as the impression prevailing in their armies, 
go to show that Grant with a large force is to move against Richmond. One of their 
correspondents at Harrisburg stated, upon the occasion of the visit of Genls Burnside & 
Hancock, that it was certain that the former would go to North Carolina. They cannot 
collect the large force they mention for their operations against Richmond without reducing 
their other armies. This ought to be discovered & taken advantage of by our respective 
commanders…Longstreet’s corps…I would recommend that it be returned to this 
army…But all the information that reaches me goes to strengthen the belief that Genl 
Grant is preparing to move against Richmond.496  
 
Lee assumed that because Grant was assembling a large military force, this action would 
weaken Union forces elsewhere. This assumption proved false, and Grant was able to continue 
to generate more field forces. Ultimately, the Union’s main eastern force, the Army of the 
Potomac, continued to absorb casualties without significantly drawing on or weakening any 
other Union forces, particularly those under Sherman and Sheridan. And because of this, the 
Army of the Potomac remained intact and effective, enabling Sherman and Sheridan’s major 
breakthroughs. 
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Lee wanted to strike, but the question was when; certainly not before Confederate 
ground forces were massed.497 As the engagement approached, Lieutenant General James 
Longstreet’s corps was dozens of miles away in western Virginia foraging for supplies.498 Yet Lee 
wrote to another corps commander, Lieutenant General Richard Ewell, on May 4 at 8pm, that 
he desired to bring the enemy to battle, “as soon now as possible.”499 And so Lee began the 
initial engagement of the 1864 campaign at the Battle of the Wilderness on the back foot. Lee 
fought before he had all his troops in place. 
Lee’s offensive mindset continued through the entire campaign. On May 11, 1864, Lee 
wrote to Brigadier General Henry Heth: “My opinion is the enemy are preparing to retreat 
tonight to Fredericksburg…We must attack those people if they retreat.”500 Lee even desired an 
offensive when he was sick and bedridden. In late May, at the Battle of the North Anna (River), 
while sick in bed, Lee’s chief aide reported Lee as saying, “We must strike them a blow—We 
must never let them pass again.”501 
On May 23, Lee wrote to Davis: “It seems to me our best policy [is] to unite upon 
[Grant’s army] and endeavor to crush it.”502 Lee wanted to strike when the balance of forces 
were closest, after the Battle of Spotsylvania in mid-May 1864, when the most reliable modern 
estimate of the strengths of the two armies was 51,000 to 53,000 in the Army of Northern 
Virginia to 67,000 in the Army of the Potomac.503 Even though at the outset of the campaign, 
Grant had a nearly two-to-one advantage, at critical moments during the campaign the ratio was 
not so decisive or anywhere near what modern military doctrine proscribes (i.e. a three-to-one 
ratio of attackers to defenders). This relatively close margin tempted Lee into keeping up his 
offensive mindset. 
This continued into June, when Lee wrote to Lieutenant General Richard Anderson on 
June 4, 1864 (Anderson had taken command for the wounded Lieutenant General James 
Longstreet):  
 
I apprehend from the quietude the enemy has preserved today that he is preparing to leave 
us tonight, and I fear will cross the Chickahominy. In that event the best course for us to                                                         
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pursue in my opinion, would be to move down and attack him with our whole force, 
provided we could catch him in the act of crossing.504 
 
In addition to his offensive disposition, Lee also focused on Richmond, and fully assumed 
Grant’s aim was Richmond.505 When asked to shore up the Confederates armies in the West, 
Lee, wanting to stay in the war’s principal theater and near his home of Virginia, turned down 
President Davis’s offer to lead in the West on December 7, 1863.506 
Lee was broadly correct by weighting the Eastern Theater over the West. Abraham 
Lincoln had done so, and noted how much the Eastern Theater overshadowed the Western 
Theater after a Union victory out west in August 1862: “Yet it seems unreasonable that a series 
of successes, extending through half-a-year, and clearing more than a hundred thousand square 
miles of country, should help us so little, while a single half-defeat should hurt us so much.”507 
While there were important things happening in the Western Theater, the world watched the 
Eastern Theater. 
Lee’s actions reflected this fact. On April 15, 1864, Lee dispatched to Davis his case for 
reinforcements to defend Richmond, which Lee considered Grant’s primary target:  
 
I think it certain that the enemy is organizing a large army…the former is intended to move 
directly on Richmond, while the latter is intended to take it in flank or rear…If Richmond 
could be held secure against the attack from the east, I would propose that I draw 
Longstreet to me & move right against the enemy on the Rappahannock. Should God give 
us a crowning victory there, all their plans would be dissipated…I however see no better 
plan for the defense of Richmond than that I have proposed.508 
 
Lee believed that the Army of the Potomac’s primary mission was to take Richmond, as 
can be seen again in his May 4 dispatch to Davis: “[I]t is apparent that the long threatened effort 
to take Richmond has begun, and that the enemy has collected all his available force to 
accomplish it.”509                                                         
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Even more, Lee had a personal fear of the advance on Richmond.510 As Lee was boxed 
in towards Richmond, and on May 30, 1864, he wrote to Davis his assessment that he thought it 
“very important to strengthen this army as much as possible.” Moreover, Lee assessed: “If this 
army is unable to resist Grant, the troops [assigned to] the city will be unable to defend 
[Richmond alone].”511 
Some have defended Lee, and argued that he was not an old fashioned general (as 
opposed to more a modern-thinking supreme commander). Others argue that, in actuality, Lee 
supported national over local ideology, to push back against criticism that Lee was too provincial 
in his strategic thinking.512 
Even if one grants that, Lee was a key reason the Confederates lasted so long in the war, 
we should also observe that Lee, in his own words, exhibited a laser focus on the conduct of 
offensive operations to protect Richmond, and persisted in the mistaken assumption that 
Grant’s strength necessarily meant Union weakness elsewhere.513 Beyond that, though the 
offensive may have been popular in the Southern press and with the people, it was not always 
the correct choice. Lee’s actions played into his opponent’s efforts, which can be seen in his 
assessment of his own campaign concerns, when he fretted about “scarcity of our supplies” just 
before the 1864 campaign.514 
 
In Summary 
 
In considering the above, Grant’s judgment on the use of force to obtain his goals was accurate 
in this case. His challenge was to design, determine, and decide on a plan for Union forces to 
organize for the 1864 campaign, and then move as one against Confederate forces. Grant 
initially desired maneuver through North Carolina, and then Halleck and Lincoln asked Grant to 
amend his plans to ensure Washington was always covered from attack. Grant then selected 
simultaneous, concentric, persistent pressure on all Confederate forces in all places. 
Lee’s challenge was to determine how to organize Confederate forces for 1864: Where 
should the Confederates defend and where should they choose to fight? Lee opted for an 
offensive-defensive strategy, and to choose to fight offensively against Union forces in Virginia 
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in the Battle of the Wilderness and for the rest of the campaign. He aimed to throw off the 
Union’s plans to deny Lincoln’s re-election. 
When the dust settled from the fighting that followed these choices, Grant’s offensive 
had consumed Confederate forces, denied them any further offensive actions, and held the 
Confederates into place. Confederate newspapers called the opening month of the campaign 
“bloody May,” for the “terrible and unprecedented carnage” Grant’s campaign inflicted on the 
Confederacy.515 
And Lee did not have to fight the campaign as offensively as he did. By being more 
conservative, Lee might have preserved a greater force to send north to strike Washington. Lee’s 
commitment to hold Richmond at high cost also went against the Confederacy’s longer term 
strategic survival. Granted, Richmond’s maintenance as the Confederate capitol was important 
owing to its symbolism. However, it was not entirely necessary; the Confederacy could survive 
without Richmond. In fact, the Confederate capital had been in another location (Mobile, 
Alabama) earlier in the war. 
Of course, Grant’s willingness to accept casualties strained political unity in the North. 
But he also showed a willingness to create military plans within political realities and constraints.  
 
4.5 Lee: Raid Washington versus Grant: Defend Washington 
 
Lee: Raid Washington 
 
While Grant was on the strategic offensive, Lee took the tactical offensive in a raid on 
Washington. In mid-June 1864, Lee dispatched newly installed corps commander Lieutenant 
General Jubal Early through Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley toward Washington. 
This target shook Washington’s political confidence in President Lincoln’s 
administration. Even more important was the raid’s timing, at a moment when it seemed 
possible to throw the North’s election in 1864.516 Newspaper headlines shouted “THE 
CAPITAL SERIOUSLY THREATENED” and reported a “very large force of rebels” 
approached the capital city.517 
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This was the effect Lee hoped for when he commanded Early, on June 12, 1864, to 
mount a raid on Washington.518 This raid might have had the potential to gain outsized military 
dividends, because at this point in the Virginia campaign, Lee’s defense of Richmond was 
stretched very thin over 35 miles.519 To strike Washington might spell relief because it might 
distract the Union army in addition to delivering a direct blow against Northern war morale. The 
idea for the raid first appears in a dispatch from Lee to Lieutenant General A.P. Hill in May, 
1864: 
 
The time has arrived, in my opinion, when something more is necessary than adhering to 
lines and defensive positions. We shall be obliged to go out and prevent the enemy from 
selecting such positions as he chooses. If he is allowed to continue that course we shall at 
last be obliged to take refuge behind the works of Richmond and stand a siege, which 
would be but a work of time.520 
 
After Grant had pushed Lee back into defensive positions around Richmond and 
Petersburg, Lee saw that absent action the Confederates would be on the path to siege that 
would hurt the Confederates more than it would hurt the Union. In early June, General Braxton 
Bragg recommended to Jefferson Davis an option to “driv[e] the Union forces out of the 
Shenandoah Valley, thus opening the road to Washington.”521 The day before Early’s departure, 
on June 11, Lee wrote a dispatch to President Jefferson Davis to express his assessment of the 
raid’s costs and benefits: 
 
I acknowledge the advantage of expelling enemy from the Valley. The only difficulty with 
me is the means. It would [take] one corps of this army. If it is deemed prudent to hazard 
the defense of Richmond, the interests involved by…diminishing the force here, I will do 
so. I think this is what the enemy would desire.522   
 
At this point, Lee was lukewarm in his support for the raid. He perceived that Grant 
might gain by sending Early on the raid because it would mean a reduction of Richmond’s 
defenses. However, Lee’s opinion shifted later in the dispatch: 
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A victory over General Grant would also relieve our difficulties. I see no indications of his 
attacking me in his present position. Think he is strengthening his defenses to withdraw a 
portion of his force, and with the other move to the James River. To attack him here I must 
assault a very strong line of intrenchments and run great risk to the safety of the army.523 
 
Lee reasoned that one option was that he could attack in place against Grant and 
Meade’s Army of the Potomac, but that such an effort would be risky; in contrast, Early’s raid 
seemed the better option. 
Early departed on June 15, 1864, and Lee wrote: “Genl Early was in motion this 
morning at 3 o’clock & by daylight was clear of our camps…His troops would make us more 
secure here, but success in the Valley would relieve our difficulties that at present press heavily 
upon us.”524 In the end, Lee blessed off on the raid, albeit with reservations. 
Early recorded his orders from Lee were “to strike” and “if possible, destroy” Union 
forces in the Valley, and then “threaten Washington City.” Early’s corps “numbered a little over 
8,000 musket for duty.” While in the Valley, Early was joined by another unit, and the total 
Confederate force that marched on Washington totaled 12,000.525 
After Early won an initial battle in the Shenandoah Valley on the way to Washington, on 
June 26, 1864, Lee wrote to Davis on the continuance of Early’s campaign:  
  
If circumstances favor, I should also recommend his crossing the Potomac. I think I can 
maintain lines here against Genl Grant. He does not seem disposed to attack, and has 
thrown himself strictly on the defensive. I am less uneasy about holding our position than 
about our ability to procure supplies for the army.526 
 
Early continued to move toward Washington through Fredericksburg, Maryland, where 
he picked up supplies and confiscated $200,000 from the citizens there. Then he met with a 
relatively small blocking force sent from Washington.527 Union Major General Lew Wallace 
moved out from Washington with a scant force of 6,300 lightly trained new recruits. Numbering 
half the Confederates, Wallace’s forces engaged Early’s corps on July 9, 1864, at the Battle of the                                                         
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Monocacy, and Wallace was driven back into Baltimore, Maryland, having sustained roughly 
1,300 casualties to Early’s losses of 800. Early resumed his movement to Washington, and on 
the next day, was within site of Fort Stevens, a defensive outpost on the edge of Washington.528 
While Wallace’s force had been defeated, it delayed Early long enough to ensure the capital was 
prepared for Early’s assault.529 
At this stage of the war, Washington was likely the most heavily fortified capital in the 
world, with an interlocking defense system of  
 
68 enclosed forts boasted 807 mounted cannon and 93 mortars in 1,120 emplacements, 93 
unarmed batteries for field guns with 401 emplacements and 20 miles of rifle trenches plus 
three blockhouses.530 
 
As Early approached the ramparts outside Washington, Early received a dispatch from Lee late 
on July 11 that Grant had sent a corps to Washington, and so Lee left the decision to attack up 
to Early, to “be guided by the circumstances.”531 Waiting until the last moment, Grant had, in 
fact, sent a corps with an extra division to counter Early’s raid.532 Wallace’s holding action 
provided time for these Union forces, sent by Grant, to reinforce the capital. 
This atmosphere was bad for the Union, and felt like the war was turning for the 
Confederates.533 This was a shaky moment for the Union war effort. And it almost got worse, as 
President Abraham Lincoln went personally to see the fighting:  
 
The six-foot-four-inch president wearing his top hat made a large target as he peered over 
the parapet at enemy sharpshooters. As John Hay recorded the incident, “A soldier roughly 
ordered him to get down or he would have his head knocked off.” By tradition this soldier 
was Capt. Oliver Wendell Homes, Jr., a thrice-wounded veteran who was serving as a staff 
officer for Sixth Corps commander Gen. Horatio Wright. “Get down, you fool,” Holmes 
reportedly said, not realizing in the excitement of the moment that he was speaking to the 
president. There is no definitive evidence either for or against the story that Holmes was the                                                         
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man who ordered Lincoln to get down. The next day, as the Sixth Corps was preparing to 
drive Early away, Lincoln returned to Fort Stevens. A Union officer was shot while standing 
close to the president.534 
 
The officer who took the bullet so near to Lincoln was a medical officer from the 102nd 
Pennsylvania.535 It is of course possible that Lincoln’s death at this point may have thrown the 
Union war effort into disarray, not to mention what might have happened in the political 
struggle to come in early 1865 over the extension of full legal rights for black citizens. 
Militarily, on all sides, there were about 1,000 casualties from the Battle of Fort 
Stevens.536 Early’s raid successfully frightened Lincoln on his political future, as it came a mere 
five weeks before Lincoln’s famous cabinet letter in which he predicted his own loss in the 
upcoming 1864 election. 
Confederate news reports had an impact on the Southern assessment of the campaign. 
Confederate supporters thought it might increase the Northern desire for peace. Yet, there were 
Confederate dissenters that thought the raid would actually strengthen Northern resolve.537  
 
Grant: Defend Washington 
 
Grant saw Early’s raid as an opportunity to strike enemy forces as they left their prepared 
defenses. On July 5, 1864, Grant wrote to Halleck, with full knowledge of Early’s movement 
toward Washington: “We want now to crush out & destroy any force the enemy dares send 
north. Force enough can be spared from here to do it.”538 
Lincoln was more concerned with what the newspapers were calling “the Rebel 
Invasion,” and requested that Grant leave some sufficient minimum amount of troops to siege 
Richmond and Petersburg, and bring the bulk of his forces back to Washington to defend the 
capital and turn the raid back.539 
Grant did not view it as a threat worth distraction from his primary objective, to 
continually tie down all Confederate military forces, as he wrote to Lincoln on July 10: “I think 
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on reflection it would have a bad effect for me to leave here…I have great faith that the enemy 
will never be able to get back with much of his force.”540 
So Grant sent one corps plus one division to Washington. Grant personally judged the 
force Lee sent against Washington unable to make a meaningful, significant attack on the city 
that would alter the course of the war. Grant had Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia tied down in 
Richmond and Petersburg, and all other forces were engaged simultaneously on a wide arc 
against all Confederate forces. Grant decided it would be best to send a smaller detachment to 
support Washington’s defense, despite the fact he was under great pressure to get back to 
Washington to protect the capital.541 
This was how Grant rode out Early’s raid on Washington. The raid bent, but did not 
break, Washington’s defenses. Grant’s judgment proved accurate. By mid-July, just after Early’s 
raid, two major Confederate forces were completely tied down in Richmond and Atlanta.542 
Grant’s assessment on July 5, 1864: “If the rebellion is not perfectly and thoroughly crushed, it 
will be the fault and through the weakness of the people [of the] North. Be of good cheer and 
rest assured that all will come out right.”543 
Grant’s assessment held through August, when Major General Henry Halleck wanted to 
end the Union offensive, because the Union had suffered so many casualties and he perceived 
the Union was not making sufficiently speedy progress.544 Grant disagreed with this finding, and 
wrote on August 16, 1864 to Elihu Washburne with his own separate assessment of the 
Confederate war effort: 
 
The rebels have now in their ranks their last man…A man lost by them cannot be replaced. 
They have robbed the cradle and the grave equally to get their present force. Besides what 
they lose in frequent skirmishes and battles they are now losing from desertions and other 
causes at least one regiment per day. With this drain upon them the end is visible if we will 
but be true to ourselves. Their only hope now is in a divided North. This might give them 
reinforcements from Tenn. Ky. Maryland and Mo. whilst it would weaken us. With the 
draft quietly enforced the enemy would become despondent and would make little 
resistance. 
I have no doubt but the enemy are exceedingly anxious to hold out until after the 
Presidential election. They have many hopes from its effects. They hope a counter                                                         
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revolution. They hope the election of the peace candidate. In fact, like McCawber, they 
hope something to turn up.545 
 
In Summary 
 
Lee’s choice was to respond to initial campaign setbacks in May and June in order to, as he 
judged, best defend Richmond from attack. His options were between hardening the approaches 
to Richmond and Petersburg, and sending a force to raid Washington. Lee chose to support a 
raid through the Shenandoah Valley and on to Washington. While Lee was initially lukewarm on 
the operation, he did support the decision and the raid was a moderate tactical success, yet did 
not fundamentally change the conflict. 
In contrast, Grant’s challenge was to determine the proper response to Early’s raid 
through the Shenandoah Valley and on Washington. President Lincoln requested Grant’s 
personal presence in the defense, and Grant, instead, chose to remain in place as he sent a Union 
corps and a division instead. His assessment was correct; Grant sent an appropriate force to 
parry Early’s raid. While there was a political scare, it did not sink the Union war effort and they 
stayed on the path to victory.  
 
4.6 Lee: Prisoner Parole Request versus Grant: Prisoner Response/Vote Support 
 
Lee: Prisoner Parole Request 
 
As the long 1864 campaign wore on, Lee was short of men for his Army of Northern Virginia, 
and requested from Grant a return of all the prisoners that had been taken to that point of the 
war. Lee wrote, on October 1, 1864:  
 
With a view of alleviating the sufferings of our soldiers, I have the honour to propose an 
exchange of the prisoners of war belonging to the armies operating in Virginia man for 
man, or upon the basis established by the [mutually-agreed upon approval authority for 
prisoner exchanges].546 
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Grant responded the next day, October 2, 1864: 
 
Your letter of yesterday proposing to exchange prisoners of War belonging to the Armies 
operating in Va. is received. I could not of a right accept your proposition further than to 
exchange those prisoners captured within the last three days and who have not yet been 
delivered to the [commanding] Gen. of Prisoners. Among those lost by the Armies 
operating against Richmond were a number of Colored troops. Before further negociations 
are had upon the subject I would ask if you propose delivering these men the same as White 
soldiers.547 
 
Grant’s response revealed Lee’s true agenda. Lee recognized the Northern election was 
one month away, and he desired to make the Union publicly acknowledge it would not exchange 
prisoners because the Confederates were unwilling treat black prisoners the same as white 
prisoners (which would force the Union to treat black and white soldiers as fully equal). This was 
a sore political subject for border state Unionists, who had been allowed to keep their slaves 
after Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation (and who generally supported slavery). Lee sought to 
exploit this political friction in the Union, and to make the Union Army to admit it was leaving 
white soldiers in captivity out of solidarity with black soldiers. Lee’s intended message to the 
North was that white soldiers are suffering for black soldiers. 
Grant’s military policy response, to turn down this offered prisoner exchange, was 
consistent with his overall strategy. He sought to deny Lee the benefit of additional manpower, 
even if it would have meant gains in Union manpower. Grant also pushed back on the proposed 
exchange for political purposes, only for him the issue was less domestic and more to generate 
further international alienation and isolation of the Confederate cause. 
On October 3, 1864, Lee responded: 
 
In my proposition of yesterday of the 1st Inst: to exchange the prisoners of War belonging 
to the armies operating in Viga I intended to include all captured soldiers of the U.S. of 
whatever nation Colour under my Control – Deserters from our Service, & negroes 
belonging to our Citizens are were  are not Considered Subjects of exchange & are were not 
included in my proposition. If there are any Such among those stated by you to have been 
Captured around Richmond, & they will can not be exchanged returned.548                                                         
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In this, Lee explicitly stated any black prisoner was subject to be withheld if that captive 
was determined to have been a runaway slave (with intentionally ambiguous, exploitable criteria). 
Grant replied the same day: 
 
Your letter of this date is received. In answer I have to state that the Government is bound 
to secure all persons received into her Armies the rights due to soldiers. This being denied 
by you in the persons of such men as have escaped from Southern Masters induces me to 
decline making the exchanges you ask. The whole matter however will be refered to the 
proper authority for their decession and whatever it may be will be adhered to.549 
 
Grant held firm and did not allow the prisoner release. This deliberate and consistent 
part of his strategic approach can be seen in his previous dispatch to Secretary of War Edwin 
Stanton on September 13, 1864: 
 
Prompt action in filling our Armies will have more effect upon the enemy than a victory 
over them. They profess to believe, and make their men believe, there is such a party North 
in favor of recognizing southern independence that the draft can not be enforced. 
Undeceive them and you gain a great triumph Let them be undeceived. Deserters come into 
our lines daily who tell us that the men are nearly universally tired of the War and that 
desertions would be much more frequent but they believe peace will be negotiated after the 
fall elections. The enforcement of the draft and prompt filling of up of our Armies will save 
the shedding of bloods to an immence degree.550 
 
The pursuit of numerical attrition was core to his approach, and Grant had the patience 
and perseverance to see it through. As Grant had written to Major General Benjamin Butler, 
“Every man released, on parole or otherwise, becomes an active soldier against us at once either 
directly or indirectly.”551 
Grant was the no-exchange policy’s greatest champion.552 Though Grant was aware of 
the political cost, he also saw it benefits: “It is hard on our men held in Southern prisons not to 
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exchange them, but it is humanity to those left in our ranks to fight in our battles.”553 And Grant 
wrote the same to Secretary of State William H. Seward: “We have got to fight until the Military 
power of the South is exhausted and if we release or exchange prisoners captured it simply 
becomes a War of extermination.”554 
 
Grant: Prisoner Response/Vote Support 
 
Grant was well aware the war was both a political and military contest. Beyond fending off Lee’s 
attempts at prisoner exchange, Grant used military policy in his own way to support the 
incumbent candidate for the presidency, Abraham Lincoln. 
Grant had nuanced views on the interplay between war, politics, and policy. He called 
politics an “ever-present consideration,” and that while he had his “views on all these subjects, 
as decided as any man,” he “took no open part in politics” and “never allowed” himself to be 
influenced by them. He felt that “political bias” was “fatal to a soldier,” and that a soldier had 
“no right” to interfere in the political process.555 
While did not personally vote in the election of 1864, Grant made every other effort 
within legal and moral bounds to secure Lincoln’s re-election, because without it he felt there 
would be no Union.556 
Congressional elections in 1862 ran against Lincoln’s Republican Party, and they lost 23 
House of Representative seats, “lowering their percentage of seats from 59 percent to 46 
percent, which meant that they also lost control of the House.” For the next two years, 
newspapers focused on Lee’s successes against a succession of several Union generals. On top 
of that, a faction of the Republican Party had openly broken from Lincoln, calling itself the 
Radical Republicans, and argued that Lincoln was not hard enough on the Confederacy or 
strong enough an abolitionist.557 Lincoln’s election was far from guaranteed; Grant recognized 
this fact. 
Grant knew how important the election victory would be to secure the war’s outcome, 
and supported his soldiers’ opportunity to vote. Without polling and easy access to election data, 
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Grant had no way to know what the election might bring. While he never openly campaigned 
for President Lincoln, Grant did allow the president to use his official dispatches in support of 
the administration’s public messaging (for example, it became common to issue Grant’s situation 
reports on the state of the war to show progress). On this, Grant wrote to Elihu Washburne: 
 
I have no objection to the President using any thing I have ever written to him as he sees 
fit—I think however for him to attempt to answer all the charges the opposition will bring 
against him will be like setting a maiden to work to prove her chastity.558 
 
In late September 1864, in anticipation of the November vote, Grant wrote to Secretary 
of War Edwin Stanton about the soldier vote. Grant suggested soldier suffrage “is a novel thing” 
and “generally been considered dangerous to constitutional liberty and subversive of Military 
discipline.”559 However, Grant wrote, the  
 
circumstances are novel and exceptional. A very large proportion of the legal voters of the 
United States, are now either under arms in the field, or in hospitals, or otherwise engaged 
in the Military service of the United States…they are American Citizens, having still their 
homes and social and political ties, binding them to the States and Districts, from which 
they come, and to which they expect to return. They have left their homes temporarily, to 
sustain the cause of their country, in the hour of its trial. In performing this sacred duty, 
they should not be deprived of a most precious privilege. They have as much right to 
demand that their votes shall be counted, in the choice of their rulers, as those citizens, who 
remain at home; Nay more, for they have sacrificed more for their country.560 
 
Grant supported the soldier vote. He was careful not to actively campaign or directly 
support Lincoln, and described the apolitical manner in which he allowed the vote to occur:  
 
I state these reasons in full for the unusual thing of allowing Armies in the field to vote, that 
I may urge on the other hand, that nothing more, than the fullest exercise of this right, should 
be allowed; for any thing not absolutely necessary to this exercise cannot but be dangerous 
to the discipline of the Armies, and dangerous to the liberties of the country. The Officers 
and Soldiers, have every means of understanding the questions before the country. The 
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newspapers are freely circulated, and so, I believe, are the documents prepared by both 
parties, to set forth the merits and claims of their candidates. 
Beyond this nothing whatever should be allowed. No political meetings, no 
harangues from soldiers or citizens and no canvassing of camps or regiments for votes.561 
 
In mid-October, Grant directed Halleck to propagate a “general order…directing all 
officers and men [on recruiting duty] to cease recruiting at once and return immediately to their 
respective commands.”562 The intent was to enable them to get from distant duty to their home 
districts in time to vote in the election. 
Grant also viewed the election in tactical terms. To Major General George G. Meade on 
November 5, 1864, he wrote of his concern, “the enemy may make an attack expecting to find 
us unprepared and to prevent as far as possible the holding of elections.”563 Two days later, 
Grant wrote to Brevet Major General Alfred Terry, commanding the Army of the James (River, 
stationed in Virginia), that the Northern press had written that significant numbers of the Union 
Army returned home to vote and this information had likely already passed to the Confederates. 
This increased the likelihood the Confederates might attack, which prompted Grant to advise:  
 
I think there is sufficient probability of you being attacked to justify requiring the greatest 
vigilance on the part of every Division and Brigade commander and the most perfect 
readiness to form and move their commands. If the enemy should attack and be repulsed 
he should be followed up at once and no officer should hold back for orders to do so.564 
 
Grant prepared to use the election to draw out the Confederates from their entrenched 
positions. The political contest was important bait, potentially to be put in the service of Grant’s 
attrition strategy. 
On October 23, Stanton requested Grant’s support to secure the election in New York 
City for “the security of the forts in the harbor of New York, the defence of the lake frontier 
from invasion, and the preservation of the public peace, as and for the purity of the ballot-box 
from rebels imported from Canada.”565 Stanton noted these soldiers would be back in time for 
regular duty by mid-November. The next day Grant responded that while he did not favor this 
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option, he saw “the absolute necessity of further reinforcing [New York], and it must be done. I 
do not like the idea of sending troops from here, but if they can not be spared from elsewhere, 
they must go from here.”566 
Stanton requested Grant send three regiments of Delaware soldiers to vote, because 
their state was crucial: 
 
The first, third, and fourth regiments of Delaware Volunteers are now near Petersburg – 
two of them numbering about one hundred each – one numbering about four hundred. 
They are in the Fifth Corps. The vote of the State will depend on them. If it be possible, 
please give them leave of absence to go home for the election. One transport can carry 
them to Baltimore, and they can return the day after the election.567 
 
Grant replied, “if possible I will give the furloughs you ask. Will telegraph you again in 
the course of the day tomorrow.”568 On November 1, Grant sent the three regiments to vote.569 
On election day, as the election results began to come in, Grant sent his own internal 
Army of the Potomac poll results to Stanton which showed Lincoln was ahead.570 
After he had won, Lincoln reflected, “The election has exhibited another fact not less 
valuable to be known—the fact that we do not approach exhaustion in the most important 
branch of national resources, that of living men.”571 This was the nail in the Confederacy’s 
coffin; Lee’s strategy of defeating the will of the North had failed. 
In review, the election of 1864 was closer than it might appear. At first glance, out of 
roughly four million votes cast, Lincoln received a little less than 55 percent to George 
McClellan’s 45 percent, which translated to a 212 to 21 Electoral College win. Moreover, Lincoln 
handily won the soldier vote (receiving 78 percent of about 150,000 votes), which can be seen by 
looking to the twelve states where those votes were tallied separately, compared to the 53 
percent of the vote Lincoln received from the civilians of those states.572 So Lincoln won by a 
solid margin.                                                         
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But the American Electoral College system can be misleading; McClellan still had a 
chance for victory. Edward Bonekemper has found, “a shift of less than one percent of the 
popular vote (29,935 out of 4,031,195 [votes cast]) could have given McClellan an additional 97 
electoral votes—just enough to provide him with the total 118 electoral votes he needed to win 
the election.” McClellan was close in the large states of New York and Pennsylvania, and had he 
picked up a few other small states (i.e. Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, and Oregon) he would have 
won.573 So the soldier vote mattered, as did the supportive actions of the Union’s supreme 
commander. 
On the election result, Charles Francis Adams, Jr., from his position in a Union cavalry 
unit, wrote to his brother: “this election has relieved us of the fire in the rear and now we can 
devote an undivided attention to the remnants of the Confederacy.”574 Lee described the 
downfall on November 18, 1864: “desertion is increasing in the army despite all my efforts to 
stop it.”575 The political war was won, and the military fight was close to the same. 
Grant wrote to congratulate Lincoln (via Secretary of War Stanton), on election day, 
November 10, 1864: “Congratulate the President for me for the double victory. The election 
having passed off quietly, no bloodshed or riot throughout the land, is a victory worth more to 
the country than a battle won. Rebeldom and Europe both will feel it will so construe it.”576 
Grant distinguished himself as a strategist here; he understood the political victory 
mattered at least as much as pure military victory. He was aware of the international connections 
and linkages, that those international and domestic audiences mattered, and such insight is likely 
at least one factor that propelled him to victory. 
 
In Summary 
 
Lee chose to push against Union military policy to divide the separate political parts of the 
Union war effort. His request for a prisoner exchange, and subsequent decision to deny that any 
black Union soldiers were eligible for parole, was calculated to drive a strategic wedge into his 
enemy’s efforts. Lee’s choice, from available options, was to request prisoner exchange directly 
from Grant.                                                         
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Grant’s challenge was to find a way to use military policy to support the Union war 
effort effectively and in such a way as to ensure the Confederate defeat. He strongly backed the 
“no exchange” policy, and found every opportunity to support the soldier vote in what could 
have been a close election. 
Lee’s attempt did not work; the Confederacy did not catalyze a rupture in the Union war 
effort, and did not gain any manpower through prisoner exchange. On the other hand, Grant’s 
judgment about what political fallout the Union could tolerate resulting from his hardline 
military policy on prisoner exchange, as well as his support to the soldier vote in a close election, 
helped steady the Union on the path to victory. 
 
4.7 Campaign Judgments, 1864 
 
This section looks comprehensively at the 1864 campaign’s most important judgments. And, just 
as there is no strategic silver bullet, there is no single judgment which caused Grant to display 
superior judgment over Lee. 
And before assessing the value of Lieutenant General Grant’s judgment during the 
campaign, it is helpful to first consider General Lee’s judgments as the standard against which 
Grant was forced to compete. In review, Lee opted for an offense-defensive strategic approach, 
with limited tactical offensives in Virginia and in a raid on Washington itself, as well as a parole 
effort designed to split the Union war effort. Taken together, Lee was an offensive-minded 
commander that burned his forces down while attacking Grant. 
Grant, for his part, judged that what was lacking was for all Union armies to come into 
common movement. He also determined that the Union would be better able to handle high 
casualty figures, and, politically, would accept such high casualty figures in order to gain strategic 
victory. This was the recognition that a war of attrition would harm the South more (and faster) 
than war weariness would grip the North. Grant accurately assessed the relative severity of 
Early’s raid on Washington, and parried it with an appropriately-sized force designed to keep 
maximum pressure on the Richmond Confederate government and Lee’s Army of Northern 
Virginia. Grant deftly refused Lee’s prisoner exchanges as part of his overall attrition strategy, 
and judged the politics of the matter would not seriously undermine the war effort. Lastly, Grant 
supported the administration and election without harming the non-partisan norms of his 
military profession. It would have been easy to stuff the ballot or cheat to gain the outcome he 
wanted, but Grant conducted himself and the election within the boundaries of ethical behavior, 
important in a democracy, especially one at war. 
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Cumulatively, these judgments interacted and all impacted the outcome. And at the end 
of 1864, particularly after Lincoln’s re-election, the Confederates never had another chance to 
achieve their policy objectives in the war. 
In assessing each commander’s relative performance, one can see that Grant’s judgments 
were cumulatively more militarily correct and politically coherent than Lee’s. Whether it was the 
broad decision for simultaneous pressure, the precise parry of Early’s raid on Washington, his 
sense for what the Union could tolerate in his rejection of Lee’s prisoner request, or his nuanced 
approach to politics and the election, each of Grant’s judgments supported a successful Union 
attrition strategy. Each of Lee’s judgments attempted to exhaust the Union’s will and forces. 
Both supreme commanders made reasonable judgments, and they were certainly qualified, 
intelligent supreme commanders. Both had sufficient material resources to contest their enemy 
and secure their aim. However, one was ultimately superior, and one was inferior. By evaluating 
these judgments, we can determine the former from the latter. Grant’s objectively superior 
performance is one reason why the Union was successful, ultimately, against the Confederacy. 
 
4.8 Final Assessment and Formal Characteristics 
 
This section considers two critical aspects of Grant’s observed characteristics: his judgment and 
the thinking that underpinned his decisions; and the formal characteristics that can be observed 
from his life that likely had an impact on his judgment (i.e. education, experiences, personal 
characteristics, and post-war life). 
After the war, General William T. Sherman said there was “never anything like” Grant’s 
military genius.577 British Major General J.F.C. Fuller has written Grant was “the greatest general 
of his age, and one of the greatest strategists of any age.”578 
Not just military officers, but professional historians agree with this finding. When a 
prestigious American Civil War magazine gathered six top scholars to determine who the war’s 
top general was, five picked Grant (the sixth broke format and placed Lincoln in first, Grant 
second).579 All six of these historians placed Lee precisely one spot behind Grant, a strong 
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message that was punctuated by one roundtable military historian’s comment: “Ulysses S. Grant 
was unquestionably the greatest general of the Civil War.”580 
Five years later, a similar gathering convened to rate Civil War commanders based on 
eleven categories: physical courage, moral courage, coup d’oeil, logistics, political skill, charisma, 
coordination, administrative skill, killer instinct, maneuver, and people skills. Grant again won 
top billing by a wide margin, scoring perfect in all categories except those of “charisma” and 
“coordination.”581 
Grant has been called the “towering military genius of the Civil War” and that he “would 
have excelled at any time in any army.”582 With such a degree of support, it’s no wonder one 
historian has written that “No general could do what [Grant] did because of accident or luck.”583 
Explaining the confidence some contemporaries felt for Grant, Charles Francis Adams, 
Jr., assessed that “in a crisis he is one against whom all around” tended to “instinctively lean,” 
owing to Grant’s “most exquisite judgment and tact.”584 
The irony was that Grant could appear as if he was unstudied when it came to warfare 
and strategy, but his focus on the destruction of the enemy’s army, and avoidance of strict 
observance of rules, gave him something of an advantage on the battlefield.585 
In this campaign, and before, Grant displayed a human empathy that likely augmented 
his ability as a military commander. After the end of the opening days of the campaign in the 
Battle of the Wilderness, Grant wept over the knowledge that finishing the war would mean the 
end of so many lives, and that he would be the one driving that tragic result. One staff officer 
describing the incident wrote, “When proper measures had been taken, Grant went into his tent, 
threw himself face down upon his cot, and gave way to the greatest emotion.” The staff officer 
asserted he had “never before seen [Grant] so deeply moved” and that “nothing could be more 
certain than that he was stirred to the very depths of his soul.” Writing separately, Charles F. 
Adams Jr. confirmed that he “never saw a man so agitated in my life.” And, just like that, it 
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passed, and shortly thereafter, another staff officer wrote, “I looked in his tent, and found him 
sleeping as soundly and as peacefully as an infant.”586 
This burst of empathy was not the only time Grant was moved to tears during a Civil 
War campaign. His son, Frederick, in a post-war memoir, recalled a similar occurrence during 
the Vicksburg campaign in 1863: 
 
A small boy, with blood streaming from a wound in his leg, came running to where father 
and [William T.] Sherman stood, and reported that his regiment was out of ammunition. 
Sherman was directing some attention to be paid to his wound, when the little fellow, 
finding himself fainting from loss of blood, gasped out, “Calibre 56,” as he was carried off 
to the rear. At this moment I observed that my father’s eyes were filled with tears.587 
 
During the 1864 campaign itself, Grant showed another sort of compassion, for animals, 
when he saw a Union worker flogging some horses. Grant called the man a “scoundrel,” and 
punished him by having him tied to a tree for six hours for “brutality.”588 
This empathy was not limited to emotional outbursts. These were just outward 
manifestations of what was Grant’s ability to intuit the needs of others. For example, as 
previously described, his compromise with Lincoln on Major General Nathaniel Banks’s 
demotion. Or his sense that the Union could tolerate such high casualty figures in order to end 
the war and secure both of Lincoln’s aims, to preserve the Union and to end the practice of 
slavery. His sense of empathy helped him understand the perspective and viewpoint of others, to 
sense the pain felt by those that endured the war’s horrifying costs, which profited Grant 
because this ability helped attune him to brutally difficult decisions. 
And once he decided to do something, Grant stuck to it. He was, in a word, gritty. As 
one contemporary officer described Grant at work, “there was no nonsense” because “the one 
single purpose” was the military task at hand.589 All throughout 1864, Grant conducted himself 
this way, and kept up the strategic pressure on Lee, despite the streams of Union bodies piling 
up and being sent back to Washington. 
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Of Grant’s past, from before the 1864 campaign, we can observe several characteristics 
that would have impacted his ability to effectively make judgments on war. He was formally 
educated for military service at West Point, and Dennis Hart Mahan (the father of Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, also a standout figure in his own right), taught Grant about Antoine-Henri Jomini and 
the campaigns of Napoleon while he was a cadet, recalled Grant fondly said Grant’s “mental 
machine is of the powerful low-pressure class…which pushes steadily forward and drives all 
obstacles before it.”590 
While a cadet, Grant was also greatly interested in fiction, led a literary society, and 
reported that he enjoyed the novels of Sir Walter Scott, Washington Irving, and James Fenimore 
Cooper. He did well in drawing class at West Point, and was known as the best horseman at 
West Point.591 
His relatively small size likely helped along his love for horses. Grant reported to West 
Point at five feet, two inches tall, and 117 pounds. By the time he graduated, he had grown to 
five feet, eight inches tall, and had put on some weight (though in his last year an illness had 
dropped him back to his entry weight; during the 1864 campaign, Grant’s weight was around 
145 pounds). He could be brave. When a horse was feared by most other cadets, Grant would 
still ride him. This prompted a classmate to tell Grant, “That horse will kill you some day,” to 
which Grant said, “Well, I can’t die but once.”592 
Before the Civil War, Grant fought in the Mexican War a few years after his graduation 
from West Point, a conflict during which he gained military experience. Grant described learning 
by watching General Winfield Scott (later to become the Union’s first supreme commander) and 
Brigadier General Zachary Taylor (later to become an American president): 
 
In their modes of expressing thought, these two generals contrasted quite as strongly as in 
their other characteristics. General Scott was precise in language, cultivated a style peculiarly 
his own; was proud of his rhetoric; not averse to speaking of himself, often in the third 
person, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was talking about without the least 
embarrassment. Taylor was not a conversationalist, but on paper he could put his meaning 
so plainly that there would be no mistaking it. He knew how to express what he wanted to 
say in the fewest well-chosen words, but would not sacrifice meaning to the construction of 
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high-sounding sentences. But with their opposite characteristics both were great and 
successful soldiers; both were true, patriotic and upright in all their dealings.593 
 
Moreover, Grant critiqued Scott’s performance in command,   
 
General Scott’s successes are an answer to all criticism. He invaded a populous country, 
penetrating two hundred and sixty miles into the interior, with a force at no time equal to 
one-half of that opposed to him; he was without a base; the enemy was always intrenched, 
always on the defensive; yet he won every battle, he captured the capital, and conquered the 
government. Credit is due to the troops engaged, it is true, but the plans and the strategy 
were the general’s.594 
 
From Grant’s early wartime experience, he gained understanding of the responsibilities 
and requirements of high command. He learned a sense of perspective, and wrote during the 
Mexican War that he was “willing to believe that the opinion of a lieutenant, where it differs 
from that of his commanding General, must be founded on the ignorance of the situation.”595 
Ely Parker served alongside Grant for several years during the American Civil War, and 
found he was 
 
personally fearless and brave, often going or riding into unnecessarily close proximity to the 
enemy to make his own observations. I never heard him use a profane word or utter an 
indelicate expression in the whole time of my association with him; but I have often heard 
him good-naturedly remonstrate with his chief of staff for using too vigorous and 
sulphurous language.596 
 
In his Memoirs, Grant affirmed Parker’s hunch, and Grant himself wrote he was “not aware of 
ever having used a profane expletive in my life,” but, after he had described the difficulty Grant 
had during the Mexican War with some unruly military transport donkeys, he “would have the 
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charity to excuse those who may have [used curse words], if they were in charge of a train of 
Mexican pack mules at the time.”597 
Grant possessed a strong guiding compass when it came to command philosophy. Once, 
in describing his anticipation that those in Washington would oppose a military move of his that 
some felt would be a “violation of all the principles of the art of war,” Grant 
 
felt that in every war I knew anything about had made laws for itself, and early in our 
contest I was impressed with the idea that success with us would depend upon our taking 
advantage of new conditions. No two wars are alike, because they are generally fought at 
different periods, under different phases of civilization.598 
 
Grant understood the political nature of the American Civil War.599 When Sherman 
disagreed with Grant and argued that Grant should not move on Vicksburg as Grant planned, 
Sherman wrote that “the politicians in Washington should take care of their affairs and we 
would take care of ours.” Grant replied that, “In a popular war we had to consider political 
exigencies.”600 
But even if Grant understood politics, he did not intervene in the political process. 601 In 
this way he was the only Union supreme commander not to push the Lincoln government for 
more resources than what the political climate would allow. “The greater number of men we 
have, the shorter and less sanguinary will be the war,” wrote Grant to Lincoln, “I give this 
entirely as my view and not in any spirit of dictation—always holding myself in readiness to use 
the material given me to the best advantage I know how.”602 
Grant’s personal philosophy related to command was also well-developed. He said, “I do 
not believe in luck in war any more than luck in business. Luck is a small matter, may affect a 
battle or a movement, but not a campaign or a career.”603 
As to the characteristics of successful generalship, Grant remarked at how “it is difficult 
to know what constitutes a great general.” At the core, he placed “health and youth and energy,” 
that he “should not like to put a general in the field over fifty.” He called attention to “the                                                         
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power to endure,” and that “the only eyes a general can trust are his own,” and that a general 
must know the difference between the map and the terrain: “There is nothing ideal in war.” 604 
Grant also dismissed the “popular estimate of generals.” Grant believed there was “no 
greater mistake” than to assume “that because generals failed in the field they lacked in high 
qualities.” He assessed that such a characterization was unfair, that some of those in the 
American Civil War were merely “unfortunate” and that some were those he still had “perfect 
confidence” in, those that Grant “would not be afraid to trust with important commands.”605 
Some generals, Grant felt, “failed because they worked out everything by rule. They 
knew what Frederick did at one place, and Napoleon at another. They were always thinking 
about what Napoleon would do.” But such consideration meant they were thinking less about 
present realities and their immediate opponent. Grant said he did not “underrate the value of 
military knowledge,” but that “if men make war in slavish observance to rules, they will fail.” To 
do so meant that, too often, “practical facts were neglected” which, strictly in this case, Grant 
considered 
 
remembrances of old campaigns a disadvantage. Even Napoleon showed that, for my 
impression is that his first success came because he made war in his own way, and not in 
imitation of others. War is progressive, because all the instruments and elements of war are 
progressive.606  
 
Grant was in fact a student of war, both imagined and real. Just before the war, he was 
said to have studied Napoleon III’s Italian campaign in 1859, and read the contemporary 
accounts, studied the maps, and would say “This movement was a mistake. If I commanded the 
army, I would do thus and so.” Even before that, when stationed in the Pacific Northwest of the 
fledgling United States in 1853, in discussing the Mexican War with his peers, Grant would be so 
specific and vivid in his description, that his colleagues would say, “How clear-headed Sam 
Grant is in describing battle! He seems to have the whole thing in his head.”607 After the Civil 
War, Grant said that he often went “over our war campaigns” to 
 
critic[z]e what I did, and see where I made mistakes. Information now and then coming to 
light for the first time shows me frequently where I could have done better. I don’t think                                                         
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there is any one of my campaigns with which I have not some fault to find, and which, as I 
see now, I could have improved, except perhaps Vicksburg.608 
 
While certainly not a pacifist, and capable of imposing devastating blows, Grant did not 
like war.609 Later in life, Grant said he “was never more delighted at anything than the close of 
the war” and that he had never gone “into a battle willingly or with enthusiasm.” Moreover, he 
took “no interest in armies” and that he never again wanted “to command another army.” Not 
only that, he said he had not wanted to go to West Point, and remarked, “If I could have 
escaped West Point without bringing myself into disgrace at home, I would have done so.”610 
His last physician, who cared for Grant in his final months before death, reinforced the 
same, that “the carnage in some of his engagements was a positive horror” to Grant only made 
tolerable by the “awful necessity of the situation.” Grant told his doctor, “It was always the idea 
to do it with the least suffering, on the same principle as the performance of a severe and 
necessary surgical operation.” In observing Grant’s sentiments, the doctor noted that, 
“Paradoxical as it may appear, he had an almost abnormally sensitive abhorrence to the infliction 
of pain or injury to others.”611 
Grant was an excellent writer. Major General George Meade observed “one striking 
feature” of Grant’s command, that “no matter how hurriedly he may write [orders] on the field, 
no one ever has the slightest doubt as to their meaning, or ever has to read them over a second 
time to understand them.”612 Another officer close to Grant’s command, Ely Parker, affirmed 
Grant “was a ready writer.”613 One historian has testified to his concentration while in the act of 
writing, that Grant  
 
would be working at his desk, bent over writing, and he would need something across the 
room, a document or something. He would get up and never get out of that crouched 
position and go over there and pick up the document and he’d come back to his desk and 
sit down again without ever having straightened up.614 
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This can be seen in Grant’s effort to write his Memoirs. He was proud to note that he had 
written (or, in some cases, dictated) all his own dispatches as supreme commander during the 
Civil War and all his own speeches as president.615 We can see this point reinforced through a 
bitter missive to a former staff officer, Adam Badeau, who had an ugly falling out with Grant 
over Badeau’s role as a researcher for Grant’s Memoirs. Badeau wrote and accused Grant of being 
a poor writer, to which Grant replied with a self-assessment of his own writing: 
 
I have only to say that for the last twenty-four years I have been very much employed in 
writing. As a soldier I wrote my own orders, directions and reports. They were not edited 
nor assistance rendered. As President I wrote every official document, I believe, bearing my 
name…All these have been published and widely circulated. The public has become 
accustomed to them and my style of writing. They know that it is not even an attempt to 
imitate either a literary [or classical style] and that it is just what is pure and simple and 
nothing else.616  
Grant went on to spend the last year of his life writing through the tremendous pain of 
throat cancer, for several hours each day. Quiet as Grant was known to be, he was able to write, 
in one year, 336,000 total words for a book that was to be about 275,000 words in final form.617 
Grant’s Memoirs were received as “one of the greatest pieces of nonfiction in American 
literary history.” Of course, the publisher Mark Twain, and Grant’s friend William T. Sherman 
praised the book. But literary luminaries such as Gertrude Stein, Sinclair Lewis, and Robert Frost 
held him in the highest regard; Stein even went so far as to place him as superior to Lincoln in 
her book Four in America. Modern literary critics have agreed; Edmund Wilson thought it was on 
par with Walt Whitman’s Leaves of Grass, while Gore Vidal called the book a “classic.”618 
There were many factors in Grant’s development that likely aided his success in the 
American Civil War’s brutal campaign of 1864. It seems the core component to that success 
must be ascribed to his judgment. While it might be fair to acknowledge that Lee was an 
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excellent and perhaps better tactician, Grant clearly held the wider view of the war, and his 
strategic sense was superior to Lee’s.619 
In the end, it may be that no person has had a better understanding of Grant’s supreme 
command than his closest comrade in command, William T. Sherman. 
Not quite two years after Grant’s death, Sherman penned an essay in The North American 
Review to rebut an article written by British General Lord Wolseley in Macmillan’s Magazine in 
March 1887. Wolesley had read Robert E. Lee’s memoirs, and found that 
 
General Lee towered far above all men on either side in that struggle. I believe he will be 
regarded, not only as the most prominent figure of the Confederacy, but as the great 
American of the nineteenth century, whose statue is well worthy to stand on an equal 
pedestal with that of Washington, and whose memory is equally worthy to be enshrined in 
the hearts of all his countrymen.620 
 
Sherman opposed Wolseley’s characterization of Lee, and wrote that Lee’s 
 
sphere of action was, however, local. He never rose to the grand problem which involved a 
continent and future generations. His Virginia was to him the world. Though familiar with 
the geography of the interior of this great continent, he stood like a stone wall to defend 
Virginia against the ‘Huns and Goths’ of the North, and he did it like a valiant knight as he 
was. He stood at the front porch battling with the flames whilst the kitchen and house were 
burning, sure in the end to consume the whole. 
 
Sherman also found that Lee was too “aggressive” and fundamentally “not a success.” 
Sherman said Lee spent too much time “defending Virginia and Richmond,” but that myopic 
focus was detrimental, because this allowed “the Northern armies” to gain everywhere else. In 
sum,  
 
Grant’s “strategy” embraced a continent, Lee’s a small State; Grant’s “logistics” were to 
supply and transport armies thousands of miles, where Lee was limited to hundreds. Grant 
had to conquer natural obstacles as well as hostile armies, and a hostile people; his “tactics” 
were to fight wherever and whenever he could capture or cripple his adversary and his 
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resources; and when Lee laid down his arms and surrendered, Grant, by the stroke of his 
pen, on the instant gave him and his men terms so liberal as to disarm all criticism.  
 
Sherman finished, “Between these two men as generals [Lee and Grant] I will not 
institute a comparison, for the mere statement of the case establishes a contrast.”621  
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5. Dwight D. Eisenhower 
 
5.1 Strategic Context in 1944 
 
Historian Jean Smith has written about both generals Ulysses S. Grant and Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, and spoken about the similarities between the two as military leaders.  
 
[T]here are many parallels. They were both professional soldiers, both educated at West 
Point. Commanded victorious armies in wars of unprecedented magnitude. Were elected 
and reelected president by overwhelming majorities and left office at the height of their 
popularity. They also suffered significant erosions in their reputations in the years following, 
and they’re both now experiencing renewed appreciation.622 
 
Moreover, Eisenhower’s military victory was just as convincing to the Nazis as Grant’s 
victory was over the Confederates.623 Grant and Eisenhower lived similar experiences and faced 
similar struggles as American supreme commanders in high-stakes wars. 
When he had achieved his aim, Eisenhower simply and concisely wrote to inform higher 
headquarters of the victory: “The mission of this Allied Force was fulfilled at 0241, local time, 
May 7th, 1945. Signed Eisenhower.”624 
Yet, eleven months earlier, on D-Day, when Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of 
Nazi-occupied France, was to commence, the same Eisenhower said to his driver, “I hope to 
God I know what I’m doing.”625 He also scribbled a note, apparently so nervous it was misdated: 
 
Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I 
have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon the 
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best information available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that Bravery and 
devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone.626 
 
Such a contrast in statements invites several questions: How did success come about? 
Why did Eisenhower display such concern in June 1944, only to be followed by a confident 
statement of victory in May 1945? What made this an allied victory?627 
This campaign was immense; as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Eisenhower 
had overall control of 4.5 million American and 1 million Allied troops, 91 troop divisions, 
28,000 aircraft, 470,000 vehicles, and 18 million tons of supplies.628 Specifically engaged in 
frontline combat, “about 2.9 million men fought in Normandy for the Allies.”629 
This case features global, industrial, total war, combined and joint military operations, 
expeditionary and coalition warfare, all hallmarks of the modern era in American military 
operations. This war’s United Nations alliance itself is a distinguishing, if challenging feature, as 
the Allies famously fought nearly as much within the alliance as they did against their Axis 
adversaries.630 It encompasses a precise, complex, amphibious assault that was difficult to plan 
and harder to execute, against a well-entrenched and fortified enemy with years to prepare. One 
historian has called it “easily the largest and most complicated multi-national, tri-service 
amphibious landings in the history of mankind.”631 Indeed, the Germans enjoyed the advantages 
of the defense and held a manpower advantage on the beach for at least a week at the point of 
assault, and longer in the wider French region. Moreover, the German war machine had the 
psychological advantage of deep strike technology that shocked and befuddled the Allies.632 
There were reasons to doubt the possibility of Allied victory in France.                                                         
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By 1944 the German offensive to the east had stalled. Soviet campaigns to take back 
Crimea, Ukraine, and the “territory between Leningrad and Estonia chewed up German 
strength.” From the broadest perspective, the Germans had 193 divisions in the east, 28 in Italy, 
18 in Scandinavia, and 59 in France, Holland, and Belgium. Those German divisions on the 
Western Front, nearly 60, formed the Atlantic Wall that the Allies had to breach; while at a 
numerical disadvantage on the ground in France, the Allies air and naval forces commanded the 
sea and sky.633 
In a conflict as vast as the Second World War, there were many things happening in 
many places all across the globe that had distant, strategic impact on other theaters. The Imperial 
Japanese Army tied down approximately 30 U.S. Army divisions in the Pacific (as well as all six 
Marine divisions), reducing the available American troop supply for the European Theater.634 
The Soviets did the same to the German Army on the Eastern Front; in one case during the 
Allied invasion of Normandy, for example, when the Soviets launched Operation Bagration on 
June 22, 1944 as a second front for the Germans to contend with. The Soviets ultimately ground 
down 28 German divisions in that effort.635 Both distant opponents, Imperial Japan and Soviet 
Russia, stressed available resources for the American and German forces fighting in France. Of 
course these had an impact on both countries in the campaign and the war, yet, what mattered 
most was that each combatant in France, the Allies and the Nazis, had the military and strategic 
resources to achieve some form of victory. 
In this context, Dwight Eisenhower commanded all Allied forces. Eisenhower’s effort in 
this undertaking, and his reputation more generally, has suffered at the hands of a few 
distinguished critics. His immediate subordinate, British General Sir Bernard Montgomery, 
wrote to a colleague: “When it comes to war Ike doesn’t know the difference between Christmas 
and Easter.” Another British contemporary, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, commented in his 
diary about Eisenhower’s performance at a major staff briefing on the eve of the Normandy 
invasion in May 1944: “No real director of thought, plans, energy, or direction! Just a 
coordinator—a good mixer, a champion of inter-allied cooperation, and in those respects few 
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can hold a candle to him. But is that enough? Or can we not find all the qualities of a 
commander in one man?”636 
This is a common line of criticism toward Eisenhower. Critics typically accept minor, 
mostly interpersonal success, and then sharply dismiss his strategic successes or withhold praise 
for his performance as supreme commander. This can be seen in one historian’s comment that 
“Eisenhower’s most significant contribution” to Operation OVERLORD’s success “was his 
historic decision to launch D-Day despite the bad weather.”637 Such a statement reduces 
Eisenhower to a mere passive observer, that he only really got one tactical judgment right, but 
otherwise was an unengaged supreme commander. 
More broadly, some historians have essentially written out the role of the supreme 
commander in World War II. In Why the Allies Won, Richard Overy argued that in the Allied 
victory in France, “two explanations stand out above the rest. The first is the inestimable value 
of air power to the invading armies” and the second was “deception.”638 Historian Paul 
Kennedy’s book, Engineers of Victory, like Overy’s, was an “investigation of how the war was 
won.” Kennedy reported the following as decisive characteristics in France: “command and 
control,” “command of the air, command of the sea, and well-handled deception and 
intelligence,” and “the weather in the English Channel and the nature of the German military 
positioning and response.”639 
These explanations bypass a subtle but critical issue: how to use these instruments of 
military power to obtain victory. For example, how should the Allies use their airpower 
advantage? How should the Germans arrange their coastal defenses: at the beach, in fixed, 
entrenched positions, or positioned farther back as a flexible, mobile response force? In the way 
Overy and Kennedy present their cases, these issues are brushed aside as unimportant. Such a 
view ignores the real debates within the Allied high command about the multiple ways to use 
available airpower resources, such as the heated debate over whether to use sustained bombing 
against French rail and transportation networks (e.g. the “Transportation Plan”), or to strike 
more distant and deep strategic bombing targets, or to limit bombing to the days immediately 
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preceding the invasion. Overy and Kennedy overlook these decisions, and in doing so, they miss 
the importance of Eisenhower’s key role as supreme commander. 
This chapter will assess supreme command decisions because by looking at the options 
available at the time, we can see why a particular action was chosen. Moreover,  
 
A decision implies there were choices to be made, alternatives available. To the actors 
concerned, even the most ideologically committed (or blinkered), vital considerations were 
at stake, crucial assessments to be made, big risks to be taken. There was no inexorable path 
to be followed.640 
 
Assessments that skip ahead to a generalizable strategic effect miss the several options 
available at the time, and, by extension, the importance of military judgment and the decisions 
that come from a supreme commander. 
There was disagreement on nearly every major Allied decision with respect to the 
Normandy attack and invasion to retake France. Senior military and political officials involved in 
the planning often disagreed mightily over the proper course of action, and   these opinions did 
not neatly overlap. “Why are we trying to do this?” worried British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill in February 1944.641 Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith 
also shared the following about Churchill’s concern over the impending invasion: 
 
Mr. Churchill told an American general in April 1944 that if he had been planning 
OVERLORD, he would have waited until we could have recovered Norway, taken some 
Aegean islands and got Turkey into the war on our side.642 
 
On the day before the landings, General Sir Alan Brooke, British Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, wrote “I am very uneasy about the whole operation. At the best, it will come very 
far short of the expectations of the bulk of the people, namely all those who know nothing 
about its difficulties. At its worst, it may well be the most ghastly disaster of the war.”643 
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The stakes were high and as such there were many different views and courses of action 
on offer. Headquarters correspondence and official dispatches verify this point.644 Yet only one 
Allied officer could make final decisions: Eisenhower. 
With only a distant martial heritage, a relative having fought for General George 
Washington at the Battle of Long Island in 1776, Dwight D. Eisenhower attended and graduated 
from the United States Military Academy at West Point’s in 1915.645 He was a gifted athlete, just 
under six feet tall, and although he arrived at the school at 152 pounds, later on, his college 
football playing weight was 190 pounds.646 His final year at the academy, he “collected precisely 
one hundred demerits and stood one hundred and twenty-fifth in conduct among a class of 164” 
cadets in his year. He graduated sixty-first, a little behind the upper-third of his graduating class, 
and a friend said that if “he had not indulged in so many extra-curricular activities he could easily 
have led his class scholastically. Everyone was his friend—but with no loss of dignity or 
respect.”647 
Eisenhower went on to a diverse, varied military career, spanning from the development 
of the first U.S. Army tank doctrine, to Panama, to the post-World War I American Battle 
Monuments Commission in France, then a stint in Washington, and the Philippines.648 While 
Eisenhower was stuck at the rank of major for sixteen years, as the American entry into World 
War II approached, he rocketed “from lieutenant colonel to five-star [general] in 42 months, an 
average of six months between promotions.”649 
Just weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, American and 
British military leaders met to discuss strategy, and agreed on a coordination group, the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff, to provide bi-national direction for the war. To support this alliance 
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framework, the Americans developed their own Joint Chiefs of Staff. 650 In February 1942, with 
Eisenhower part of the War Plans Division, an important U.S. War Department planning 
organization, his office wrote a memorandum to Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall 
insisting that an “attack through Western Europe” was the best course of action as it involved 
the “shortest possible sea routes,” would prevent German concentration against Russia, and 
“attack our principal enemy while he is engaged on several fronts.”651 Soon thereafter, on March 
9, 1942, Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower became the chief of that War Plans Division.652 
The Americans immediately began to work on BOLERO, a plan for attack across the 
English Channel. The plan had two variants: SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP. 
SLEDGEHAMMER was a “diversionary strike of up to two divisions in 1942,” conceived as a 
“desperate contingency plan in case the Soviet Union appeared on the verge of defeat.” 
ROUNDUP was the “main event projected for 1943,” closer in vision to what was eventually 
executed. At this point in early 1942, Major General Eisenhower wrote to General Marshall, “the 
principal target for our first major offensive should be Germany, to be attacked through 
Western Europe.”653 
Early on, acknowledging the difficulty of alliance operations, the Allies determined there 
must be unity of command, as British General Sir Alan Brooke wrote on March 11, 1942, “there 
should always be a Supreme Commander in a theatre where active operations are in progress.”654 
In suit, Eisenhower was raised in rank to General and named commander of the European 
Theater of Operations U.S. Army (ETOUSA) on June 24, 1942. He was informed he would 
command the invasion of North Africa. This command was granted despite Eisenhower’s lack 
of previous combat as he had missed fighting in World War I and had never held a wartime 
command, or any command at all above the battalion.655 
Later, while Eisenhower was in North Africa, preparing to strike Italy, at a conference in 
Casablanca in January 1943 the Allies agreed to set up a bi-national planning staff for the attack 
into France.656 Further, at this conference, the Allies selected a Chief of Staff to the Supreme                                                         
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Allied Commander (COSSAC) and directed him to build a staff and start basic planning for the 
invasion of France.657 British Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan was selected for the task.  
The COSSAC planning tackled issues about the general location for the landings, as well as the 
general purpose, but important details had yet to be settled.658 While several issues had been 
considered by COSSAC, Eisenhower still had many important gaps to fill. 
Eisenhower was named to command the Normandy invasion at the Allied conference in 
Tehran in late November 1943, and the announcement was made public on December 24, 
1943.659 Eisenhower’s military chief of staff noted that, “As Supreme Commander, General 
Eisenhower was in direct command of the forces dedicated to the conquest of Hitler’s armies.” 
The Allies fixed “responsibility” on Eisenhower, and “left to him to decide” how to defeat the 
German ability to make war.660 
Not only that, but Eisenhower selected, with Marshall’s blessing, nearly every senior 
military commander in the European Theater.661 Moreover, in the twenty-two documented 
decisions in which American President Franklin D. Roosevelt overruled his military 
commanders, Roosevelt never once overturned a decision by Eisenhower.662 Even in a more 
nuanced democratic system, Eisenhower was the supreme commander. 
Eisenhower’s opposite supreme commander was Adolf Hitler. Hitler appointed himself 
“Supreme Commander of the armed forces” in February 1938, and took this role very seriously. 
He himself decided upon strategies and operations, and Hitler did not delegate away his supreme 
command authority.663 
While some academics have tried to sort out the blame between Hitler and his generals, 
ultimately, Hitler was the only individual with full authority and responsibility for the German 
war effort in France. Strategic issues were often discussed by German generals, but Hitler always 
decided. In the end, Hitler was clearly responsible for all aspects of German strategic 
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performance. Of the 650 major orders issued in the German war effort, all but 72 were issued by 
Hitler.664 
Some might object to any comparison between a military officer and a political figure, an 
argument that might proceed to explain that one was a mere theater commander and the other 
the leader of an entire nation (and then some). Of course, it must be acknowledged that Hitler 
had full command of German national resources, while Eisenhower’s control was specific to a 
particular geographic domain, and subject to some checks and oversight by others. 
Countries are never exact mirror images. Even the United States and Confederate States 
in the American Civil War established different norms, procedures, and decision-making 
structures. To insist on precise title and position equality would make it impossible to compare 
many of the chief military strategists of warring parties. 
Sometimes that person is a king, a Kaiser, a chief, or a general, but one definition always 
applies: “the executive military strategist is a person with responsibility for making, or for 
conducting, military strategy or strategies designed to shape the course and outcome of an entire 
conflict.” Further, Colin Gray has found this is applicable in this case, “While the military 
strategist can function as general, witness Adolf Hitler’s exciting brief career as sole strategist 
and supreme operational military commander, so also he can perform as grand strategist.665 
Even though he was not a professional soldier, Hitler had fought on the line during 
World War I, and one German general pointed out that “Hitler had read a lot of military 
literature, and was also fond of listening to military lectures.”666 
While not a mirror image, in this case, Eisenhower did have an adversary supreme 
commander in Adolph Hitler. Hitler was the elected political leader of Nazi Germany, while 
General Dwight Eisenhower was the appointed leader of a multi-national allied military force. 
Though the two rose from separate circumstances and derived authority from different sources, 
they are to be considered opponents in this strategic engagement. 
Some other more extreme objections might consider Hitler insane or an imbecile, claims 
that let moral considerations consume any objective analysis of Hitler’s strategic performance. 
Such characterizations also avoid appropriate credit for Hitler’s previous strategic successes, as 
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one must allow that he did conquer all of Western Europe for a limited time. If Hitler was a 
lunatic or a simpleton, it is doubtful he could have mobilized all of Germany’s resources to 
accomplish such a feat. Even contemporary assessments acknowledged as much at the time. 
Edward Meade Earle wrote in 1943, “Hitler deserves credit for astute conduct of the war.”667 
Basil H. Liddell Hart found, “Hitler had a natural flair for strategy and tactics” that was 
“characteristic of genius.” Even further, Hart wrote:  
 
Hitler was quicker to spot the value of new ideas, new weapons, and new talent. He 
recognized the potentialities of mobile armoured forces sooner than the General Staff did, 
and the way he backed [General Heinz] Guderian, Germany’s leading exponent of this new 
instrument, proved the most decisive factor in the opening victories…though [this was] 
accompanied by liability to make elementary mistakes, both in calculation and action.668   
 
Considering these comments, and that Hitler did temporarily achieve some of his policy 
objectives, one can consider him a competent supreme commander as part of the strategic 
environment against which General Dwight Eisenhower had to contend. 
Hitler’s Germany desired to create and build a “Thousand-Year Reich.” Hitler told the 
German Reichstag in 1942: “This war is one of those elemental conflicts which usher in a new 
millennium and which shake the world.” More specifically, Hitler wanted a to build living space 
for his Aryan people.669 This living space was to be gained through the conquest over all of 
Europe, including, Russia, and beyond.670 Hitler’s war aim was to be attained through military 
annihilation. 
Additionally, Hitler laid out specific objectives for the defense of France in his “Fuehrer 
Directive Number 51,” of November 3, 1943. This document provided explicit military guidance 
to German forces in the Western theater. Hitler wrote that France was where “the decisive 
landing battles will be fought.”671 In it, Hitler correctly assessed the Allies would make an 
amphibious assault on the Normandy coastline. Later, at a meeting in December 1943, he also 
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anticipated the invasion was soon to come: “There’s no doubt that the attack in the West will 
come in the spring; it is beyond all doubt.”672 He considered this attack would be decisive. Hitler 
said, “If this attack is driven back, the whole affair will be over.” From these statements, one can 
see the high value Hitler placed on this Western defense. On the Western Front, in 1944, his 
military objective was to defeat the Allied cross-channel invasion. Hitler was aware of the 
impending 1944 American presidential election and entertained the thought that President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt might lose, which he hoped would end the American war effort.673 While 
his ultimate policy objective was to expand the German sphere to the maximum extent and 
spread what he believed were superior German values across the globe through Nazi 
domination, his immediate concern in France was to hold his position and drive back the Allies 
and Americans. 
American and Allied strategy in the war was based on several important tenets. First, the 
Americans, fighting from a distance, would use their economic heft to wage war as an “Arsenal 
of Democracy.” This distance dictated the Americans would rely on expeditionary forces, 
underpinned by logistics and firepower. Most importantly, the Americans recognized the 
challenge was too great for any one nation’s resources, and so American strategy was oriented 
on an alliance system. The Americans developed a particularly close relationship with the British 
and a necessary relationship with the Soviets. British survival was critical, as was the agreement 
to target Germany first (instead of Japan).674 
Within this context, on February 12, 1944, General Eisenhower received his directive to 
command OVERLORD, an order which Eisenhower’s chief of staff wrote, established the 
“broad latitude given to the commander.”675 A thirty-word order focused Eisenhower’s actions: 
“You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other united nations, 
undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.”676 
Later, Eisenhower himself wrote that his objective was “to bring all our strength against [the 
enemy], all of it mobile, and all of it contributing directly to the complete annihilation of 
[Germany’s] field forces.”677                                                         
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This required a foothold on the European continent. General Eisenhower first met with 
his key subordinate, British General Bernard Montgomery, in London during January 1944. At 
this point the campaign’s key judgment was the invasion force’s numerical strength. Eisenhower 
was unhappy with the COSSAC staff plan’s feasibility because the attack was planned with a 
thin, three-division front (with two divisions in close reserve). When he met with Montgomery, 
General Eisenhower stated he “was convinced that the plan, unless it had been changed since I 
had seen it, did not emphasize sufficiently the early need for major ports and for rapid build-
up.”678 General Montgomery also wrote a separate official report for British Prime Minister 
Churchill which concurred with Eisenhower that the “initial landing is on too narrow a front 
and is confied [sic] to too small an area,” and the plan was “too impracticable,” while the “initial 
landings must be made on the widest possible front.”679 
The product of the meeting with General Montgomery was a January 23, 1944 cable 
from Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and British Chiefs of Staff, essentially a list of 
Eisenhower’s official first impressions regarding OVERLORD strength and his assessment in 
support of a necessary second landing in the south of France (ANVIL): 
 
We are convinced…this operation marks the crisis of the European war. Every obstacle 
must be overcome, every inconvenience suffered and every risk run to ensure that our blow 
is decisive. We cannot afford to fail… 
To ensure success we consider it essential to increase the assault force to five 
divisions. Nothing less will give us an adequate margin to ensure success… 
Our reasons for this view are that an operation of this type must be designed to 
obtain an adequate bridgehead quickly and to retain the initiative…It will be essential to 
extend the front to give us a greater opportunity of finding a weak spot through which to 
exploit success… 
I regard “ANVIL” as an important contribution to “OVERLORD” as I feel that 
an assault will contain more enemy forces in southern France than a threat. The forces of 
both US and French are in any case available; and the actual landing of these forces will 
increase the cooperation from resistance elements in France. 
“OVERLORD” and “ANVIL” must be viewed as one whole. If sufficient forces 
could be made available the ideal would be a five divisional “OVERLORD” and a three 
divisional “ANVIL” or, at worst, a two divisional “ANVIL.” If insufficient forces are 
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available for this, however, I am driven to the conclusion that we should adopt a five 
divisional “OVERLORD” and a one divisional “ANVIL,” the latter being maintained as a 
threat until enemy weakness justifies its active employment. This solution should be 
adopted only as a last resort and after all other means and alternatives have failed to provide 
the necessary strength by the end of May for a five divisional “OVERLORD” and a two 
divisional “ANVIL.” 680 
 
In this memorandum, we can see the importance Eisenhower attached to the increased 
landing force and the connection between OVERLORD and ANVIL (which was to be bitterly 
contested later in the campaign). 
The Germans readied their positions on the Atlantic Wall, as their immediate military 
objective was to deny the Allies a foothold in Europe. Naval advisor and principal subordinate 
to German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge, has noted that the early 
war campaigns of 1940 “doubled the territory under German control and increased the length of 
defended coastline to approximately 3,500 miles (smaller islands excluded), all open to direct 
attack from the sea.” An earlier Allied raid attempt had taught the Germans that the Allies would 
not directly attack ports, but instead land on the beach first, and then attack ports from the 
rear.681 
Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt was German Commander-in-Chief in the West; he 
believed the Allies would invade at the shortest point between Britain and France, and he 
expected the attack sometime after March.682 On October 25, 1943, Rundstedt submitted a 
memorandum that predicted the Allies would land in the Pas de Calais, followed by Normandy 
and Brittany, because these offered the most direct invasion routes. Rundstedt argued that it 
would be advantageous for the Germans to fight to hold the coast, and also made the case that 
the best way to either defeat the Allies at the water or force the Allies into a negotiated 
settlement, was for the Germans to employ targeted counterattacks with a large reserve to push 
back early Allied landings into the sea.683 So Rundstedt wanted to use a mobile, massed reserve. 
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At the same time, Adolf Hitler prepared Fuehrer Directive 51, the key document that 
guided German strategic thinking on the military challenge ahead. Specifically, Hitler assessed 
that:  
 
The threat from the East remains, but an even greater danger looms in the West: the Anglo-
American landing! In the East, the vastness of the space will, as a last resort, permit a loss of 
territory even on a major scale, without suffering a mortal blow to Germany’s chance for 
survival. 
Not so in the West! If the enemy here succeeds in penetrating our defenses on a 
wide front, consequences of staggering proportions will follow within a short time. All signs 
point to an offensive against the Western Front of Europe no later than spring, and perhaps 
earlier. 
For that reason, I can no longer justify the further weakening of the West in favor 
of other theaters of war. I have therefore decided to strengthen the defenses in the West, 
particularly at places from which we shall launch our long-range war against England. 
 
As to invasion specifics, Hitler believed that in the first encounter at the beach,  
 
Only an all-out effort in the construction of fortifications, an unsurpassed effort that will 
enlist all available manpower and physical resources of Germany and the occupied areas, 
will be able to strengthen our defenses along the coasts within the short time that still 
appears to be left to us. 
 
Hitler believed that if the Allies were to land, they  
 
must be hit by the full fury of our counterattack. For this mission ample and speedy 
reinforcements of men and material, as well as intensive training reserves suitable for 
offensive operations. The counterattack of these units will prevent the enlargement of the 
beachhead, and throw the enemy back into the sea.684 
 
The same month, in November 1943, having received Rundstedt’s report, Hitler 
dispatched Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and his “entire staff” with “over 200 officers” to 
determine the best way to beat back an Allied invasion. So Rommel studied the military problem 
to develop the most effective defense, and in the process was given a command as part of the                                                         
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defense of the Atlantic Wall. Then, on December 30, 1943, perhaps to co-opt Rommel, 
Rundstedt formally proposed placing Rommel’s “Army Group B under [Rundstedt’s] High 
Command West, with direct responsibility for command of the garrison of the Netherlands and 
of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Armies in the Pas de Calais and Normandy.”685 Hitler agreed 
with Rundstedt’s suggestion and put Rommel in charge of preparing the tactical defense of the 
Atlantic Wall. 
While Hitler identified the need to prepare to fight in France, and sent one of his best 
generals there, he had yet to specify the utilization and implementation of these newly-focused 
forces. Normandy and France were valuable objectives for Hitler and the German war effort, 
even compared to the Eastern Front. By both word (Fuehrer Directive 51) and deed (Rommel’s 
commitment), Hitler showed this theater mattered greatly to him as a defensive objective.  
 
5.2 The 1944 Campaign’s Strategic Effect 
 
In May of 1944 both the Germans and the Allies still had the ability to achieve some version of 
victory. The Germans still held France, defended by a robust set of forces and fortifications, 
with some of the Reich’s most talented military commanders, and were hard at work on 
improving their striking power in the form of a new missile (e.g. the V-weapons). 
Yet by the fall of 1944, the Allies had taken Paris and France, on the way to the German 
border, and had forced the Nazis into the close-in, two-front war they had so dreaded. This 
1944 fighting season was the European Theater’s terminal campaign, and Normandy was the 
“decisive western battle” of the war, and so this time period had the greatest impact on the way 
the war was to turn out.686 
It all went to the Allies great advantage, as the frantic withdrawal of German forces 
toward the German border “yielded unmistakable evidence of massive positive strategic effect 
achieved by Allied command performance.”687 
Beyond a general positive sense, there are several specific gains the Allies made as the 
result of this campaign. First, prior to the invasion, the Allies had no foothold which enabled 
them to directly attack Germany on land, secure or otherwise, on the European Continent. The 
Normandy invasion put the Allies physically on the Continent in sufficient size and effective 
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position to project force against the heart of Germany. Without this posture, there was no way 
to militarily defeat the Germans in a way beneficial to the United States and Allies. 
Second, the Soviets required a second front in order to maximize their efficacy, 
something Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had requested of his Allied partners since 1942. Certainly 
there was a titanic struggle on the Eastern Front, yet, activity is not necessarily the same as 
progress. Stalin’s Red Army had done well despite immense casualties, yet nonetheless required a 
second front in the West. 
Additionally, Allied gains in France denied the Germans the ability to launch V-weapons 
(their newly developed crude ballistic missiles) with impunity against war-weary Britain. This had 
real impact on civilian morale in Britain, and when the Allies denied these weapons and 
launching positions in France, it cut down one of Hitler’s primary theories of victory, as he had 
expected the British to be terrorized into defeat.688 
Practically, the Allied ground gains in France also meant that the German navy lost their 
best, most convenient and effective Atlantic bases. Also, the Allies advance across France cut 
the German land bridge to Spain and Portugal, which meant “critical raw materials, especially 
wolfram and chrome, could no longer be imported or smuggled out” of the Iberian Peninsula.689 
Because the Allies accomplished these positive strategic effects in taking France from the 
German Army, by the end of the 1944 campaign, the Germans faced a two-front war on their 
home borders, without long-range strike capability, and the Allies had secured multiple ports 
with which to support further strategic advances. Without Allied success at Normandy and in 
France, the war’s outcome might have been significantly different.  
 
5.3 Could the Germans have won?  
 
The next issue is whether Hitler had an opportunity to accomplish his objectives. Did the 
Germans have the potential to achieve their objectives at Normandy on the road to their grand 
strategic goal in the war? Counterfactuals can help understand the answer to this question. This 
not the same as asking broader questions about whether the rest of the 20th Century would have 
looked different without Hitler.690 Such deep and distant questions are not necessary to envision                                                         
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the challenges that might have led to German gains, and maybe even strategic advantage, at 
Normandy. Because Normandy was the last time the German armed forces might have kept 
Hitler from strategic defeat.691 
The Allies were not destined to victory at Normandy. Despite a massive advantage in 
airpower (11,590 Allied planes to 319 German planes), the initial American bombardment of 
1,745 tons of munitions killed not a single German defender on Normandy’s crucial Omaha 
Beach largely due to effective German defensive positions made of steel rebar reinforced 
concrete bunkers. In the invasion’s initial stages, the German defensive advantage was real. For 
example, the average American landing soldier’s pack weighed 75 pounds, and as a result many 
soldiers drowned in the clumsy movement from the landing craft to the beach.692 Expeditionary 
warfare is costly; the act of moving mountains of supply to a tenuous beachhead, and beyond, 
was an incredible challenge. Between these defensive advantages and the problems of supply 
alone, researchers are forced to admit there was real reason to believe Allied failure was 
plausible. 
Several historians have taken seriously German success at Normandy.693 Some have 
wondered what might have happened if the Allied landings had failed, and considered the 
potential use of the atomic weapon in Europe (instead of Japan), largely because there was no 
backup plan and such a failure would have threatened the Churchill government. Also,  
 
Failure on D-Day would not have spared Hitler the problems of a two-front war, because 
of the Allied forces still intact in Britain, always posing a threat. Still, he would have been 
free to transfer at least some of his army in France to his Eastern front. Perhaps more 
important, he could have used the D-Day failure to split the strange alliance of West and 
East. How hard would it have been for Goebbels and the Nazi propaganda machine to 
convince Stalin that the capitalists were ready to fight to the last Russian? It is not 
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inconceivable that Hitler and Stalin would have groped their way back to 1939, when they 
were partners, and reinstated the Nazi-Soviet pact.694 
 
Another considered the consequences if Field Marshal Erwin Rommel delivered a 
successful stalemate with his Atlantic Wall; that a favorable, negotiated peace was possible for 
the Germans.695 Even at the time, in July 1943, British strategist Basil H. Liddell Hart wondered 
in The Daily Mail whether 
 
a logically calculating German strategist might be inclined to welcome invasion as the most 
likely chance of an “honourable peace” now that his offensive ambitions have been 
foiled…in a vivid demonstration of the strength of the “Fortress of Europe,” by inflicting a 
disastrous repulse on its would-be invaders, he might attain the best chance, and perhaps 
the only chance, of curbing the Allies’ appetite for complete victory and making them 
modify their demand for Germany’s unconditional surrender.696 
 
This reflects the great Anglo-American concern from 1941 to 1943, that Stalin would 
make a separate peace to get out of the war against Germany, a fear which traded on rumors of 
Stalin-directed peace overtures to Germany via Soviet diplomats in Stockholm.697 
Separately, another historian has noted the residual missile threat that would result from 
invasion failure: 
 
[I]f we had not invaded Northern Europe in the summer of 1944, London would have been 
laid flat by the V-1 bombs and V-2 rockets. For no defense at that time had been worked 
out against the V-2, and without an invasion of Northern Europe its launching sites would 
have remained intact. Nobody has more respect for the fortitude of the English people than 
I have; yet could they, after all their previous sufferings and sacrifices, have withstood an 
accelerated and intensified V-2 offensive?698 
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Failure in the D-Day landings and in the contest to retake France had two potentially 
devastating outcomes for the Allied war effort. First, there would have been a distinctly negative 
political effect. Germany might have forged another agreement with the Soviet Union, two 
opportunistic, totalitarian countries.699 A second deal was possible, especially if the Allies failed 
in the West and Stalin lost confidence as a result. 
Next on the political front, a military failure would have had a chilling effect on the 
Allies, and brought on grave strategic threats. The V-1 and V-2 weapons Hitler launched on 
London from Normandy, known at the time as “pilotless planes” or “buzz bombs,” would have 
continued to wreak havoc on the British people, who, though they had already shouldered the 
psychological shock and burden of the Battle of Britain, could not be expected to fight off such 
indiscriminate devastation indefinitely. The principal supreme commanders knew the stakes. 
Eisenhower certainly did, as did Hitler when he acknowledged in December 1943: “If they 
attack in the West, [then] this attack will decide the war.”700 Thus, there were several strategic 
pathways to success for Hitler and the Germans.  
 
5.4 Eisenhower: Airpower versus Hitler: Coastal versus Mobile 
 
Eisenhower: Airpower 
 
Upon arrival for command, in January 1944, General Eisenhower wrote to U.S. Army Air Force 
General Carl Spaatz that Spaatz’s headquarters’ would now work alongside British Bomber 
Command, “under [the] general direction of the Supreme Commander.701 A few months later, 
both Spaatz and the British Bomber Command opposed Eisenhower’s major plan for invasion 
airpower as well as more generally “submitting to Eisenhower’s control.” In addition, both the 
chief of the British Royal Air Force and prime minister agreed.702 The ground-air command 
relationship became so acrimonious that Eisenhower wrote about the “air problem” on March 
22, 1944, that “the British had a great fear that the American idea was to seize all the air in Great 
Britain and apply it very locally in preparation of OVERLORD.” Moreover, in the same 
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dispatch, Eisenhower threatened self-relief over the matter, and wrote, “If a satisfactory answer 
is not reached I am going to take drastic action and inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff that 
unless the matter is settled at once I will request relief from this Command.”703 
What drove Eisenhower to the point of resignation? Despite appearances, it was not a 
personal or personnel issue, and instead better cast as a “protracted” military and political 
problem. The Allies needed to cripple the railway system in France to the point where the 
Germans could not reinforce on the ground as quickly as the Allies came ashore.704 On March 
27, 1944, Eisenhower aide Harry Butcher succinctly put the matter, “whether strategic bombers 
on oil or transportation as the best means of helping OVERLORD is a question for Ike to 
determine.”705 Eisenhower listened intently to both proposals. It proved a difficult decision. 
There were two options to isolate Normandy from German reinforcements using 
airpower. The first, which had been assumed in the earlier COSSAC plan, was “interdiction: line-
cutting, strafing, bridge-breaking, and the destruction of a few rail focal points.”706 However, this 
interdiction bombing was meant to be short and sharp, immediately to precede the amphibious 
assault. Another choice, as the invasion neared, Air Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory proposed a 
longer-term attrition campaign to strike the entirety of the rail networks in France and even 
Belgium. This was to include the rails themselves, but also repair facilities and trains.707 
The contrast was clear: short-term interdiction versus long-term attrition (the latter was 
more commonly known at the time as the “Transportation Plan”). Advocates for interdiction 
estimated that whatever traffic was left could be struck and neutralized. Leigh-Mallory argued 
long-term attrition was preferable, because interdiction was too dependent on good weather to 
reveal enemy rail reinforcements in the run-up to D-Day. Moreover, an AEAF [American 
Expeditionary Air Forces] study from February 12, 1944, suggested the Transportation Plan was 
superior because it showed that fully two-thirds of all rail traffic was German military 
equipment. Therefore, any significant degradation of the rail system would register a direct 
impact on the German war effort in France. The Transportation Plan was resource heavy; 
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tactical air forces could not undertake such a sustained air campaign on their own, and would 
require support from strategic bomber assets, and pull the bombers away from their deeper 
attacks on German war materiel.708 
On February 15, 1944, General Spaatz and British Air Chief Marshal Harris met with 
Leigh-Mallory to oppose the Transportation Plan. Spaatz stated the Transportation Plan would 
pull heavy bombers from more important missions. Harris supported Spaatz, and argued the 
Transportation Plan was based on the flawed assumption that interdiction would not work. 
Spaatz and Harris were also supported by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, General Sir Alan 
Brooke, British Chief of the Air Staff Marshal Charles Portal, the Joint Intelligence Committee, 
and the British Ministry of Economic Warfare. They argued interdiction was superior to attrition 
in attacking rail systems, and believed the Transportation Plan would harm the French 
population too much, which might hamper follow-on Allied operations in France. The U.S. 
Embassy in London even pulled together an ad hoc research committee of rails experts in 
Britain which favored interdiction because they estimated only one-fifth of the French rails were 
used by the German military. This contrasted with the two-thirds figure previously arrived at (as 
well as the post-war estimate that the correct percentage of German military rail use in France 
was one-third). Which figure one accepted would have an important role in determining which 
use of airpower was best, as well as the amount of harm to come to French civilians.709 
Spaatz’s alternate proposal on March 5, 1944 was titled “Plan for the Completion of the 
Combined Bomber Offensive,” which promised to “reduce German gasoline supplies by 50 
percent in six months.” Spaatz pointed out “only fourteen plants were turning out 80 per cent of 
Germany’s synthetic petroleum, most of which was used for gasoline” and “the loss of fourteen 
synthetic oil plans might be catastrophic to the Germans, who could easily spare fourteen rail 
centers.”710 
Leigh-Mallory rebutted, and raised the risk of waiting to use airpower until close to D-
Day; doing so would subject the operation to the whims of the weather. Eventually, Air Chief 
Marshal Harris changed his mind and put his support behind the Transportation Plan, perhaps 
persuaded by the Deputy Supreme Commander, Air Chief Marshal Tedder. Tedder opposed 
Spaatz’s oil targeting plan because he did not believe there was enough time prior to the invasion 
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to make a difference in German oil production, while there would be sufficient time to dislodge 
French rail networks before the Allied landing.711 
General Eisenhower considered both arguments, and decided in favor of what he 
perceived to be the most critical task, to secure lodgment for the invasion’s ground forces in 
France. At an Allied conference on March 25, 1944, Eisenhower announced he had selected the 
Transportation Plan as the course of action as it would contribute the most to OVERLORD’s 
amphibious assault. On April 14, Eisenhower ordered the Transportation Plan to commence.712 
Eisenhower’s reasons for the decision are instructive. In continued discussion with 
important political stakeholders, we can see Eisenhower’s thinking and judgment in action. On 
April 5, 1944, just before he gave the order, Eisenhower wrote to Prime Minister Churchill: 
 
After long study, [we]…decided that the only preparatory field in which our air force could 
be profitably employed…was against the enemy’s transportation system… 
I and my military advisors have become convinced that the bombing of these 
centers will increase our chances for success in the critical battle. 
The French people are now slaves. Only a successful OVERLORD can free them. 
No one has a greater stake in the success of that operation than have the French. 
As a consequence of all these considerations I am convinced that while we must do 
everything possible to avoid loss of life among our friends I think it would be sheer folly to 
abstain from doing anything that can increase any measure our chances for success in 
OVERLORD… 
[The] French people would accept these bombings as a necessary sacrifice incident 
to [the Germans] earlier defeat. 713 
 
In this point on French acceptance, Eisenhower was undoubtedly correct. The French 
commander of the French Forces of the Interior in Britain initially protested the decision, but 
when briefed in full, he agreed with the bombing plan. Eisenhower’s chief of staff recorded the 
French general’s response: “‘C’est la guerre’ was never used with deeper feeling.”714 On April 29, 
1944, as Churchill and the British high command continued to disagree with his decision, 
Eisenhower wrote to General George Marshall: 
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The British Government has been trying to induce me to change my bombing program 
against the transportation systems, so as to avoid the killing of any Frenchmen. I have stuck 
to my guns because there is no other way in which this tremendous air force can help us, 
during the preparatory period, to get ashore and stay there. The Prime Minister talked to me 
about bombing “bases, troop concentrations and dumps.” The fact is that any large dumps 
are obviously located near marshaling yards while troop concentrations are by battalion in 
little villages. Any immediate attempt to bomb the German troop units throughout France 
would probably kill four Frenchmen for every German.715 
 
These were the tough tradeoffs between military effectiveness and political compromise, 
as can be seen in Eisenhower’s note to Prime Minister Churchill on May 2, 1944: 
 
I have throughout realized the political considerations arising from the inevitable casualties 
to French civilian personnel caused by the attack on the enemy’s Rail Transport 
system…Subsequent to my meeting with you on the 28th, I further directed that the 
remaining Railway targets involving the greatest risk of civilian casualties will, as far as 
possible, be attacked at a later stage in the Operation. Although this postponement does 
inevitably affect the full efficacy of the Plan, since some of the targets involving heavy 
casualties are, from a railway point of view, some of the most important, I feel this handicap 
can be accepted in view of the weighty political considerations put forward by the British 
Cabinet. 
I must point out that casualties to civilian personnel are inherent in any plan for the 
full use of Air power to prepare for our assault… 
It is stated that attack on the Railway system involves the killing of 10,000 to 15,000 
Frenchmen. This is an estimate made after careful examination of each target, and assuming 
that there would be no evacuation despite the warnings which have been given, and despite 
the series of attacks which have already been made. Experience has, however, shown that in 
fact the casualties, even if we accept Vichy figures, have been in the aggregate considerably 
less than the estimate.716 
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Eisenhower’s memorandum showed regard for critical political sensitivities and provided 
a view into his thoughts on casualties. Eisenhower continued, and stated his specific military 
objectives in his final judgment and decision. 
 
I fear that there is still considerable misunderstanding regarding the nature of the object of 
my operations against enemy Rail transportation. It has never been suggested that these 
Operations by themselves will stop essential military movement. The object of the whole 
Operation is so to weaken and disorganize the Railway system as a whole that, at the critical 
time of the assault, German rail movements can be effectively delayed, and the rapid 
concentration of their forces against the lodgment area prevented. Time is the vital factor 
during the period immediately following the assault. The delay which would be involved by 
enforced use of Motor Transport in place of Railway Transport would, in itself, be of 
inestimable value… 
As regards alternative plans, at my Meeting…at which all authoritative military and 
expert opinion was represented, it was clear…to me…that there is no effective alternative 
plan…[The other options] do not, themselves, however, in any way constitute a plan by 
which our Air power can, in the final stages, effectively delay and disrupt enemy 
concentrations.717 
 
As a military proposition, Eisenhower was clear that his use of airpower was the only 
effective way to ensure disruption of a German counterattack. He also wrote more on the 
balance between military effectiveness on political considerations: 
 
As I said at the beginning of this note, I fully appreciate the gravity of the issues raised. I 
have modified my plan as far as possible without vitiating its value. If it is still considered 
that the political considerations are such as to limit the Operations [any more severly], such 
a modification would emasculate the whole plan… 
The “OVERLORD” concept was based on the assumption that our overwhelming 
Air power would be able to prepare the way for the assault. If its hands are to be tied, the 
perils of an already hazardous undertaking will be greatly enhanced.718 
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In this judgment and decision, Eisenhower exercised choice from amongst alternate 
options voiced by effective, powerful advocates, and considered military effectiveness balanced 
against political coherence. One historian assessed the result, and found Eisenhower’s decision 
here “was one of the single most important policy calls in the entire war” and as such, “by June 
6, 1944, French rail traffic was a mere 30 percent what it had been in January; by early July, it 
was only 10 percent.”719 Eisenhower’s judgment had been militarily effective. Also, while there 
was much argument over what the political ramifications would be if the Transportation Plan 
killed many French civilians (pre-invasion estimates were as high as 160,000 casualties; 25% of 
those would be deaths); in the end, the total was approximately 10,000.720 While still high, this 
was nowhere near the feared potential figures. 
 
Hitler: Coastal versus Mobile 
 
When a subordinate reported the June 6, 1944 landings to Hitler, he replied, “I am glad that the 
Anglo-Americans have finally decided to land in France, and exactly where they were expected. 
Now we know where we are. We will see how things go from now on.”721  For the Germans, 
this was the one missing part of the puzzle, because at the time they did not know where or 
when the Allies would land.722 This was the great challenge in the preparation for the Allied 
landing. Absent specific knowledge about location, how best to prepare a response? 
The German campaigns in 1940 had massively expanded Germany’s frontiers to 
defend.723 This large coastline was a benefit, but also a challenge: 
 
The Fifteenth Army in the Pas de Calais sector eventually grew to a strength of 18 infantry 
and two panzer divisions, responsible for about 340 miles of coastline. The Seventh Army, 
responsible for Normandy and Brittany, had 14 infantry divisions and a single panzer 
division. It was responsible for 995 miles of coast. One of its divisions had a defensive 
sector of 62 miles; another was expected to secure no fewer than 167 miles.724 
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With such a large geographical and military problem, different officers provided multiple 
approaches to the challenge. In March 1942, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt became the 
German commander in France and the other German-occupied countries in the West. Later, to 
signal the theater’s importance, Hitler put Field Marshal Erwin Rommel in command of Army 
Group B (to include the 15th and 7th Armies in Normandy), both of which were later placed 
under Rundstedt’s command in the West.725 The command relationships at that point became 
complicated: 
 
Rommel’s Army Group B was given the right to command any formations of Panzer 
Group West in its operational area as part of its preparation for the invasion. Rommel also 
received the right to recommend sector assignments and command appointments for the 
mobile formations directly to von Rundstedt, thus bypassing [General Leo] Geyr [von 
Schweppenburg]. The result was an increase in friction among the senior officers that led 
Hitler to intervene directly.726  
 
Rommel’s view was to fight the Allies at the beach, in relatively smaller detachments, and 
not to let them ever establish a beachhead. Rommel envisioned German counterattacks very 
near the beach to take advantages of vulnerable troops making an amphibious landing.727 
Rommel’s ideas on the defense were not just opposed by Rundstedt, but also General 
Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg, who in July 1943 was given command of Panzer Troops West. 
Geyr advocated much larger counterattacks (i.e. division-size) from farther back inland. Rommel 
rebutted that such large forces would never make it to the beach in time because Allied airstrikes 
would pound the rail and road networks. Rommel stuck to his belief that the Germans should 
hold the invaders at the water line.728 
Hitler made the ultimate decision. With ten mechanized divisions available for a reserve, 
he first moved three mechanized divisions to southern France, which left seven mechanized 
divisions to allocate. If they had been organized as a cohesive body, they might have been large 
enough to influence or determine the battle. Instead, Hitler gave three divisions to Rommel for 
his direct control in Army Group B, and then four divisions to stay with Panzer Group West, 
only to be released on Hitler’s personal command. Hitler’s compromise left the German 
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counterattack thin everywhere and so not powerful enough to make a difference when the fight 
came. One historian believes that if at least four of these divisions had been placed nearer 
Normandy, with more appropriate tactical release authority, then these German units might have 
made a big difference in the invasion result.729 Hitler’s indecision between Rommel and 
Rundstedt was costly.730 
There is much testimony from contemporary German commanders on this mistake. 
Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge assessed there was “no uniform defence plan.”731 Rundstedt’s 
Chief of Staff, General Gunther Blumentritt, found the “chain of command was very 
complicated and muddled” and that on June 6, German forces “freedom of action…was 
impossible.”732 Both Rundstedt and Rommel requested the employment of the mechanized 
reserve; both were denied.733 Ruge found the core reason the German defense failed was “lack of 
a single, clear-cut plan, carried out under the responsibility of a single, experienced 
commander.”734  
 
In Summary, Eisenhower: Airpower versus Hitler: Coastal versus Mobile 
 
Hitler’s challenge was to determine how the German Army should best defend the Atlantic Wall. 
There were multiple choices available, including Rommel’s belief the invaders should be 
confronted at the beach, and Rundstedt’s faith in German mobile counterattack. Hitler’s choice 
was poor in that he decided to break his reserve into three parts, diminishing its punching power 
and ability to make a difference in the fight. 
Eisenhower’s judgment and decision on the use of force was correct in this case. His 
challenge was how to employ Allied airpower in such a way as to enable a successful landing. 
General Spaatz counseled in favor of strategic bombing; Churchill and other members of the 
British high command were concerned over potentially high French civilian casualties in the 
Transportation Plan. Nevertheless, Eisenhower chose the Transportation Plan, while deftly 
modifying it to suit political considerations and maintain Alliance unity, a decision that 
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effectively halted German resupply and counterattack, and ultimately aided the Allies landing 
effort. 
 
5.5 Eisenhower: Airborne versus Hitler: V-weapons 
 
Eisenhower: Airborne 
 
Early on, the Combined Chiefs of Staff allocated COSSAC planners two American airborne 
divisions for use in the invasion.735 The trouble was specifically where to drop them, an issue 
which caused considerable disagreement. There were two radically divergent military opinions 
on offer from two respected figures in the senior command structure: Air Chief Marshal 
Trafford Leigh-Mallory and General George Marshall. 
On February 10, 1944, Marshall sent Eisenhower a message: 
 
My dear Eisenhower: Up to the present time I have not felt that we have properly exploited 
air power as regards its combination with ground troops. We have lacked planes, of course, 
in which to transport men and supplies, but our most serious deficiency I think has been a 
lack in conception. Our procedure has been a piecemeal proposition with each commander 
grabbing at a piece to assist his particular phase of the operation, very much as they did with 
tanks and as they tried to do with the airplane itself. It is my opinion that we now possess 
the means to give a proper application to this phase of air power in a combined operation. 
I might say that it was my determination in the event I went to England to do this, 
even to the extent that should the British be in opposition I would carry it out exclusively 
with American troops. I am not mentioning this as pressure on you but merely to give you 
the idea of my own conclusions in the matter.736 
 
As he had originally been the top contender to command the invasion, Marshall’s 
thoughts on the subject likely carried heavy significance with Eisenhower. Marshall felt so 
strongly on the matter that he assigned three officers from his personal staff to study the issue, 
who generated three options for employment of airborne troops at Normandy. Of the three, 
Marshall supported “Plan C,” which                                                          
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Establishes an air-head in keeping with my ideas on the subject, one that can be quickly 
established and developed to great strength in forty-eight hours. The area generally south of 
Evreux [200km inland from Normandy and 100km to Paris] has been selected because of 
four excellent airfields. 
This plan appeals to be me because I feel that it is a true vertical envelopment and 
would create such a strategic threat to the Germans that it would call for a major revision of 
their defensive plans. It should be a complete surprise, an invaluable asset of any such plan. 
It would directly threaten the crossings of the Seine as well as the city of Paris. It should 
serve as a rallying point for considerable elements of the French underground. 
In effect, we would be opening another front in France and your build-up would be 
tremendously increased in rapidity. The trouble with this plan is that we have never done 
anything like this before, and frankly, that reaction makes me tired. Therefore I should like 
you to give these young men an opportunity to present the matter to you personally before 
your Staff tears it to ribbons. Please believe that, as usual, I do not want to embarrass you 
with undue pressure. I merely wish to be certain that you have viewed this possibility on a 
definite planning basis.737 
 
This vision for airborne drops was to be two-thirds of the way to Paris. U.S. Army Air 
Force Commander General Hap Arnold concurred with General Marshall on this plan to 
threaten Paris directly. However, on both counts, the objective and placement of the airborne 
drops, Eisenhower disagreed and considered the option ill-advised.738 
Nine days after Marshall’s memorandum was signed, Eisenhower responded with polite, 
yet firm, disagreement: 
 
My initial reaction to the specific proposal is that I agree thoroughly with the conception 
but disagree with the timing. Mass in vertical envelopments is sound—but since this kind of 
an enveloping force is immobile on the ground, the collaborating force must be strategically and 
tactically mobile. So the time for mass vertical envelopment is after the beach-head has been 
gained and a striking force built up… 
As I see it, the first requisite is for the Expeditionary Force to gain a firm and solid 
footing on the Continent and to secure at least one really good sheltered harbor… 
[T]he initial crisis of the Campaign will be the struggle to break through beach 
defenses, exploit quickly to include a port and be solidly based for further operations. To                                                         
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meet this first tactical crisis I intend to devote everything that can be profitably used, including 
airborne troops... 
The second consideration that enters my thinking on this problem is expressed in 
the very first sentence of your letter, in the phrase ‘air power as regards its combination with 
ground troops’… 
Whatever the conditions in other Theaters of War, the one here that we must never 
forget is the enemy’s highly efficient facilities for concentration of ground troops at any 
particular point. This is especially true in the whole of France and in the Low Countries. 
Our bombers will delay movement, but I cannot conceive of enough air power to prohibit 
movement on the network of roads throughout northwest France…We must arrange all 
our operations so that no significant part of our forces can be isolated and defeated in 
detail… 
An airborne landing carried out at too great a distance from other forces which will 
also be immobile for some time, will result in a much worse situation… 
All of the above factors tend to compel the visualization of airborne operations as 
an immediate tactical rather than a long-range strategical adjunct of landing operations. 739 
 
In this response, readers can see Eisenhower’s judgment in operation. His priority was to 
gain a solid foothold in Europe. To that end, he described a concentrated effort to achieve that 
goal, and determined that Marshall’s advice would result in immobile, isolated targets for 
German mobile reserves. In sum, Eisenhower determined the airborne troops in this operation 
were to be used in support of, and not a separate independent effort from, the landings in 
Normandy. 
Another challenge, one week before the Allied landings, Eisenhower’s personal aide 
Navy Captain Harry Butcher wrote an entry in his journal titled, “Misgivings About the Airborne 
Operation.” Butcher wrote on May 30, 1944 that Eisenhower had a “tough one today” because 
“Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory, who has been lukewarm to the paratroop phase of 
OVERLORD, has ‘gone on record’ in a letter emphasizing his fear of colossal losses in the 
American paratroop operation.”740 
Eisenhower acknowledged in his command diary entry on May 22, 1944, “In 
contemplating airborne operations…we have run into a great deal of difficulty because of the 
almost universal coverage of the European continent by strong flak,” a scenario with the likely 
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result being “the Eighty-second Airborne Division will have a most sticky time of it.”741 
Eisenhower knew the decision was risky due to the paratroopers’ relatively slow descent. 
Leigh-Mallory thought the airborne troopers would be a colossal failure.742 Specifically, 
Leigh-Mallory penned a letter, one week before the invasion, which outlined his concerns that 
the airborne operation would “yield results so far short of what the Army C.-in-C. expects and 
requires, that, if the success of the seaborne assault in this area depends on the airborne, it will 
be seriously prejudiced.”743 Later, Eisenhower recalled Leigh-Mallory estimated the two 
American airborne divisions would suffer losses of up to 70 percent, which would render them 
combat ineffective.744 Eisenhower’s chief of staff’s recollection was that Leigh-Mallory’s estimate 
was even higher, 75-80 percent casualties in the airborne force.745 Eisenhower responded to 
Leigh-Mallory’s letter: 
 
Thank you very much for your letter of the 29th [May, 1944] on the subject of airborne 
operations. You are quite right in communicating to me your convictions as to the hazards 
involved and I must say that I agree with you as to the character of these risks. However, a 
strong airborne attack in the region indicated is essential to the whole operation and it must 
go on. Consequently, there is nothing for it but for you, the Army Commander, and the 
Troop Carrier Commander to work out to the last detail every single thing that may 
diminish these hazards… 
I am, of course, hopeful that our percentage losses will not approximate your 
estimates because it is quite certain that I expect to need these forces very badly later in the 
campaign.746 
 
This was a difficult decision, one that weighed heavily on Eisenhower, even after the 
Allied operation. In Crusade in Europe, written just after the war’s end from his in-war diary notes, 
Eisenhower reflected at great length on the decision: 
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[The] old question of the wisdom of the airborne operation into the Cherbourg peninsula 
was not yet fully settled in Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory’s mind. Later, on May 30, he 
came to me to protest once more against what he termed the “futile slaughter” of two fine 
divisions. He believed that the combination of unsuitable landing grounds and anticipated 
resistance was too great a hazard to overcome. This dangerous combination was not 
present in the area on the left where the British airborne division would be dropped and 
casualties there were not expected to be abnormally severe, but he estimated that among the 
American outfits we would suffer some seventy per cent losses and glider strength and at 
least fifty per cent in paratroop strength before the airborne troops could land. 
Consequently the divisions would have no remaining tactical power and the attack would 
not only result in the sacrifice of many thousand men but would be helpless to effect the 
outcome of the general assault. 
Leigh-Mallory was, of course, earnestly sincere. He was noted for personal courage 
and was merely giving me, as was his duty, his frank convictions.747 
 
At this point, Eisenhower turned to his own thought process, and wrote in stark terms: 
 
It would be difficult to conceive of a more soul-racking problem. If my technical expert was 
correct, then the planned operation was worse than stubborn folly, because even at the 
enormous cost predicted we would not gain the principal object of the drop. Moreover, if 
he was right, it appeared that the attack on Utah Beach was probably hopeless, and this 
meant that the whole operation suddenly acquired a degree of risk, even foolhardiness, that 
presaged a gigantic failure, possibly Allied defeat in Europe. 
To protect him in case his advice was disregarded, I instructed the air commander 
to put his recommendations in a letter and informed him he would have my answer in a few 
hours. I took the problem to no one else. Professional advice and counsel could do no 
more. 
I went to my tent alone and sat down to think. Over and over I reviewed each step, 
somewhat in the sequence set down here, but more thoroughly and exhaustively. I realized, 
of course, that if I deliberately disregarded the advice of my technical expert on the subject, 
and his predictions should prove accurate, then I would carry to my grave the unbearable 
burden of a conscience justly accusing me of the stupid, blind sacrifice of thousands of the 
flower of our youth. Outweighing any personal burden, however, was the possibility that if 
he were right the effect of the disaster would be far more than local: it would be likely to 
spread to the entire force.                                                         
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Nevertheless, my review of the matter finally narrowed the critical points to these: 
 
If I should cancel the airborne operation, then I had either to cancel the attack on 
Utah Beach or I would condemn the assaulting forces there to even greater 
probability of disaster than was predicted for the airborne divisions. If I should 
cancel the Utah attack I would so badly disarrange elaborate plans as to diminish 
chances for success elsewhere and to make later maintenances perhaps impossible. 
Moreover, in long and calm consideration of the whole great scheme we had agreed 
that the Utah attack was an essential factor in prospects for success. To abandon it 
really meant to abandon a plan in which I had held explicit confidence for more 
than two years. 
 
Finally, Leigh-Mallory’s estimate was just an estimate, nothing more, and our 
experience in Sicily and Italy did not, by any means, support his degree of pessimism. 
Bradley, with Ridgway and other airborne commanders, had always supported me and the 
staff in the matter, and I was encouraged to persist in the belief that Leigh-Mallory was 
wrong! 
I telephoned him that the attack would go as planned and that I would confirm this 
at once in writing.748 
 
In the end, though the drops were scattered, they ultimately provided successful support 
to the invasion.749 Eisenhower later said the airborne casualty figures were about eight percent.750 
Eisenhower recorded that when the beachhead was secure, Leigh-Mallory “was the first to call 
me to voice his delight and to express his regret the he had found it necessary to add to my 
personal burdens during the final tense days before D-day.”751 
 
Hitler: V-weapons 
 
On July 28, 1943, having absorbed the British bombing of Hamburg, Germany, Hitler was 
furious and quickly approved of the V-weapon deployment in France. While the German Army                                                         
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had sponsored a ballistic missile program in the 1930s, it was stepped up during World War II.752 
On December 24, 1943, Hitler announced high hopes for the V-1 and V-2 flying bombs 
designed to provide long range strike on London. Hitler’s strategy with the V-weapons was to 
bomb London into submission before the Allies could advance on Germany. The Germans 
planned eventually to even fire V-2s on America from specially-designed naval vessels. Hitler 
laid out his thinking on the V-weapons at a military conference in July 1943: 
 
The English will only stop when their towns are destroyed, nothing else will do it…He’ll 
stop when his towns are destroyed, that much is clear. I can only win the war by destroying 
more on the enemy’s side than he does on ours – by inflicting on his the horror of war. It 
has always been that way and it’s the same in the air.753 
 
What were these weapons that Hitler put so much stock in? After all, Hitler spent “about 
$3 billion, or triple the cost of the US atomic bomb program” on the V-weapons (roughly 
equivalent to 24,000 fighter aircraft).754 The V-1 was “essentially an aerial torpedo with wings,” 
and “25 feet 4 inches long with a 16-foot wingspan, and it weighed 4,750 pounds,” “launched up 
125-foot concrete ramps stationed right across Occupied France” and “flew up to 360mph.” 
The V-1’s range was 130 miles, which made all of Britain’s southeast a target. Roughly 80 
percent of V-1s landed in an 8-mile radius of their intended mark.755 
The V-2 was “ground-breaking rocket technology.” The V-2 was a “supersonic ballistic 
missile” that “flew at 3,600mph,” carried a 1-ton warhead, and was “by far the biggest weapon 
of its kind.” The V-2 was “launched from an upright position from vehicles that simply drove 
off after firing,” and so “it did not even have launch-pad installations…that the Allies could 
bomb and overrun.” The V-2’s first combat strike was on “a suburb of Paris on 8 September 
1944; the second struck London a few hours later.”756 
The V-1s began their assault during the Normandy campaign. On June 13, 1944, one 
week after the first landings on Normandy, a V-1 struck a rail bridge in London.757 Eisenhower’s 
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aide, Harry Butcher, wrote on June 13, “About twenty-five pilotless aircraft came across the 
Channel last night and nineteen are known to have hit land, four in the London area. Ike went 
ashore in France yesterday for the first time.” On Saturday, June 17, 1944, Butcher wrote: 
 
The pilotless craft, dubbed “divers” in an Air Force report, continued coming last night. 
The first alert sounded at the cottage just after dinner, while the General, John 
[Eisenhower’s son, a West Point cadet], and I were seeing a movie of the assault landings in 
OVERLORD. There were alerts until after dawn. The Bomber Command was out in 
strength against sites in the Pas de Calais, the radar disclosing. Now to bomb a new site, we 
have to destroy the surrounding village, which further impairs our deteriorating relationship 
with the French.758 
 
This military problem clearly came with political and social challenges. On Tuesday, June 
20, 1944, Butcher continued: 
 
Ike and John spent Saturday night at the Advance [Command Post in newly-taken France]. 
During the last three days we have had fairly continuous arrivals of Hitler’s secret weapon, 
variously called “Diver,” “Pilotless Aircraft,” “Buzz Bomb,” “Doodle Bug,” or “Robot.” 
Perhaps “Junebug” or “Jitterbug” would be appropriate. Certainly, most of the people I 
know are semidazed from loss of sleep and have the jitters, which they show when a door 
bangs or the sounds of motors, from motorcycles to aircraft, are heard. 
[Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith] has been 
ominously predicting that the Germans will start using their next secret weapon, the rocket, 
said to contain ten tons of explosive in a fifty-ton projectile, which is skyrocketed from a 
hole in the ground like a giant sunken stovepipe and encased by heavy concrete. There are 
seven known sites for launching rockets, five in the Pas de Calais and two in the Cherbourg 
Peninsula. Fortunately, the latter either have been or soon will be captured by our rapidly 
advancing American troops, and crews of experts are awaiting opportunity to examine 
them. One crew was reported to have been en route to a supply site for the “Junebugs” 
yesterday, shortly after news reached us that Bradley’s army had made a rapid advance 
northward toward Cherbourg… 
The Prime Minister is having daily meetings to consider defense measures against 
the flying bombs. On Sunday, all antiaircraft fire in the London area was ordered stopped 
because when they are hit, they plummet to earth and explode. They have to be shot down 
in relatively non-populated areas. Barrage balloons supplemented by kites have been placed                                                         
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along the line of flight and in depth. There is a fifteen-mile band of antiaircraft between 
London and the coast. The fighters were given one day to show their effectiveness and 
scored forty-eight per cent knockout out of all that crossed the coast, but still leaving a 
considerable number of them to wreak physical and mental havoc in Greater London. The 
fighters claim their advantage of speed over that of the flying bomb is so slight that 
practically all the distance from the Channel to London is required to catch and destroy the 
winged projectile. Consequently, anti-aircraft fire hinders their efforts.759 
 
The V-1 flying bombs were a challenging military and technical problem. Butcher also 
wrote about this campaign’s strategic effect. 
 
Meanwhile Goebbels’ press and radio are cackling with glee, the story being so ravenously 
sought by the German public that newspapers which had been permitted to publish only 
semiweekly are now given sufficient paper to print daily. They picture London in flames 
and the people rushing to evacuate the city. Most of which, of course, is untrue. 
To go back to the flying bombs, which most of us do nowadays, the PM called on 
Ike Sunday afternoon at our headquarters preliminary to his meeting of the Cabinet to 
consider defensive measures. Ike, having control of all air operations for the battle, has a 
definite but unforeseen responsibility. He has wholeheartedly agreed, and has so directed 
Tedder, who attends the PM’s meetings, that these targets [V-1 and V-2 firing points in 
France], called CROSSBOW, are to take first priority over everything except the urgent 
requirements of battle, and that this priority is to continue until we can be certain that we 
definitely have the upper hand over this particular menace.760 
 
In all, from June 13, 1944 to April 1945, the “German missile campaign against British 
and Belgian cities in 1944-45 was the first large-scale use of guided missiles in history with some 
23,172 V-1 and 3,172 V-2 missiles launched.”761 There was significant damage: 
  
[M]ore than 24,000 Britons were casualties of the Fuehrer’s vicious “secret weapon,” with 
5,475 of them dying…At one point during the initial assault in July and August 1944 10,000 
homes were damaged every day. By late August over 1.5 million children had been 
evacuated from [Britain’s] south-east.762 
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There was massive devastation, but the Allies adapted and responded with measures that 
were moderately successful, and from June to September 1944 “3,912 [V-1s] were brought down 
by anti-aircraft fire, RAF fighters and barrage balloons.” Hitler hoped these weapons would 
upend the British war effort; he was wrong.763 The V-weapons did not decided the war’s 
outcome, and, in April 1945, even Hitler acknowledged they were unsuccessful.764  
 
In Summary, Eisenhower: Airborne versus Hitler: V-weapons 
 
Hitler’s challenge was to determine how best to employ his available technologically advanced 
weaponry to halt or slow the Allies amphibious assault (or even knock one of the Allies out of 
the war). Hitler’s V-weapons had a limited tactical and psychological impact on the Allies. In 
part, this was due to Hitler’s early basing choices for the missiles; he decided in favor of bunkers 
as opposed to lighter, road-mobile launch platforms, which in hindsight significantly reduced 
their efficacy.765 In the end, Hitler’s faith in these weapons was misplaced; he believed too much 
in a weapon that provided little strategic gain that also sapped much-needed strategic resources. 
Eisenhower’s judgment and decision on the use of force was correct in this case. His 
choice was how to employ airborne forces in support of the amphibious landings at Normandy. 
Leigh-Mallory and Marshall, both important military figures, had strong opinions about this part 
of the operation. Marshall desired a deep, vertical envelopment, while Leigh-Mallory believed the 
airborne drops would be completely unsuccessful. Eisenhower’s decision reasonably batted away 
both alternate suggestions. In the end, the airborne drops were successful and aided the 
amphibious landings. The Allies secured the beach and were able to continue operations from a 
position of strength. 
 
5.6 Eisenhower: ANVIL versus Hitler: Fight or Withdrawal? 
 
Eisenhower: ANVIL 
 
On August 15, 1944, an American-led invasion force landed on the south coast of France, just 
east of Toulon. Lieutenant General Alexander Patch and his 7th Army, comprised of forces                                                         
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reallocated from the Mediterranean Theater, easily took the beach moved inland, and after a 
single day, 66,000 Allied troops were ashore with few casualties. Hitler would later declare 
August 15 “the worst day of my life.766 Nearly flawless in execution, in a single month the 
landing had secured vital ports, taken more than 100,000 German prisoners, destroyed a 
German army, and liberated the south of France.767 
Despite all that, the landing was hotly contested amongst the Allies. British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill disagreed wholeheartedly with the decision to land in southern 
France. In addition to Churchill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff General Alan Brooke wrote 
to the American Chiefs of Staff to voice his dissent and willingness to subordinate these 
concerns: “If you insist on being damned fools, sooner than falling out with you, which would 
be fatal, we shall be damned fools with you.”768 There was significant disagreement over this 
landing. What caused such a row? Why and how did Eisenhower’s judgment and decision meet 
such disfavor with the British command? 
Originally code-named ANVIL (and later known as DRAGOON), the landing in 
southern France was intended mostly for supply reasons, but also in part to be a diversionary 
attack for the OVERLORD landings. While Eisenhower and the Americans wanted to 
undertake ANVIL, the British were never keen. Following OVERLORD’s initial foothold, the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff met in London from June 11-13, 1944 to “review grand strategy, 
particularly the relationship of OVERLORD to operations in the Mediterranean in the light of 
the success of OVERLORD.”769 
There were three amphibious courses of action discussed by Allied planners at this 
conference: an operation in France’s south to take a port (ANVIL), an assault aimed at western 
France to open a port city, or a separate operation directed at the “head of the Adriatic.”770 The 
Combined Chiefs believed this decision hinged on multiple factors: OVERLORD’s progress, 
the next Russian offensive, and German responses to both. Either way, the Combined Chiefs 
advised three divisions for the assault, wherever it was to be directed, and the  
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lift would come from craft already in the Mediterranean, whatever craft Eisenhower could 
release without prejudice to OVERLORD, and such additional assistance as could come 
from the United States.771 
 
Eisenhower wrote to the commander of the Mediterranean Theater, British General Sir 
Henry Wilson, on June 16, 1944: 
 
My conviction is that the German is sorely pressed, that many of his divisions in France are 
not of first quality and that the over-riding consideration is to strike without delay… 
My belief is that we would keep more Germans away from the decisive area of 
northern France by landing in southern France rather than the Adriatic. Moreover, we 
would reap the full benefit of French resistance, which is yielding results beyond my 
expectations and which is particularly strong in the south of France…Time is the vital 
factor and the over-riding consideration is to launch an operation in France which holds out 
a reasonable prospect of success at the earliest possible date.772 
 
Wilson had advocated for the option to land at the head of the Adriatic for a push into 
the Balkans. Eisenhower chraracterized Wilson’s views in a memorandum to General Marshall 
on June 20, 1944: 
 
[Wilson] seems to discount the fact that the Combined Chiefs of Staff have long ago 
decided to make Western Europe the base from which to conduct decisive operations 
against Germany. To authorize any departure from this sound decision seems to me ill 
advised and potentially dangerous. In my opinion, to contemplate wandering off overland 
via Trieste to Ljubljana repeat Ljubljana is to indulge in conjecture to an unwarrantable 
degree at the present time. Certainly it involves dispersion of our effort and resources. Even 
granted successful achievement of this objective by autumn, I am unable repeat unable to 
see how the over riding necessity for exploiting the early success of OVERLORD is thereby 
assisted.  The fundamental factor…[is] the necessity for seizing ports quickly in France 
through which the weight of our forces can be poured. We must concentrate our forces to 
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the greatest possible degree and put them into battle in the decisive theater. To do so they 
must all land in France and work toward a common center.773 
 
One factor which weighed heavily on Eisenhower was the knowledge that the United 
States had nearly 50 divisions in the United States and Britain, organized for combat, which 
required port capacity beyond what OVERLORD could provide.774  These forces needed port 
access to get into the war. 
On June 23, 1944, Eisenhower wrote to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the matter at 
considerable length: 
 
For reasons which General Wilson explains in his [memorandum] of 19 June, amphibious 
operations against western France cannot be launched in time to be of use to OVERLORD, 
and, therefore, can be eliminated. Likewise, General Wilson says that there is no possibility 
of launching any major amphibious operations in the Adriatic before September. As an 
alternative to ANVIL and to either of these above operations, he recommends an advance 
to the Ljubljana Gap and Trieste, combined with amphibious operations against Trieste at a 
later date. 
 
2. The following are the factors which emerge from our conversations:  
 
a. OVERLORD is the decisive campaign of 1944. A stalemate in the OVERLORD 
area would be recognized by the world as a defeat, and the result on Russia might 
be far reaching. It is imperative that we concentrate our forces in direct support of 
the decisive area of northern France.  
b. ANVIL, with an invasion in the Bay of Biscay precluded, then provides the most 
direct route to northern France where the battles for the Ruhr will be fought. 
Moreover, ANVIL initially will contain an appreciable number of German divisions, 
will give us a port through which reinforcements from the US can be deployed, and 
will open a route for an advance to the north where these reinforcements can fight 
on the main battlefield of France. 
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c. Assistance from the French Forces of the Interior in the ANVIL area is likely to 
be more effective than at any other place in France. 
 
d. Although the port of Marseilles is less desirable than Bordeaux from the 
standpoint of distance from the US and proximity to the OVERLORD area, yet the 
time factor is so important that the Bordeaux operation can be rejected in favor of 
ANVIL. 
 
e. Our forces in Italy do not directly threaten any area vital to the enemy who, 
therefore, has the initiative in deciding whether or not to withdraw out of Italy. 
 
f. An advance on Ljubljana and Trieste would probably contain a considerable 
amount of German strength, but there would be no guarantee that it would divert 
any appreciable number of German divisions from France. Neither would it give us 
an additional port which could be used to assist in the deployment of divisions from 
the US, and this we believe to be one of the most important considerations. It is 
believed that it would have little positive effect until 1945.  
 
3. I, therefore, recommend ANVIL. General Wilson is fully prepared to carry out ANVIL if 
the decision is made to do so [through the release of the tactical force for the invasion]. This 
opens up another gateway into France, which, if not the best in geographical location, is the 
best we can hope to obtain at an early date. The possession of such a gateway I consider 
vital. 
 
4. As regards the means of mounting ANVIL against the present scale of resistance, General 
Wilson considers that for the operation to have a reasonable chance of success, he must 
have a lift for three assault divisions, shore to shore, together with three preloaded followup 
divisions, one of which will be ship to shore. This will require fifty LST’s over and above the 
fifty-five now allocated.775 
 
To punctuate his argument, Eisenhower reiterated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that 
France was “the decisive theater” and “the resources of Great Britain and the US will not permit 
us to maintain two major theaters in the European war, each with decisive missions.” In this 
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assessment, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, including Marshall, backed Eisenhower; they determined 
“Wilson’s proposal to go into northern Italy and the Balkans was unacceptable.”776 
While the US Chiefs of Staff accepted Eisenhower’s position, the British still disagreed 
and wanted to use the divisions apportioned to ANVIL for continuance of OVERLORD and to 
widen the war against German forces in the Mediterranean. On June 28, the British Chiefs of 
Staff wrote to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and asked them to reconsider the decision. Churchill went 
over Eisenhower and the Combined Chiefs and wrote directly to U.S. President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt; Churchill called Eisenhower’s decision “arbitrary,” and asked Roosevelt to “consent 
to hear both sides.” Churchill felt this decision would come at the ruin “of all our great affairs in 
the Mediterranean, and we take it hard that this should be demanded of us.” Churchill believed 
Eisenhower was overly focused on France at the expense of the wider war, criticized ANVIL as 
“bleak and sterile,” and questioned  
 
Whether we should ruin all hopes of a major victory in Italy and all its fronts and condemn 
ourselves to a passive role in that theatre, after having broken up the fine Allied army which 
is advancing so rapidly through that peninsula, for the sake of ANVIL with all its 
limitations, is indeed a grave question for His Majesty’s Government and the President, 
with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to decide.777  
 
Roosevelt deferred to Eisenhower. In his initial response to Churchill, Roosevelt wrote: 
“I think we should support the views of the Supreme Allied Commander. He is definitely for 
ANVIL and wants action in the field by August 30th preferably earlier.”778 On June 29, Roosevelt 
went further:  
 
At Tehran we agreed upon a definite plan of attack. That plan has gone well so far. Nothing 
has occurred to require any change. Now that we are fully involved in our major blow 
history will never forgive us if we lost precious time and lives in indecision and debate. My 
dear friend, I beg you to let us go ahead with our plan. For purely political reasons over 
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here, I should never survive even a slight setback in OVERLORD if it were known that 
fairly large forces had been diverted to the Balkans.779 
 
On the same day, Eisenhower wrote to Marshall: 
 
 It is my belief that the Prime Minister and his Chiefs of Staff are honestly convinced that 
greater results in support of OVERLORD would be achieved by a drive toward Trieste 
rather than to mount ANVIL. They are aware, of course, of the definite purpose of the 
United States Chief of Staff to mount an ANVIL and I have been even more emphatic in 
my support of this operation than have your telegrams on the subject. I have the further 
impression that although the British Chiefs of Staff may make one more effort to convince 
you of the value of the Trieste move, they will not repeat not permit an impasse to arise, 
and will, consequently, agree to ANVIL…All the above is fact tinged with conjecture but 
does represent the impressions gained by me and by General Smith in separate 
conversations with the Prime Minister.780 
 
The Combined Chiefs and President Roosevelt supported Eisenhower’s decision on 
ANVIL. In further reflection on the matter, one week before the early August landing, 
Eisenhower wrote in his diary the issue had still not been settled as there was still resistance: 
 
1. The prime minister and the British chiefs of staff became interested, several days ago, in 
abandoning Anvil in favor of bringing additional forces into Brittany. A quick study of the 
proposition showed that (a) there was no assurance that we would have the Brittany ports 
working during the next several weeks; (b) even when we do get them working, we are 
counting upon them to support troops already here and scheduled for arrival; (c) if 
additional troops should be brought in, there is no reason why two or three extra divisions 
could not come from the United States; (d) to abandon Anvil would, at the best, give us in 
the first lift only the initial follow-up elements of Anvil, short a great deal of equipment and 
some personnel. The arrivals in Brittany would, therefore, be piecemeal and slow.  
 
2. Nevertheless, the British felt this was a better proposition than to go on with Anvil.                                                         
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3. I disagreed. I informed both the United States chiefs of staff and the prime minister of 
my flat disagreement. 
 
4. This morning, August 8, a message from the United States chiefs of staff indicates that I 
am supported by Washington and that Anvil will go on as planned.781 
 
Despite Eisenhower’s hardest fought judgment of the war, in which Churchill decried 
Eisenhower and his American partners as domineering, the invasion went on as Eisenhower 
planned. In nearly every respect, ANVIL/DRAGOON was successful. The invasion opened up 
the port cities of Marseille and Toulon. Moreover, in terms of supply, by September 1944, the 
newly opened French ports made the largest contribution to the Allied armies moving toward 
the German border. The Allies defeated a large German force, and took significant German 
casualties. This decision also enabled the French forces of General Philippe Leclerc to be the 
first Allied forces to enter Paris on August 24, 1944. Eisenhower shrewdly employed this single 
French division (of the 39 assigned to the campaign) to enable the French to recapture their own 
capital.782 These were all the fruits of the successful ANVIL landing. 
 
Hitler: Fight or Withdrawal? 
 
By the time the Allies built a solid lodgment, the war moved from an amphibious phase to a 
campaign on the ground and in the air.783 On June 17, 1944 in northern France, and then on 
June 29, 1944 in the Bavarian Alps, Hitler met his top two generals in France: Rommel and 
Rundstedt.784 Both commanders counseled strategic withdrawal.  At the earlier meeting, Rommel 
explained the situation was dire, 
 
The Allies had landed at least twenty divisions in Normandy–half a million men with 77,000 
vehicles. The German Seventh Army opposed them with the equivalent of fourteen                                                         
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divisions, and those depleted units averaged under 11,000 men, compared with almost 
17,000 a few years earlier. German casualties had reached 26,000, including more than 50 
senior commanders.785  
The Allies had grown from eight divisions, with significant casualties, on D-Day to 
twenty divisions in the course of eleven days’ time.786 It is worth reflecting for a moment on the 
three key elements to a successful amphibious assault: 
 
First, an attacker should achieve air superiority. Second, the attacker should use maneuver, 
surprise, and strength to land forces in a place where they locally outnumber defenders in 
troops and firepower. Third, it should try to strengthen its initial lodgment faster than the 
defender can bring additional troops and equipment to bear.787 
 
The American lodgment had built a local, numerical advantage by June 17, 1944.  
However, on that same day, the German Fifteenth Army had only sent one of its twenty-one 
divisions to Normandy from the Pas de Calais.788 So the Germans held sufficient resources to 
counter the Allied assault in France. The Allies plan for deception (Operation FORTITUDE) 
was successful at pinning down many German units that otherwise could have been used to 
attack the landing beaches at Normandy. Even later, one full month into the invasion, on July 3, 
1944, one of Hitler’s key generals in Berlin told the Japanese naval attaché that an Allied army 
group led by General George Patton, with twenty-nine total divisions was soon to land in 
France.789 Hitler and the Germans did not read the Allied attack well, yet these intelligence 
failures are best seen as failed judgments, and there was another, more important judgment to 
come. 
Hitler had a choice remaining on the Allied landing: fight or withdrawal. His 
commanders made their argument for withdrawal, and the decision was left to the supreme 
commander to make. So Hitler decided; his order was for German forces in France to stand and 
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fight.790 Hitler believed there was no need to retreat since the V-weapons would soon change the 
course of the war, and even intimated that troops that wanted to withdrawal were cowards.791 
There is an available window into Hitler’s decision-making process, why he made the 
decision to stay and fight, which came through a meeting with a key subordinate on July 31: 
 
We must be clear with each other Jodl. Which places do we want to hold under all 
circumstances because they provide additional supply possibilities for the enemy? We 
cannot throw away the harbors that keep the enemy from having unlimited manpower and 
material at his disposal. Thus, if the enemy is no longer able to get a number of the 
productive ports, then that is about the only brake we can put on his already almost 
unlimited possibilities for movement…we must therefore make up our minds that a certain 
number of troops are simply going to have to be sacrificed to save others.792 
 
Hitler judged the time provided by denying the Allies ports was worth the sacrifice, 
which was a logical and brutal decision.793 This meant a great number of troops would be left 
isolated from the main body of German troops, but also that the Allies would be forced to 
expend more resources securing necessary ports, a partly sound decision for Hitler, considering 
that an Allied soldier landing at Normandy required one ton of supplies per month.794 And it did 
hold for some time: Cherbourg fell on June 27, 1944, but after that it took the Allies until 
September, when three other ports were captured (although one of those ports, Antwerp, was 
not fully cleared until November 1944).795 The Atlantic Wall held for some time. 
It was a militarily defensible judgment. Strategic affairs in wartime is often to decide 
where one must accept losses. A U.S. Army War College professor has remarked, “Military 
commanders sell the lives of their soldiers dearly to buy things: to buy advantage; to buy 
opportunity; to buy victory; to buy an objective. It is a hard thing for a commander to make that 
rationale and yet it has to be done.”796 
While the military logic may have been sound, Hitler’s relationship with his senior 
general officers had turned sour. The contentious nature of the two meetings in June meant 
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both generals expected to be fired.797 Rundstedt was relieved on July 2, 1944, while Rommel was 
injured in an Allied air strafing run on July 17, 1944, and subsequently implicated in the July 20, 
1944 plot to assassinate Hitler, and ultimately made to drink poison by other Nazi generals on 
October 14, 1944.798 
More broadly, this was a high turnover period for the German high command. The 
firings and purges demoralized senior generals as well as subordinate troops.799 Hitler believed 
he was the only one that could save the Germans from the coming danger.800 The infamous July 
20, 1944 plot to kill Hitler failed, and resulted in more than just Rommel’s death: 
 
More than 7,000 people were arrested and 4,980 of them killed over the next few months. 
Sixty officers were executed in the OKH, OKW and the General Staff, twenty generals 
were executed and another thirty-six were condemned by the court for opposition to the 
regime; forty-nine committed suicide to escape the verdict of the courts. At the fronts 
another 700 soldiers were executed.801 
 
The crackup in command structure was significant and widespread. At the same time, 
after a period of stalemate when the Germans held fairly well into July, the British took Caen on 
July 8802 Toward the end of July, 1944, American forces pierced German lines near St. Lo and 
moved quickly on the Seine River, toward Paris.803 The German loss, according to Fritz 
Bayerlein, a German commander and at one time, Rommel’s chief of staff, compared the 
German defeat to Cannae, and said none other “can approach the battle of annihilation in 
France in 1944 in the magnitude of planning, the logic of execution, the collaboration of sea, air, 
and ground forces, the bulk of the booty, or the hordes of prisoners,” and, its “greatest strategic 
effect” was to cement the “foundation for the subsequent final and complete annihilation of the 
greatest military state on earth.”804 
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German casualties from June 6, 1944, until late August, were above 400,000, 200,000 of 
whom were prisoners. American casualties were 134,000; Allied casualties were approximately 
91,000.805 
 
In Summary, Eisenhower: ANVIL versus Hitler: Fight or Withdrawal? 
 
Hitler’s challenge was how to handle initial Allied success in establishing a beachhead in 
Normandy. When the Allies made the landing, both Hitler’s key subordinates advised him to 
conduct a strategic withdrawal. Instead, Hitler chose to stand and fight at the French ports, 
which was useful in slowing Allied supply. However, while this choice had tactical and 
operational upside, in the end, the large German army that fell to capture or casualty in France 
could have been used in other places for later objectives, and so the decision harmed Germany 
strategically. Moreover, the turbulent and difficult relationship Hitler put upon his senior 
commanders was clearly a negative and disjointed one, which can be seen in his multiple 
command changes and even the July 20, 1944 assassination attempt. 
Eisenhower’s challenge was to determine where the Allies would place a second 
amphibious landing to best support the Allied mission and war effort. Several important British 
stakeholders strongly supported a landing in either western France or to enable a drive on the 
Balkans. Eisenhower’s choice, instead, amidst heavy institutional resistance within the high 
command, opened critical ports in France, poured a great deal more Allied troops into France, 
and enabled French forces to take part in and symbolically lead the recapture of Paris. 
Eisenhower’s judgment was accurate, militarily, in that it meaningfully contributed to ultimate 
Allied success, and he sought to balance this decision with political considerations as he took a 
strong but respectful approach to those with disagreements.  
 
5.7 Campaign Judgments, 1944 
 
Prior to assessing the value of General Dwight Eisenhower’s judgment during this campaign, it 
is useful to review Adolph Hitler’s judgments as the competitor against which Eisenhower had 
to fight. 
Hitler made two judgments prior to the Allied landings that impacted the Germans 
ability to hold the beach. The first was the basic apportionment of forces and release authority 
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for counterattack. Hitler had to choose between Rommel’s preference for a fixed defense at the 
beach of the Atlantic Wall, and Rundstedt’s determination for a strong mobile counterattack 
from farther back. Hitler went a third way, instead, and split the available reserve in multiple 
ways, diminishing its value as a reserve. Hitler also put significant faith in the V-weapons ability 
to coerce the British into surrender, so much that he spent more on the V-weapon than any 
other German military program. Both these decisions were proven wrong, strategically. And 
while Hitler’s decision to hold port cities until the last man did achieve tactical objectives for a 
time, in the end, the choice consumed his forces in western France entirely. His decisions 
weakened Germany’s position in the war’s final stages. 
Some attest that Hitler lost because he placed ideology above all else when making 
decisions. Moreover, that Hitler had succumbed to belief in his own “Fuehrer principle,” that he 
could never be wrong in the pursuit of his deliberate terror strategy.806 Others castigate Hitler for 
waging war without any strategy at all.807 
In the end, when Hitler’s performance as a dueling supreme commander in the summer 
and fall of 1944 is assessed, it was as Edward Meade Earle observed in 1943: “history will not 
speak any too well of him.”808 
Particularly compared to Eisenhower. Eisenhower’s judgments were objectively superior, 
even if one sets aside his important decision to launch the invasion. (In that decision alone, 
Eisenhower pushed aside Montgomery’s judgment first, because Montgomery wanted to cross 
the English Channel a day earlier on June 5th, despite very bad weather; then, Eisenhower had to 
contend with Leigh-Mallory’s counsel against launching the invasion on June 6th, and 
Eisenhower had to bypass Tedder’s indecision to send the invasion on June 6th.)809 
Eisenhower’s early campaign decisions centered on two issues: the direction of airpower 
resources and the location of airborne drops. The impact of these judgments is not to be 
understated, as the result did no less than significantly impact the Allies ability to establish a firm 
lodgment on the Normandy’s coast. Eisenhower faced steep resistance in his determination that 
the French rail network was to be the primary target for available Allied airpower resources. In 
opposition, the bulk of the airpower community and the formidable British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill disagreed with this course of action. A similarly intense decision came when                                                         
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the landing’s air component commander assessed that the airborne drops would be militarily 
ineffective. Influential General George Marshall advised the airborne drops should go as deep 
strike envelopments roughly two-thirds of the way to Paris. Eisenhower overruled both and 
chose to go ahead with the drops close to the beach. 
Eisenhower’s decisions on both the Transportation Plan for airpower and to go ahead 
with the airborne drops as planned were important to the Allies ability to get ashore on June 6th 
and press on to retake France in the campaign. 
Then again, as the campaign continued, Eisenhower had to make another command 
decision to open a second port for supply purposes in the face of stiff resistance from several 
crucial Allied partners. 
Collectively, several of these judgments interacted and impacted the outcome. And by 
the end of this campaign, the Allies had retaken France, the Germans were in a two-front war on 
their home borders, and the Nazis never had another opportunity to seize their war aims. 
In review, objectively, Eisenhower’s supreme command judgments and decisions were 
superior to Hitler’s. This was a campaign in which both sides sought to impose a strategy of 
annihilation to compel their opponent to surrender. Both supreme commanders had adequate 
resources to address the threat posed by the enemy and achieve their aims. Yet, in the end, one 
was superior. Eisenhower’s better judgment was one reason why the Allies retook France and 
ultimately won the war against Nazi Germany.  
5.8 Final Assessment and Formal Characteristics 
 
This section considers two critical aspects of General Eisenhower’s observed characteristics: his 
judgment as well as the thinking that underpinned his decisions during the campaign; and the 
formal characteristics that can be observed from his life that likely had an impact on his 
judgment (i.e. education, experiences, personal characteristics, and post-war life). 
It is helpful to consider the context. World War II was a unique military moment. 
Eisenhower rose in a rising army. While in 1939, the US Army had just 190,000 troops and 
15,000 officers, it eventually grew to 8.3 million soldiers and 1,300 generals.810 
It has been said that Eisenhower was not great when it came to tactics and battle. But 
that was not his job as a supreme commander. He commanded an extraordinarily large, 
ambitious, Allied enterprise. In this respect, according to E.J. Kingston McCloughry, a British air 
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vice marshal who worked at SHAEF, Eisenhower “had a genius of getting along with most 
people, combing the art of persuasion and of inspiring good will.”811 
Eisenhower received accolades even retrospectively. After the war, Basil H. Liddell Hart 
reached out to Eisenhower after reading Eisenhower’s memoir Crusade in Europe, and wrote that 
he considered it the “most fair-minded book that any great soldier of any country has written 
about either of the last two wars.” Moreover, Hart wrote to Eisenhower,  
 
Such impressive evidence of your understanding of other people’s points of view goes far to 
explain how and why you succeeded so well as Supreme Commander of a combination of 
Allied armies—better, indeed, than Foch… 
Beyond these qualities, the book provides its own evidence that you were far more 
than a harmonizer—through the many passages which show a deeper understanding of 
strategical and psychological factors than one has found in the writings of, or in contact 
with, most other high commanders of recent times.812 
 
Eisenhower was not a self-promoter. His tangible accomplishments built his reputation, 
a glimpse of which can be seen in what British Prime Minister Winston Churchill wrote to 
Eisenhower just before the invasion,  
  
If by Christmas you have succeeded in liberating our beloved Paris, if she can by the time 
regain her life of freedom and take her accustomed place as a center of Western European 
culture and beauty, then I will proclaim that this operation is the most grandly conceived 
and best conducted known to the history of warfare. 
 
Eisenhower, in reply, simply recorded an accurate prediction: “Mr. Prime Minister, we 
expect to be on the borders of Germany by Christmas, pounding away at her defenses.”813 And 
they were. 
Perhaps the greatest compliment that has been paid Eisenhower’s command, by Max 
Hastings, was that “he could not have been matched as Supreme Commander,” particularly 
when looked at in comparison to the German high command effort. Eisenhower’s “behavior at 
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moments of Anglo-American tension, his extraordinary generosity of spirit to his difficult 
subordinates, proved his greatness as Supreme Commander.”814 
In seeking some sense for what underpinned this superlative effort, a deeper look at 
Eisenhower’s power of judgment is instructive. His chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Walter B. Smith, later 
wrote that in watching Eisenhower, Smith had “never realized before the loneliness and isolation 
of a commander at a time when such a momentous decision has to be taken, with full knowledge 
that failure or success rests on his judgment alone.”815 In spite of this burden, Eisenhower 
showed exceptional judgment.816 It was never that Eisenhower got everything right. It was that 
he got most things right, consistently, and that when placed into a cumulative comparison with 
his adversary, his judgment was better. 
Reading Eisenhower’s own wartime dispatches and diary entries, is a record of this good 
sense and judgment. Having done so, as Corelli Barnett has said, “it is impossible” to not be 
“impressed with the good sense, energy, and all-round capacity and capability with which he 
applied to problems ranging widely from inter-Allied policy to inter-Allied relations to military 
discipline, training, and tactics, and to logistics.”817 
One way that can be seen is in Eisenhower’s public image. In December 1943, just when 
Eisenhower was selected as supreme commander and the rest of the invasion’s command was 
set, both Montgomery and Eisenhower were interviewed in a British newspaper. In his write-up, 
Montgomery chose to talk about tactical concerns, including his “seven-point plan” for 
generalship, testifying that, “If you can knit the power of the Army on land and the power of the 
Air in the sky, then nothing will stand up against you and you will never lose a battle.” 
Eisenhower’s concerns were more strategic, that his “own and personal job” is to “wield the 
directing team together in such a way that no friction ever develops, so that people trust each 
other, work in unison, and go into this thing with their full weight.”818 
A revealing exchange of cables from May 1945, between Eisenhower and Marshall, is 
useful for understanding Eisenhower’s judgment. It was clear that he owed his assertiveness, in 
part, to Marshall’s support: “the strongest weapon that I have always had in my hand was a                                                         
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confident feeling that you trusted my judgment.” Marshall, in reply, affirmed this: “since the day 
of your arrival in England three years ago, you have been selfless in your actions, always sound 
and tolerant in your judgments and altogether admirable in the courage and wisdom of your 
military decisions.”819 
Not only were Eisenhower’s judgments solid and objectively better than his opponent, 
but he had an intuitive understanding of the requirements of supreme command that 
transcended military problems alone. 
Eisenhower was able to understand decisions better than most because he had a well-
developed sense of empathy. President Franklin Roosevelt recognized Eisenhower as a “natural 
leader,” but this was amplified by his interpersonal skills and “exceptional political instincts.”820 
Eisenhower could make a joke, to lighten the load, even as he concluded a final OVERLORD 
brief to all the Allied high command on May 15, 1944, Eisenhower said: “In half an hour, Hitler 
will have missed his one and only chance of destroying with a single well-aimed bomb, the entire 
high command of the Allied forces.”821 
Everyone trusted Eisenhower, from the highest part of the command to the lowest 
ranking private. Even Montgomery, often a rival, wrote: “his real strength lies in his human 
qualities…He has the power of drawing the hearts of men towards him as a magnet attracts the 
bits of metal. He merely has to smile at you, and you trust him at once. He is the very 
incarnation of sincerity.”822 
While he could be just as hard and indifferent to casualties as a supreme commander 
needed to be, and Eisenhower wrote that “sometimes it just gets down to the dirty job of killing 
until one side or the other cracks,” he clearly never lost his grip on humanity. Perhaps because 
he had a soldier-age son, Eisenhower knew the war’s costs very well. In spring of 1944, 
Eisenhower wrote to his wife: “How many youngsters are gone forever. A man must develop a 
veneer of callousness that lets him consider such things dispassionately.”823 
Having met with those about to jump into Normandy, the very unit his air component 
commander had advised would suffer such horrific casualties, Eisenhower reportedly stood on a 
nearby headquarters rooftop, “barely holding back his tears,” as he saluted every plane that 
departed for the invasion.824 Moreover, in 1947, at an event for young journalists, a girl asked                                                         
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Eisenhower what his greatest decision of the war was; Eisenhower replied it was the decision to 
go ahead with the airborne drops. A few years later, in the summer of 1952, Eisenhower went to 
the Congress Hotel in Chicago for a reunion of the World War II-era U.S. 82nd Airborne 
Division. This was the same unit that had jumped in to Normandy, that Eisenhower thought 
might suffer extreme casualties. In front of those men, on live television, Eisenhower openly 
wept (images of which are still publicly available).825 Emotions, like tears, indicate a genuine 
sense of empathy, which Eisenhower undoubtedly possessed. 
More importantly, his ability to work so well and smoothly with others was key to his 
success. One officer noted that “within twenty minutes of Eisenhower’s walking into a room full 
of strangers, a good many of them would be calling him by his nickname.”826 Eisenhower could 
connect with other people because he understood them. 
Another characteristic that guided Eisenhower’s success was his grit. There must have 
been some natural bit of determination in staying in the army despite many years without 
promotion. Or the price the war cost him in health, as he smoked four packs of cigarettes each 
day during the war that resulted in “his blood pressure in July 1944 was 176 over 110,” which, in 
today’s health terms, is “high-risk, stage 2 hypertension.”827 
Marshall worried about the Eisenhower’s long work hours, which was probably correct 
because Eisenhower never took a day off, had a hard time relaxing, and slept a mere five hours 
per night during the war. Eisenhower was known to possess great energy and was deeply 
committed to whatever he engaged himself in.828 
Eisenhower had a terrible temper that he found difficult to control, mostly owing to the 
pressure he placed upon himself. Despite this, in September 1943, Eisenhower wrote, “My 
optimism never deserts me,” which echoed a typical cheery expression of his often heard around 
headquarters’.829 
Eisenhower was also said to have been committed to simplification of problems, in that 
he would break them down into smaller, more manageable parts, in order to best pick a priority 
with which to solve the issue.830 
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Eisenhower’s education also had an impact on his development as a military officer. 
Growing up, he loved to read newspapers because, as he told a friend, he wanted to know “what 
is going on outside of Kansas” which made him “realize that Kansas isn’t all the world.”831 
Eisenhower was relatively indifferent to a military career, and was motivated to attend 
West Point mostly for the “hope” he could “continue an athletic career.” Once there, he often 
asked himself, “What am I doing here?”832 His military career was filled with important 
experiences and meaningful mentors. Eisenhower had gone on a transcontinental road trip 
across the United States in 1919, to better understand and test out national mobilization, and 
when he returned he was stationed with then-Colonel George S. Patton, who Eisenhower “got 
along famously” with. They worked on a “comprehensive tank doctrine” together with the 
“enthusiasm of zealots.”833 
In January 1922, after the death of an infant son, Eisenhower arrived in Panama for the 
“most interesting and constructive of my life. The main reason was the presence of one man, 
General Fox Conner.” Conner jumpstarted Eisenhower’s interest in the military profession, and 
put him on a successful course of self-education. 
 
In asking me a casual question, General Conner discovered that I had little or no interest 
left in military history. My aversion was a result of its treatment at West Point as an out-
and-out memory course. In the case of the Battle of Gettysburg, for instance, each student 
was instructed to memorize the names of every brigadier in the opposing armies and to 
know exactly where his unit was stationed at every hour during the three days of the battle. 
Little attempt was made to explain the meaning of the battle, why it came about, what the 
commanders hoped to accomplish, and the real reason why Lee invaded the North the 
second time. If this was military history, I wanted no part of it. 
General Conner made no comment. I found myself invited to his quarters in the 
evening and I saw that he had made an extraordinary library, especially in military affairs. 
We talked for a time and he went through the library and picked out two or three historical 
novels. ‘You might be interested in these,’ he said quietly. I remember that one of them was 
The Long Roll by Mary Johnston, and another The Exploits of Brigadier Gerard in the 
Napoleonic Wars. A third was The Crisis by the American Winston Churchill. 
They were stirring stories and I liked them. When I returned the books, the 
General asked me what I thought. As we talked about them, he said, “Wouldn’t you like to 
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know something of what the armies were actually doing during the period of the novels 
you’ve just read?” 
Well, that seemed logical enough and I expressed an interest. He took down a few 
books on the military history of those periods. 
The upshot was that I found myself becoming fascinated with the subject. But 
fascination wasn’t enough. After I read the first of these books, General Conner questioned 
me closely about the decisions made—why they were made and under what conditions. 
‘What do you think would have been the outcome if this decision had been just the 
opposite?’ ‘What were the alternatives?’ And so I read Grant’s and Sheridan’s memoirs, and 
a good deal of John Codman Ropes on the Civil War. I read Clausewitz’s On War three 
times and a volume that was the Comte de Paris’ Army of the Potomac narrative. The 
General did not urge me to read the Comte de Paris in its entirety but only certain chapters 
that bore upon the campaigns we were discussing. He had me read Fremantle’s account of 
the Battle of Gettysburg, as well as that of Haskell. The best outline or summarized history 
of the Civil War, he thought, was Steele’s Campaigns. As I began to absorb the material of 
these books, I became even more interested in our Civil War and we spent many hours in 
analyzing its campaigns.834 
 
Eisenhower’s unofficial professional development, directed by Conner’s guidance, and 
through novels, theory, and history, was key to building a military imagination that would be 
critical later on. Moreover, it gave him a knowledge baseline that enabled him to graduate at the 
top of his 1926 Army Command and General Staff class at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, a 
prestigious mid-career marker for potential future success. 
In the summer of 1928, while Eisenhower desired a different assignment, his wife 
convinced him to take on a second stint with the American Battle Monuments Commission in 
France. While there, Eisenhower traveled extensively and learned a great deal about the French 
military, geography, culture, and politics.835 This could only have aided his performance in 1944. 
In 1936, Eisenhower accompanied General Douglas MacArthur as part of a military 
liaison team to the newly independent Philippines. While there, Eisenhower’s writing documents 
his thinking through security problems with a broad geostrategic and geopolitical lens. 
Moreover, while there, Eisehower got his pilot’s license, with about 350 hours flying experience, 
which would have been helpful in understanding aspects of military airpower years later. 
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Also while in the Philippines, the Philippine president asked for Eisenhower’s counsel 
“more and more,” and Eisenhower would “frequently” advise him on “broader and deeper” 
issues beyond defense, including “taxes, education, honesty in government.”836 
During the war, prior to Normandy, Eisenhower also had the experience of dealing with 
military-political problems like the surrender of a Vichy-French admiral. That decision, taken in 
1942, had to be made quickly, but Eisenhower knew and wrote at the time that there would be 
political blowback in the Allied capitals.  
 
The military advantages of an immediate cease fire are so overwhelming [that we must take 
the offer, but]…none of this should be under any misapprehensions as to what the 
consequences of this action may be. In both our nations, [Vichy French Admiral] Darlan is 
a deep-dyed villain. When public opinion raises its outcry our two governments will be 
embarrassed. Because of this, we’ll act so quickly that reports to our governments will be on 
the basis of action taken…If public opinion becomes too inflamed because we seem guilty 
of dealing with the enemy, the governments must be free to disavow us and indeed remove 
us from our posts.837 
 
In navigating the consequences, Eisenhower revealed his willingness to be held accountable for 
his own strategic decisions, a quality that could only earn him trust with his political superiors. 
On a military-specific issue from before Normandy, Eisenhower’s judgment to take 
Pantelleria, a miniscule island in the Mediterranean, is instructive.  
 
Halfway between the northern tip of Tunisia and the island of Sicily, Pantelleria was heavily 
garrisoned by Italians. Popularly, it was said to be the “Gibraltar of the Central 
Mediterranean.” The coastline was rocky, with no beaches, and the only approach was by 
sea through a narrow harbor perhaps three hundred yards wide. The interior was hilly, cut 
up into small plots by stone walls. Its capture would be a difficult feat of arms if the place 
were garrisoned by good, sturdy troops. It was almost out of question to attack by airborne 
method; descending soldiers, blown up against the stone walls by prevailing winds, would 
be almost 100 percent casualties. In the circumstances, some thought that the island was 
unassailable and that it would be foolish to try to take it. 
There were other elements to consider, I thought. One was the fact that with the 
landing strip on the top of the island in possession of the enemy, our convoys going across 
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from Africa to Sicily would be subject to strafing and dive-bomber attack. We would be 
denied the use of the field for both defense and offensive operations. My belief was that the 
officers and men of the Italian Army were sick of the war and wanted to get out of it. We 
knew that Mussolini had given orders that if any of the Italian garrisons surrendered, their 
families at home would pay the penalty. But with the theory that morale is the telling factor 
in war and suspecting that Italian morale was at a low ebb, I insisted on attempting the 
island’s capture.  
 
While Eisenhower’s personal staff agreed with him, opposition came from some of the 
British ground commanders who were concerned about risking “failure.” In the end, when the 
attack on the little island commenced, “the men in the landing ships had not even completed 
getting into their landing craft when white flags began to appear all over the island.”838 
War provided lessons for Eisenhower, which he acknowledged in a personal note written 
on December 10, 1942: “I am learning many things.” Two in particular stand out, the first being 
that waiting on others to produce “is one of the hardest things a commander has to do.” And 
the second was that, due to the enormity of the modern military, organizational experience and 
“an orderly, logical mind are absolutely essential to success.”839 
Eisenhower also understood the nexus between war and politics, his role in it, and 
compromise. He had worked for General Douglas MacArthur and seen how inappropriately 
MacArthur had crossed onto the wrong side of the “line between the military and the political.” 
On active duty, Eisenhower did not vote or “meddle with politics.” Just after the war, when 
many sought to draw Eisenhower into politics, he dismissed the rumors. In August 1945, when a 
friend excitedly wrote that he was “ready and anxious to organize an ‘Eisenhower for President’ 
Club,” Eisenhower gently brushed it aside, then wrote, “I must tell you, with all the emphasis I 
can command, that nothing could be so distasteful to me as to engage in political activity of any 
kind. I trust that no friend of mine will ever attempt to put me in the position where I would 
even be called upon to deny political ambitions.” Then, on the subject, Eisenhower wrote to his 
wife, “Many people seem astounded that I’d have no slightest interest in politics. I can’t 
understand them.”840 Eisenhower knew his role as a supreme commander in a democracy, and 
stuck to it, which, again, likely aided in the bond of trust with his country’s political leadership. 
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That self-awareness did not preclude him from dealing deftly with the politicians of 
Allied nations, and he once told a British officer how he dealt with French politicians: 
 
I immediately started a personal campaign to establish for myself a reputation for the most 
straightforward, brutal talk that could be imagined…I refused to put anything in diplomatic 
or suave terminology, and carefully cultivated the manner and reputation of complete 
bluntness and honesty—just a man too simple-minded to indulge in circumlocution.841 
 
And he embodied, in every way, what he said. His devotion to the Allied cause was so great, he 
carried three lucky coins with him during the war: one French, one British, and an American.842 
Eisenhower had a philosophy of high command. In a note in the spring of 1943, 
Eisenhower wrote, “It is not the man who is so brilliant [who] delivers in time of stress and 
strain, but rather the man who can keep on going indefinitely, doing a good straightforward 
job.”843 In August 1942, Eisenhower also wrote, 
 
The men that can do things are going to be sought out just as surely as the sun rises in the 
morning. Fake reputations, habits of glib and clever speech, and glittering surface 
performance are going to be discovered and kicked overboard. Solid, sound leadership, with 
inexhaustible nervous energy to spur on the efforts of lesser men, and iron-clad 
determination to face discouragement, risk and increasing work without flinching, will 
always characterize the man who has a sure-enough, bang-up fighting unit. Added to this he 
must have a darned strong tinge of imagination—I am continuously astounded by the utter 
lack of imaginative thinking among so many of our people that have reputations for being 
really good officers. Finally, the man has to be able to forget himself and personal fortunes. 
I’ve relieved two seniors here because they got worrying about “injustice,” “unfairness,” 
“prestige,” and—oh, what the hell!844 
 
Eisenhower was well-positioned through experience to pull together a sharp 
organization. He joked he “had been a chief of staff, either to a division, corps, or army, longer 
than anyone else in the U.S. Army.” His athletic background seems to have influenced his 
thought that “War has become so comprehensive and so complicated that teamwork seems to 
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me to be the essence of all success…Each bureau, each section, each office…has to be part of a 
well-coordinated team.”845 
Eisenhower’s judgment as a military leader was also influenced, early-on, by an American 
baseball scandal when he was a young officer in 1919. From that, Eisenhower learned that 
 
stark facts and objective reports could not give the whole story…In the passage of years, 
whether because of the Black Sox scandal or not, I grew increasingly cautious about making 
judgments based solely on reports. Behind every human action, the truth may be hidden. 
But the truth may also lie behind some other action or arrangement, far off in time and 
place. Unless circumstances and responsibility demanded an instant judgment I learned to 
reserve mine until the last proper moment. This was not always popular.846 
 
Winston Churchill, himself lauded for his way with words, once observed about 
Eisenhower: “Good generals do not usually have such good powers of expression as he has.”847 
Eisenhower was an excellent communicator, in the most formal occasion or the least formal, 
off-the-cuff remarks.848 
As a young officer, Eisenhower had written for military journals about new ideas applied 
to emerging tank warfare doctrine (despite a serious threat of court-martial from the Chief of 
Infantry).849 While in his first tour with the American Battle Monuments Commission, 
Eisenhower had worked directly for General John (“Black Jack”) Pershing, who had 
commanded the American Expeditionary Force in World War I. This time period happened to 
be when Pershing was writing his World War I memoirs, and he asked Eisenhower to “read the 
parts of the book” that pertained to campaigns in Saint Mihiel and the Argonne. Eisenhower 
read them, and recommended Pershing “abandon the diary form for two chapters and instead 
tell the story of each battle as seen from his position as the commander of the American 
Expeditionary Forces.” Pershing “listened and seemed to be enthused” and told Eisenhower to 
“take the two chapters and draft them” as Eisenhower “thought they should be.” Eisenhower 
did so, “with considerable effort,” but, in the end, Eisenhower’s counsel was overruled by 
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counter-advice to Pershing from George Marshall (which was the first meeting between 
Eisenhower and Marshall).850 
In 1935, Eisenhower nearly resigned from the army because a newspaper wanted to hire 
him, for much greater pay than his military salary, as a military editor. Eisenhower’s reputation 
for solid prose preceded him and so he was asked; in the end, though, Eisenhower decided to 
stick with his military career.851 
When the war was over, perhaps Eisenhower’s most notable speaking engagement was 
when he was honored by the City of London, at the Guildhall, on June 12, 1945. On the award, 
Eisenhower himself “worked on a text” with a “yellow pad and started to write with pencil in 
the evenings” after each day’s grind of military occupation duty in Germany. While “weary” 
from occupation paper-work, “immediately after supper” Eisenhower crawled “into bed each 
evening” and work on his speech until he fell asleep. He “labored at it mightily, never satisfied 
with a single paragraph.” When the speech was given, Eisenhower used words that were later to 
be etched on his tombstone: “Humility must always be the portion of any many who receives 
acclaim earned in the blood of his followers and the sacrifices of his friends.” The day after the 
speech, Eisenhower wrote, “the London papers greeted the talk warmly—and even, in an excess 
of friendly misjudgment, boxed it on the front page with the Gettysburg Address.”852 
In a recent lecture at the U.S. Air Force Academy, historian Rick Atkinson sought to 
“isolate some of the characteristics” that made Eisenhower a “successful general, a war-winning 
general, and a character who…seems to have relevance for us today.”853 
This is not as easy as it might seem. Eisenhower’s own grandson has even struggled to 
describe what made Eisenhower successful, choosing mostly to stick to a series of anecdotes.854 
The same was true for a journalist in the fall of 1944 who was assigned to Eisenhower’s 
headquarters’ for several weeks to write something for the Office of War Information. After 
leaving, the journalist spoke about the experience in an informal talk at the American Embassy 
in London. The journalist said Eisenhower “is in a heroic position without himself being a 
hero.” He said Eisenhower has none of the “moody grandeur” or “depth” or “creative will” that 
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inspires “men to be better than themselves.” The journalist could not see Eisenhower “leading a 
great historic movement.”855 
But, the journalist continued, “SHAEF is perhaps the greatest fact of this war, and 
SHAEF is certainly [Eisenhower’s] creature. It didn’t exist before him and it couldn’t have 
existed without him.” The journalist felt this suggested Eisenhower’s greatest strength was in 
“co-operation” and “tolerance,” that, “in a world of such vast destructive forces, a world of such 
close-knit interdependencies, egotism is more than a mistake—it’s a crime. That’s one thing one 
learns from Eisenhower.” The journalist concluded, “history is a by-product of ordinary 
workaday effort, and you have to stand a long way back from Eisenhower to realize what an 
immense and truly creative job he’s done in a situation where, one would have thought, only vast 
killing and destruction were possible.”856 
Another contemporary biographer, writing in 1945, was struck with Eisenhower’s lack of 
“willful egotism,” that, unlike Hitler, Eisenhower would never “regard power as having its 
source in him, belonging to him personally; always he would regard it as something distinct from 
himself, a kind of stream to which he must submit in the very process of controlling it.”857 
There was a unique quality to Eisenhower’s humility, even if some historians have 
questioned its authenticity.858 Two of Eisenhower’s personal memoranda, which bookend this 
campaign, might provide insight into his exceptional humility and willingness to accept personal 
responsibility. 
Recall the invasion’s never-used failure note, jotted in the hours approaching D-Day. In 
his own self-edit, Eisenhower intentionally crossed out passive lines in favor of active voice. So, 
“the troops have been withdrawn,” in his draft, when edited, became “I have withdrawn the 
troops.” Eisenhower was willing to take full personal responsibility for failure if it ever came to 
pass.859 
Then, when it was over, Eisenhower deliberately chose not to gloat or dwell on the 
victory. After the surrender was signed, his chief of staff recalled,  
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the staff prepared various drafts of a victory message appropriate to the historic event. I 
tried one myself and, like all my associates, groped for resounding phrases as fitting 
accolades to the Great Crusade and indicative of our dedication to the great task just 
completed. General Eisenhower rejected them all, with thanks but without other comment, 
and wrote his own. It read: “The mission of this Allied force was fulfilled at 0241 local time, 
May 7, 1945.”860 
 
Humility can take many forms. But, considering all the hard judgments and difficult 
decisions Eisenhower had to navigate, and the enormity of the war, the fact that he was so 
willing to stand in failure’s breach, and so humble in success’s spotlight, must meet at least one 
version of superlative humility. 
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6. Conclusion: Thinking Theoretically About Supreme Command 
 
6.1 Observations and Findings 
 
In Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie’s classic, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control, he wrote that 
while the term “Military Mind” was something of a “catch phrase,” he reminded readers there are, in 
fact, some “very real military minds” that “will, sooner or later, as they have in the past, have a 
profound effect on our nation and on our society and its civilization.” But, unfortunately, while 
several “other fields of human activities” like politics and economics have been exhaustively 
researched,  
 
only the tremendous social upheaval of war itself has never really been studied with a 
fundamental and systematic objectivity that would lead the student (and the practitioner) to 
recognize and better understand a basic pattern of thought, a theory, that did or could influence 
the conduct of war, influence the basic matter of whether or not a people or a nation might 
survive.861 
 
Wylie dismissed the “automatic rebuttal,” that thinkers like Clausewitz and Mahan had 
covered such terrain before. “In one fashion or another," Wylie acknowledged these previous 
theorists had “studied and juggled around the detailed specifics or statistics of war,” yet, he 
countered, “none of them has set himself the task of trying to make a little clearer why wars are 
managed the way they are.” Wyle’s goal, then, was to “understand a little better the paths that are 
followed by the strategic mind at work,” to “examine some of the patterns of thought that the 
military mind does use, and to speculate on some that perhaps it might use.”862 
Wylie’s approach was to focus not on fighting, but on war: “It is warfare, not battles, and 
strategy, not tactics or techniques, that should properly be the social science.” This meant studying 
the “whole of the thing,” instead of “counting the bullets or tracing the route of the nth division on 
a large-scale map.”863 
Wylie then contextualized his work, and the ways in which war might best be studied:                                                         
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I do not claim that strategy is or can be a “science” in the sense of the physical sciences. It can 
and should be an intellectual discipline of the highest order, and the strategist should prepare 
himself to manage ideas with precision and clarity and imagination in order that his 
manipulation of the physical realities, the tools of war, may rise above the pedestrian plane of 
mediocrity. Thus, while strategy itself may not be a science, strategic judgment can be scientific 
to the extent that it is orderly, rational, objective, inclusive, discriminatory, and perceptive.864 
 
This dissertation follows directly in Wylie’s tradition. The research results that follow are a 
product of the same principles that Wylie spelled out a little over fifty years ago. 
To review, this dissertation’s central research question was: What are the characteristics of 
successful wartime American supreme commanders? 
This research identified a pattern. In the three case studies, several characteristics of 
successful American wartime supreme commanders stood out: judgment in particular, accompanied 
by a distinct quality of empathy and grit in each, as well as a number of other associated traits the 
successful supreme commanders held in common in terms of schooling and self-study, 
communication skills, post-war presidencies, and a distinct resilience developed in younger years. 
This dissertation finds that the superior judgment of a nation’s supreme commander at war 
matters as a factor in determining which combatant wins’ crucial campaigns and, ultimately, wars. 
This does not mean superior judgment in a supreme commander is itself a sufficient condition for 
victory, but, in these cases, where both adversaries had an opportunity to fulfill their war aims, it 
would appear that the supreme commander’s superior judgment was a necessary condition for 
securing critical campaign advantages on the road to strategic victory. 
This chapter considers the cumulative findings of the three case studies, draws out 
observable patterns, and confronts the study’s limitations. Then, the chapter connects with deeper 
theoretical currents, and moves on to the areas which seem likely to be impacted by the findings: 
international relations, supreme command and the practice of strategy, military history and the 
concept of military genius, and the potential impact on other academic disciplines.  
 
Superior Judgment was a Key Factor in Successful Supreme Command 
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There was an identifiable historical pattern to successful supreme command. By comparing the 
relative, cumulative judgments and decisions of adversary supreme commanders during pivotal 
moments at war, the supreme commander that demonstrated superior judgment tended to generate 
greater positive strategic effects on the path to the achievement of their country’s war aims. 
This superior judgment finding held true across all three case studies, each of which featured 
different strategies (Washington: exhaustion; Grant: attrition; Eisenhower: annihilation), different 
material and manpower balances (Washington: inferior; Grant: superior; Eisenhower: initially 
inferior, then superior over time), and different characters of conflict, time periods, and war aims. 
All these factors shifted over time and geography, while superior judgment remained an objectively 
constant, important factor. 
Not only did the successful supreme commanders make better judgments than their 
opponents, but they also did more to maintain unity of strategic effort in their respective commands. 
For example, both Howe and Hitler lost strategic unity of effort. Howe’s command came apart for 
two reasons: he fell victim to the slow communications inherent in such a distant, 18th-century 
campaign, but this was made significantly worse by his ill-preparedness for Washington’s devastating 
attacks in December 1776 and January 1777, which discombobulated and forced Howe and his 
political masters in London to fail to coordinate, and resulted in an incoherent British campaign in 
1777.865 Oppositely, Washington was able to keep multiple parties, military, political, and external 
(e.g. Native American tribes), in synchronization with his operations, despite the grim situation his 
Continental Army faced in late 1776.866 
For Hitler it was the purges and fear he created at the highest levels of command, and the 
resulting lack of trust.867 This was in stark contrast to Eisenhower’s ability to navigate complex and 
challenging decisions within an often fractious Allied command.868 
One other major theme from the research was the give-and-take between military 
effectiveness and political compromise. At one moment or another, each supreme commander was 
pulled in a certain direction for political reasons, a direction that often appeared like an option that 
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promised suboptimal military results. In short, political needs threatened to reduce military 
effectiveness. The successful supreme commanders were those that balanced, appropriately, these 
real political imperatives with military imperatives in fair-minded ways that both achieved objectives 
against the adversary and maintained unity of effort. 
Several examples from the research hold up this finding. Consider Washington’s choice 
whether or not to burn New York City, which would have been the most militarily effective way to 
deny the British a winter garrison and a strategically important logistical base for the winter of 1776-
1777. Yet, for Washington, political considerations, as well as a deference to political authority, 
outweighed the let-it-burn tactical approach advocated by his key military subordinates. At the same 
time, when Washington was convinced it was time to withdraw from New York for military reasons, 
against political guidance, he did so in a respectful, gradual manner that preserved his authority with 
the Continental Congress.869 Washington disagreed with both his military subordinates and political 
superiors, and still managed to hold these two ends of the rebellion together. 
Initially, in the winter preceding the campaign of 1864, Grant wanted to send an indirect 
offensive through North Carolina against the Confederates, to use maneuver to force Lee away from 
his Lee’s home terrain advantage in Virginia. Grant had to adjust this original concept to 
accommodate a political reality, namely, that the Lincoln administration could not allow the capital 
to go unprotected in an election year. Grant’s resulting plan of simultaneous offensive operations set 
all Union armies in motion, and still achieved both his country’s political and military needs.870 
Eisenhower’s air campaign to strike French rail networks deeply stressed the Allied 
command, to the point that the extent of this bombing, as well as the sheer number and variety of 
targets, was altered somewhat to meet the British high command’s concern for French civilians.871 
In these cases, as well as others in each chapter, these successful supreme commanders all 
encountered challenges that pitted military effectiveness against political considerations. In 
confronting these challenges with an appropriate sense of balance and personal tact, each supreme 
commander gained support as a result of their sound compromises and judgments.  
 
Common Characteristics of Successful Supreme Commanders                                                         
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In reading about George Washington, Ulysses Grant, and Dwight Eisenhower, one learns they were 
not exactly alike. Washington and Eisenhower both about six feet in height, while Grant was around 
five feet, eight inches tall.872 Their demeanors differed: Eisenhower was outwardly optimistic, Grant 
seemed more realistic and stoic, and while Washington was a rock most of the time, he could be 
incredibly pessimistic in his private correspondence.873 Washington grew tobacco at Mount Vernon, 
yet there is no historical evidence he used it during his war; Grant constantly smoked cigars and 
Eisenhower smoked four packs of cigarettes per day in 1944.874 
From a modern perspective, they were relatively young supreme commanders. British 
military theorist and major general J.F.C. Fuller took seriously the impact of age on generalship. In 
an appendix to his book, Generalship, he listed the ages of one hundred well-known and well-
regarded historical generals up to the year 1866 (a date after which he believed “generalship becomes 
senile”). Fuller noted the average age on his list was just over 40 years old, and that 74 percent were 
45 or younger. From this, Fuller theorized that the “period of most efficient generalship lies between 
the years thirty and forty-nine,” with peak performance occurring “between the years thirty-five and 
forty-five” (for his part, Grant said he would never “put a general in the field over fifty”).875 On 
balance, Fuller believed that youth in generalship was an asset and an advantage. 
More recently, Fuller’s theory has received some support: In 2005, when the U.S. National 
Bureau of Economic Research studied over 2,000 Noble Prize winners, they found the bulk of 
recipients came up with the idea that earned them the Nobel occurred between the ages of 35-39.876 
This would seem to support Fuller’s belief that important ideas tend to percolate in this age-range. 
This dissertation’s findings generally support Fuller’s hypothesis. During the campaigns 
evaluated, Washington was 44 (his opponent, Howe, turned 47 that summer), Grant was 42 (Lee 
was 57), and Eisenhower was 53 for most of the 1944 campaign (while Hitler was roughly one-and-
a-half-years older at 54). While not perfectly consistent with Fuller, two out of three successful 
supreme commanders were in Fuller’s age range for peak performance, and all three successful 
supreme commanders were younger, if not by much, than their unsuccessful adversaries. This is not                                                         
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to suggest that age alone is a discriminating feature, but, that relative youth may be another 
important characteristic in successful supreme command. 
More specific to their habits in command, and regarding the assistance they received in 
arriving at their decisions, Washington regularly consulted Councils of War that included diverse 
views from many other senior officers in the Continental Army as well as civilians who had 
knowledge on particular strategic issues; Grant kept a small, informal staff, and exchanged personal 
dispatches to a few trusted agents for advice and counsel (e.g. Sherman and Halleck); Eisenhower 
had a full, formal staff, with wire diagrams indicating appropriate chains of command and 
authority.877 
All three supreme commanders sat on top of potentially volcanic tempers, which by 
accounts never impacted their decision-making ability, and they were mostly able to hold these in 
check while at war.878 
They shared a particular strength in empathy, which each exhibited in the course of making 
key judgments. First, this can be seen in the accommodations they made and relationships they 
managed in keeping unity of effort. 
But also, there is the documented evidence of each supreme commander shedding actual 
tears during these campaigns. For Washington it occurred on November 16, 1776, while he 
helplessly watched the Continental Army’s tragic loss at Fort Washington.879 For Grant it was near 
the beginning of the campaign, on May 6, 1864, after fighting the bloody Battle of the Wilderness 
(the next day he would turn Union forces to continue to press on against the Confederates).880 For 
Eisenhower it was on June 5, 1944, while watching airborne troops depart for Normandy (and then 
he wept again for the same group of airborne veterans at a post-war reunion in 1952).881 Some might 
dismiss these tears as minor bursts of emotion from human beings in dark times, but, they do seem 
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to reveal something. As observable instances, these emotional moments support the notion that 
these supreme commanders felt a true, genuine sense of empathy toward their troops. 
Why does empathy matter? The ability to connect emotionally to other people may indicate 
the ability to more deeply connect to another person’s goals and objectives. Hew Strachan has noted 
that often the greatest challenge at war is the connection between statesmen and soldiers, the 
intersection between the “two spheres” critical to wartime command.882 If a supreme commander 
has a natural affinity for understanding other people, empathetically, then it is reasonable that this 
supreme commander would also be better able to intuit a political leader’s goals and objectives, and, 
in turn, adjust strategic course to stay in step with them. Or in certain cases, go in a direction 
unexpected by the political leadership that actually better serves a country’s strategic ends. Such 
empathy might also help a supreme commander to better understand the enemy’s mind.883 
Empathy also appears to be the quality in a supreme commander that helps smooth out the 
rough edges of wartime alliances. While it is true that “the sensible application of superior resources 
tends to be successful,” it should also be said that there must be significant effort expended to 
manage the internal competitions and petty jealousies on one’s own side in order to achieve such a 
“sensible application.”884 
More broadly, Amy Chua has theorized that every world power that has “achieved global 
hegemony” was demonstrably tolerant relative to its rivals.885 To achieve such dominance, these 
societies had to “motivate the world’s best and brightest, regardless of ethnicity, religion, or 
background.”886 The key challenge, she wrote, was to “glue” people together in a “common identity” 
to achieve some degree of loyalty and unity.887 
If one accepts this theory, then to some extent a nation’s power derives from its ability to 
bring diverse people together in strategically-important ways. The empathy demonstrated by the 
successful supreme commanders in this study would seem to embody this pattern of national 
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dominance: Washington, Grant, and Eisenhower each served as the “glue” that stuck important 
coalitions together at war. 
As a characteristic, empathy’s value seems to stem from keeping a supreme commander’s 
ears and eyes and senses open, to listen and understand the motivations and viewpoints of others 
(including the enemy). It also acts as a funnel, ensuring the best ideas surface and get through to the 
supreme commander. 
Grit, a hard-driven sense of direction and purposeful determination, can be seen in several 
ways in these case studies. Among other examples explicitly stated in each case’s chapter, certainly 
Washington exemplified grit in holding on to attack twice in December 1776 and January 1777 after 
his forces were down to a tiny fraction of what they had been mere months before, and despite his 
own personal fear that the war was effectively over.888 For Grant it was the decision to continue to 
press the attack, to grind Lee’s Confederates down, after a tough few days in the Battle of the 
Wilderness in May 1864 (notwithstanding the fortitude it took to keep the pressure on all the way 
through Lincoln’s re-election).889 And there was Eisenhower’s wherewithal in sticking to his decision 
on the airborne drops to complement the Normandy landings, despite dire warnings against this 
particular course of action.890 
In each of these, the successful supreme commander had a difficult decision to make, and, 
even with others of goodwill and high position counseling alternate options, we can see the 
successful supreme commanders held on to their selected course of action. This, perhaps, is where 
we can see objective evidence of the supreme commander’s greatest value. There can be only one 
decision-maker and so grit is enormously important because this quality is what enables a successful 
supreme commander to hold and bind and grip on a particular decision amidst a storm of other 
opinions. 
Grit seems to be about having a firm stomach for tough judgments and decisions; an iron 
gut to stay steady when others argue otherwise, sometimes incessantly. These three successful 
supreme commanders all possessed this quality. 
It also seems that the mere possession of empathy and grit are not enough, but, instead, the 
ability to use them wisely and appropriately. They often work in contrast with one another: empathy 
is about connecting with others and listening to other ideas and seeing through another person’s                                                         
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lens; grit is about closing out others and halting the flow of new ideas to hold fast to a final decision. 
Knowing when to use one, and when to engage the other, is also important to a supreme 
commander’s performance. 
All three also went on to be two-term American presidents, a correlation that may indicate at 
least two things. It would first seem to reinforce the notion that, at the highest level, generals must 
possess deft political skills, that in turn serve use after they take the uniform off. Interestingly, all 
three showed significant deference to their political superiors, as well as a complete disinterest in 
politics while still in uniform.891 This non-politically-threatening stance must have gone some way to 
earning the trust of their political superiors. 
Additionally, their presidencies were all, to one degree or another, mostly about 
consolidating the gains from the wars they did so much to win. When Washington became 
president, he had to pull together a sprawling new country of four million people that had no sense 
of the states as a single unified entity.892 The Revolutionary War had been about breaking ties with 
Britain; Washington’s presidency formed an entirely new country. In destroying slavery and the 
Confederate bid to secede, Grant had an important role in preserving the Union.893 After the Civil 
War, Grant re-built ties to the South and protected new lives for former slaves through his support 
for Reconstruction. And, having defeated Nazi Germany, Eisenhower turned his presidential 
energies toward building a new post-war world order, and “safely guided the free world through one 
of the most dangerous decades of the Cold War.”894 
Famously, George Washington was eulogized for having been both “first in war” and “first 
in peace,” a formulation which may go some way to explaining why these supreme commanders 
were so successful. Having won their wars as military leaders, they then went on to exercise personal 
political leadership in consolidating the peace that followed. This is not to suggest that every 
successful American supreme commander must or even should follow Washington, Grant, and 
Eisenhower into the Oval Office, but it does imply that personal involvement in a conflict might 
energize post-war political leadership to prioritize the consolidation of wartime strategic gains. Thus, 
these three successful supreme commanders held in peace what they had seized at war.                                                         
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Theoretically, this would seem to connect to the dual-definition of “war” Carl von 
Clausewitz wrote about in On War. Clausewitz defined war two ways: first, he wrote that war is “an 
act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” and second, war is “a continuation of political 
intercourse.”895 This way of thinking sees two aspects of war: one “negative,” “coercive,” and mostly 
about combat; the other is “positive,” “constructive,” and centers on “politics.”896 Those that look 
upon war in a similarly comprehensive way are likely to see that Washington, Grant, and Eisenhower 
may have been successful, in part, because they fulfilled both parts of Clausewitz’s theoretical vision 
of war, first as military leaders and then as political leaders. 
All three were excellent communicators. Having consumed too many dispatches, 
memorandums, and primary source documents to count, so many of which were written in 
unpleasant, dangerous circumstances, one can only come away impressed with Washington’s, 
Grant’s, and Eisenhower’s correspondence. They were able to clearly and concisely make their 
wishes, arguments, and commands known with the written word. One classicist has said much the 
same of Julius Caesar, that Caesar was “the rare person in history who’s a great general, and a great 
politician, and also a great author. We don’t see that very often.”897 The same laudatory remark 
would also reasonably be applied to these successful supreme commanders. 
This writing-ability is evident in Eisenhower’s straightforward, direct language in official 
documents during the war, as well as his Guidhall Address in London, not to mention his multiple 
books written after the war; Grant went on to pen what has often been called the best military 
memoir of all time.898 Washington, though possessing the least formal education of the three, was 
also a gifted and prodigious wordsmith, with thousands upon thousands of well-written letters in his 
personal papers that reveal an extraordinary mind at work.899 
In variable amounts, all three showed an indifference for official education, or non-
attendance at formal schooling. Yet they all displayed a passion for self-study, and all had some                                                         
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meaningful military experience prior to the wars in which they served in supreme command. 
Washington had little in the way of an education, but his desire to learn is on display with one quick 
look at his personal library, with subjects ranging from veterinary care to books on poetry, to 
religion, philosophy, geography, and law; importantly, he had a clear interest in military subjects, 
particularly his British adversaries.900 And as a younger man, he did benefit from some military 
experience as a colonial British officer. Grant never liked his education at West Point, but did enjoy 
some individual subjects like mathematics.901 After university, however, Grant was an excellent 
reader that even demonstrated the ability to put himself into the place and mind of other military 
commanders.902 He also had combat experience in the Mexican War. Eisenhower was a similarly 
unfocused student at West Point, but while there he did gain in the way of his experience on athletic 
teams and in the skills that likely contribute to interpersonal leadership.903 While Eisenhower’s pre-
supreme command military experience was not in combat, it was significant. Eisenhower had his 
interest in self-study jumpstarted by a mentor, General Fox Conner, and he went on to succeed in 
military mid-career education. Eisenhower learned much through peers and mentors, like George 
Patton and Fox Conner, and in his pre-World War II assignments on tank warfare and doctrine, in 
Panama, in Washington, and in France and the Philippines under General Douglas MacArthur. 
All three faced significant setbacks in their younger years. George Washington’s early life was 
the most tragic, having sustained the death of his father at age eleven, and then, at age twenty, the 
loss of his half-brother Lawrence who had become a “surrogate father.” Washington also always felt 
educationally deficient, having only finished grade-school.904 Grant had a domineering father who 
smothered and attempted to manipulate and live through Ulysses, so much that, without telling 
Ulysses, his father essentially single-handedly pushed Ulysses into West Point.905 Eisenhower’s 
family was poor in his early years, the result of a father who was repeatedly swindled and suffered 
business disasters.906 
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902 Fuller, Grant and Lee, 66-67. 
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Childhood resilience, learned through difficulty, seems to be an important distinguishing 
characteristic. In 1962, two researchers published the findings of their work on the childhoods of 
several hundred well-regarded individuals: 
 
these 400 eminent people did have many childhood experiences in common. They grew up in 
homes where excitement and love of learning were present, though they often disliked formal 
schooling and some were schooled at home. The homes they grew up in were full of books and 
stimulating conversation and strong opinions, so that as children, they learned to think and 
express themselves clearly. They had at least one strong parent, usually the mother, who 
believed in them.907 
 
More specifically, the study’s key trends were that in over 90 percent of the eminent 
individuals studied, “there was a love for learning in one or both parents, often accompanied by a 
physical exuberance and a persistent drive towards goals.” About 60 percent had trouble with formal 
schooling (as separate from a love for self-learning). Over 75 percent had a troubled childhood, for a 
variety of reasons: “by poverty; by a broken home; by rejecting, overpossessive, estranged, or 
dominating parents; by financial ups and downs; by physical handicaps; or by parental dissatisfaction 
over the children’s school failures or vocational choices.”908 These findings would seem to affirm 
that a challenge in childhood builds a sense of resiliency in high-performing individuals.909 More 
importantly, the early life experiences of these three successful supreme commanders (and five of 
the six total studied, the only outlier being Howe) would fit into the descriptions from the Geortzel 
study, especially their difficult childhoods. Winston Churchill once affirmed the same: “Solitary 
trees, if they grow at all, grow strong: and a boy deprived of a father’s care often develops, if he 
escapes the perils of youth, an independence and a vigor of thought which may restore in afterlife 
the heavy loss of early days.”910 It might be that difficulty endured in early years aided later-life 
success in supreme command.                                                         
907 Geortzel et al, Cradles of Eminence, vii.  
908 Geortzel et al, Cradles of Eminence, 282-283.  
909 Meg Jay, “The Secrets of Resilience,” Wall Street Journal (Saturday/Sunday, November 11-12, 
2017), C1.  
910 Winston Churchill, The River War: An Historical Account of the Reconquest of the Soudan (1899), cited 
by Andrew Roberts, “Winston Churchill: Walking with Destiny,” January 16, 2018, at The New York 
Historical Society, audio, at 19 minutes, accessed March 8, 2018, 
http://www.nyhistory.org/programs/winston-churchill-walking-destiny. 
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6.2 Limitations 
 
These cases and findings, of course, are subject to limits. First, while this dissertation did begin by 
comparing opposing supreme commanders competing against one another, in the same era, the 
dissertation then pivoted to compare the characteristics of the three successful supreme 
commanders. While they share similarities in that they all achieved their political and strategic aims, 
it must be acknowledged that it is hard to compare their strategic accomplishments because these 
three fought on different terrain, in different eras, against wildly different opponents.911 To mitigate 
this problem, the analysis focused mostly on judgments and decisions, as well as their observable 
habits of mind and characteristics, which minimizes somewhat these other considerations. 
These are also all high profile, high stakes conflicts, and as such there is apt to be political 
deference to military judgment that might not otherwise be on offer in wars of lesser intensity. 
Because these wars mattered so much, the symmetry of viewpoint between political and military 
leadership is likely to be greater, or at least more deferential to military considerations.912 This 
observation lessens the applicability of these findings in relatively limited wars that are more 
constrained by political leadership for one reason or another. 
All three successful supreme commanders fought for democratic political systems. All three 
had relatively supportive political leaders’ (though Washington had multiple partners in the 
Continental Congress he answered to). This is important because the relationship between the 
political effort and military effort overlaps, and so cooperation, friendly or tacit, would seem to be 
critical. Logic suggests that absent the presence of supportive, sharp political leadership, these three 
successful supreme commanders might not have achieved nearly so much. The fact, also, that these 
were all in a democracy limits applicability to other political systems. 
These cases are pre-nuclear era, and this makes it more difficult to apply lessons from before 
the bomb to after the bomb. Put another way, this all might be historically correct, but still difficult 
to apply to the nuclear age. Moreover, the post-war changes in American defense structure arguably 
dissipate the importance of a supreme commander in a theater of war. Today, presidential authority, 
a much larger White House staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Geographical 
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Combatant Commanders and their on-the-ground operational commands in theaters of war, these 
features are all different than the command structures in this dissertation’s three case studies, which 
again, somewhat limits applicability. 
Also, the knowledge gained from this research will almost certainly never be predictive (at 
least until modern science finds a way into a person’s thoughts in real-time). While we can observe, 
using the historical record and primary source documents, that superior judgment made a difference 
in these three campaigns and wars, because there are only three cases, this small-n work makes no 
claim for universal applicability and it is unlikely that this knowledge can be applied to a current or 
coming conflict. Yet, despite not being predictive, this research methodology still holds explanatory 
power and so does provide academic value. 
This dissertation’s method of studying successful supreme commanders is useful because it 
helps us understand military supreme command’s role in war. Supreme command as a function is 
constant; both sides at war have supreme commanders, formal or informal; but we cannot explain a 
variable effect from a constant cause. Therefore, in addition to other factors like material and 
technology, what is not constant is superior judgment and decision in a supreme commander; each 
supreme commander makes decisions that can be observed objectively in hindsight. Often, one 
judgment is relatively better than the adversary’s when evaluated using primary sources. Even if the 
inferior decision was “reasonable” it can still be labeled inferior when compared to an adversary’s 
superior judgment.913 By making explicit this analysis of judgment and decision, researchers can 
better recognize and scrutinize the role supreme commanders play at war. 
 
6.3 Implications 
 
For International Relations and Political Science 
 
These results demonstrate that a nation’s war-making material alone ought not be considered the 
sole driving force that determines war outcomes. Of the three losing sides in these cases, two 
enjoyed distinct material advantages. Howe’s British forces held a significant advantage as part of the 
largest invasion force the British Empire had ever mustered; the Continental Army was much 
smaller and weaker. Also, Hitler held a material advantage in men, fortifications, and arguably                                                         
913 Robert Jervis quoted in Tetlock and Gardner, Superforecasting, 83. 
ML Cavanaugh 
On Supreme Command  
 221 
weapons technology in the initial stages of the Allied amphibious landing. Of the three cases, the 
only ultimate victor to hold an absolute numerical advantage over his competitor was Grant. But 
even then, Lee fought on home soil, with favorable defensive terrain, and the technology of the day 
that favored such a defense. And, not to be forgotten, Lee had defeated a Union force with nearly 
the precise numerical advantage one year prior. Traditional social science theories that rely 
exclusively on material or technological differences must find ways to account for supreme 
command (or at least important human) decisions at war. 
Moreover, this research serves a “larger question, which is the relationship of victory in this 
battle to victory in the war.”914 By working from a from a known strategic result which has been 
observed (i.e. the Allied victory in World War II), this dissertation traced backwards in time to a 
point at which the war’s result was not settled. This method sought to meaningfully link battlefield 
outcomes to campaign outcomes and then campaign outcomes to strategic victories in war (i.e. the 
decisions that went into the taking of Normandy, then the seizure of Paris and France, to the 
inevitable defeat of Nazi Germany). The military supreme commander’s position is the best place to 
observe this conversion from tactical gains to strategic effect. 
International relations literature prominently features the Melian Dialogue’s precept “that the 
strong do what they will, and the weak can but submit.”915 This classic formulation of international 
relations can be alternately summed up, pithily, as “might makes right.” The present research 
counters this slogan because it found that resources do not necessarily drive outcomes. (In fact, the 
role of judgment would seem to reverse the saying: for the successful supreme commander, “right 
makes might.”) Resources are necessary to fight, but are never sufficient and hardly determinative. 
In November and December 1776, Washington was roughly at a four-to-one disadvantage 
to his British adversary (so desperate was the situation that on December, 17, 1776, Washington 
wrote to his property manager to “get my papers in order” for rapid escape).916 Yet, using maneuver 
to gain surprise and local numerical advantage, though not much more than parity, Washington won 
at Trenton and Princeton and was able to generate sufficient strategic effect to bring the French into 
the war on the American side in 1777. In the American Civil War, the Union had spent three years 
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and 144,000 casualties in Virginia alone, without much progress, against an industrial-sized 
insurgency.917 They had gone through three generals-in-chief and four commanders of the Army of 
the Potomac.918 Put in supreme command, Grant ended the war in under a year. Lastly, 
Eisenhower’s forces at the beach were initially at a numerical disadvantage to German resources in 
France.919 Eisenhower also had only one opportunity to make the European Theater of Operations a 
two-front war and the Germans had the advantage of defense. In each of these cases, numbers alone 
cannot explain victory satisfactorily. 
This research also supports a nuanced view of American civilian-military relations. The first 
major modern American theory on civil-military relations came from Samuel Huntington’s thesis in 
The Soldier and the State, which counseled a relatively “sharp separation” between military 
professionals and civilian politicians.920 Eliot Cohen, in his book, Supreme Command, pushed back in 
the other direction, and argued that the relationship between presidents and prime ministers on the 
one hand, and their generals on the other, is much more mixed and messy. 
While Cohen is undoubtedly correct that the better wartime political leaders take an active 
role in managing military subordinates, he carries his argument a bit too far. In one of his case 
studies on the American Civil War, Cohen found that American President Abraham Lincoln “did 
not merely find his generals; he controlled them.”921 This claims too much, particularly in that Grant 
habitually would only tell Lincoln after-the-fact about many strategic judgments and orders, and that 
Lincoln explicitly empowered Grant to take on other important decisions.922 
Cohen’s model is an important step away from Huntington’s hard division between the 
military and politics. But Cohen’s singular focus on engaged, shrewd, meddling presidents and prime 
ministers is only half the picture. Particularly in democratic systems, political leaders and military 
commanders are forced to work together to achieve war aims.                                                         
917 Rhea, “‘Butcher’ Grant and the Overland Campaign,” 45. 
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The two function in parallel, with overlapping, yet different attentions. If political leaders 
look to maximize the outcomes of political decisions, and accept sufficiency, or satisfice, on 
decisions related to military operations, then the supreme commander seeks to maximize the 
outcomes of military decisions, and satisfices when it comes to decisions related to politics and 
military unity. In this way, each has an impact on the other. A political decision might do harm to a 
military operation, and vice versa. What matters is whether or not the two function together, 
somewhat better than their adversaries. This is not to argue the two are fully equal. In Western 
democracies at least, as Cohen observes, the political master always ultimately trumps a military 
subordinate (hence Cohen’s description of the relationship as an “unequal dialogue”). Yet, due to 
proximity and focus and experience, the military supreme commander will necessarily exercise some 
subordinate independent judgment while at war. It may be that Washington, Grant, and Eisenhower 
earned their political leadership’s trust by so thoroughly and completely eschewing politics while in 
uniform, which allowed them such strategically important, limited autonomy.923 
 
For Supreme Command and the Practice of Strategy 
 
One important area of study in this dissertation is to make explicit the relationship between strategic 
choices and strategic victories in campaigns and wars. While military and political aims are somewhat 
different, they are “not separate,” as Basil H. Liddell Hart wrote, “Nations do not wage war for 
war’s sake, but in pursuance of policy. The military objective is only the means to a political end.”924 
This dissertation described how sound and superior choices from supreme commanders 
making decisions about important strategic issues, relative to an adversary, can cumulatively generate 
strategic advantage that can put a war on course to a successful conclusion. 
For example, while he was perilously close to defeat at one point, by the end of 
Washington’s campaign in early 1777, the Continental Army was still intact; had denied New Jersey 
to the British and their Hessians allies; had reinvigorated the cause; and had caused Howe to change 
his plans for 1777 which led to Burgoyne’s defeat at Saratoga and the French entry into the war.                                                         
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While the Confederates held the South and had maintained at least a stalemate against a 
series of Union commanders, by the end of Grant’s 1864 campaign, the simultaneous advance of the 
Union armies forced Lee into a defensive position from which he could not escape; the Shenandoah 
Valley, the three-time Confederate invasion route to the North, was closed for good; Atlanta fell to 
the Union; and the South’s ability to make war lay in ruin; all of which served to convince the Union 
electorate that Lincoln merited a second term, even if many in the North still had reservations about 
granting rights to former slaves. 
Lastly, while Hitler’s forces held the Atlantic Wall with significant resources and leadership 
talent (including the likes of Rommel), by the end of Eisenhower’s campaign in France in 1944, the 
Allies were still united, despite bitter disagreements about major decisions; had destroyed the 
German army and taken hundreds of thousands of German prisoners; neutralized the V-weapon 
sites; opened up a critical second port to offset Hitler’s decision to hold other German-held French 
ports; on the way to the recapture of Paris and the Allied advance on the western German border, 
which forced Hitler into a two-front war on home soil. 
The judgments and decisions of Washington, Grant, and Eisenhower, all had a major impact 
on those strategic gains. 
There are other unavoidable implications for military supreme command in specific and the 
practice of strategy in general. For instance, what standards should a country use to judge military 
supreme command?925 A better understanding of how supreme commanders think, when successful, 
might impact how a military selects and promotes general officers.926 Today, there are about 900 
active duty generals and admirals in the American military, and it is likely that at least a few will rise 
in rank and be selected for supreme command in a time of war.927  This dissertation’s findings 
should shed some light on such an important decision. 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have forced some recent attention on the selection of 
senior commanders, as Steven Metz has written, “It is time for Americans to think deeply about the 
skills their senior military leaders must have, otherwise we risk identifying those skills through the 
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failures of military leaders who lack them.”928 Some of this discussion was activated by U.S. Army 
officer Paul Yingling’s criticism of commanders in Iraq, which he called “a failure in generalship.” 
Yingling pointed out that a survey of Army senior generals showed that only 25 percent held 
advanced social science or humanity degrees, which he charged left them lacking in cultural 
understanding and ultimately failing at the “estimation of strategic probabilities” required by senior 
leaders at war.929 The critique continued and grew to book form with Thomas Ricks’ argument that 
successful American generalship is dependent upon strict accountability for performance and swift 
relief for battlefield failure.930 
The focus on accountability based on a simple, Darwinian method of relief has been around 
for quite some time. When Thucydides was taken by surprise by the Spartan Brasidas at Amphipolis 
in the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians held Thucydides responsible and exiled him for twenty 
years.931 Or consider John Adams, effectively the American secretary of war during the 
Revolutionary War, who wrote to his wife in mid-August 1777: “I think we shall never defend a 
Post, until we shoot a general. After that we shall defend posts…We must trifle no more.”932 So 
there is certainly a historical lineage to strict accountability measures for generals. 
But accountability through relief cannot be the best way to find talented generals and 
supreme commanders. What of commanders who stumble early in their military careers, only to 
learn from those mistakes and use them to grow to future successes? (Which was the case in all three 
of these successful supreme commanders; all survived less-than-stellar starts to their lives in military 
leadership, yet went on to great success in supreme command.) This dissertation’s results show that 
to understand exemplary military leadership, one must look at both outcome and process. 
Developing a finer sense for what drives success in supreme command is important because 
such a finding would help to discard the myths that currently persist about senior generals, such as 
this recent description,                                                          
928 Steven Metz, “Strategic Horizons: For U.S. Military, ‘Strategic Leadership’ Easier Said Than 
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True generalship is an ability to borrow elements of Patton’s technical military competence and 
the moral pureness of Gandhi, mixed with Bill Clinton’s artful communication, Ryan Crocker’s 
diplomatic savvy, and George Kennan’s strategic acumen – in other words, to approximate a 
fraction of the soul of George Marshall.933 
 
Absent a realistic understanding of competency in strategic leadership, extreme views 
proliferate. Which leaves us with the over-positive, near deification narrative shown above, and the 
super-negative, “lions led by donkeys,” post-World War I British variant.934 The upshot is that it 
seems right now, the lack of literature on exemplary supreme command and senior leadership has 
left us without a guiding light in the selection of senior military leaders. By evaluating successful 
cases, the processes, the outcomes, their judgments and decisions, in context against an adversary, 
we may better understand how to choose more wisely. 
In general, this dissertation seems to validate some military thinking on the subject of 
leadership development, particularly the three-part model that places importance on education and 
training, on-the-job experience, and self-development.935 But this dissertation goes farther than most 
military literature in that it specifies that competence in a supreme commander (or senior military 
leader) should be defined as superior strategic judgment, supported by a character marked by 
empathy and grit, and underpinned by a series of other observable behaviors. 
This dissertation also refutes the assertion, by Richard Betts, that “strategies cannot be 
evaluated because there are no agreed criteria for which are good or bad.”936 While it is undoubtedly 
true that strategies cannot and should not be assessed with absolute terms like “good” or “bad,” 
they can, in hindsight, be revealed as objectively better or worse than an adversary. In this way, 
strategies can be assessed. This is because war, and battle, often function as a “formal trial by 
combat.”937 For the most part, both sides on a battlefield chose to engage willfully and with full 
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opportunity for withdrawal. In this type of contest, supreme commanders exercise choice. And, 
using the historical record, these choices can be assessed. 
Also, importantly, supreme commanders act on theory. “No matter how pragmatic a general 
may believe himself to be,” Colin Gray has written, “he cannot help but act upon some theory, 
singular or plural, of strategy.”938 Some have even expressed this with something approaching a 
mathematical equation,  
 
[S]trategy demands a theory—a proposed causal explanation—that must stand up to rigorous 
analysis. A theory, in its most basic form, can be expressed as “if x, then y.” Thus, the strategist 
must be able to defend the statement, “If we use resource X, then we will achieve objective Y” 
(“or at least move in the direction of achieving objective Y”).939 
 
Even if strategies are somewhat imprecise, and built upon human factors well beyond the control of 
any one person, these theories can be evaluated, in context and after-the-fact. 
This dissertation also found that supreme command is about much more than pure military 
issues. The role of the supreme commander seems to include an important persuasive component 
that somewhat upends the stereotype of the commander barking orders. 
Supreme commanders often transcend the different levels of war. In military circles, there 
are three levels of war: tactical, or where the fighting occurs; operational, or large groupings of 
tactical actions, organized and sequenced in campaigns; and strategic, where military actions are 
translated into political gains.940 The term “levels,” indicates a separateness, like hierarchical floors in 
a building. 
Yet, in studying supreme commanders, the levels seem more permeable and interconnected 
than they might otherwise appear. Smoke on one floor is always apt to rise and influence another. 
After the war, Eisenhower said if it was not for the flat-bottomed boats used in the amphibious 
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assaults, “we never could have landed over an open beach. The whole strategy of the war would 
have been different.”941  
 
For Military History and the Concept of Military Genius 
 
Military historians have long written about the importance of a decisive battle, when a major, 
significant change in political or social affairs comes about as the result of a single day of fighting.942 
Such smashing, decisive victories are often the province of the Great Captains, akin to Thomas 
Carlyle’s great man theory of history, that certain individuals like Napoleon have been “the soul of 
the world’s history.”943 
Historian Cathal Nolan has pointed out that this “allure of battle,” the pursuit of such great 
victories, has prodded too many military thinkers to believe in “an elusive military genius, that rare 
general who sees through to the essence of war and leads armies to decisive victory.”944 Instead of 
one-day triumphs, Nolan points out that most wars ultimately end from “exhaustion of morale and 
material.” Further,  
 
Winning the day of battle is not enough. You have to win the campaign, then the year, then the 
decade. Victory must usher in political permanence. If it does not, after a pause to recover and 
rearm the war will continue.945 
 
This much is correct; wars extend well beyond active fighting into peacetime. And, in this, Nolan 
does well to re-contextualize how we ought to think about military genius. 
Actual military genius in the modern era, the kind that creates lasting societal or political 
change, should be less about the single battles of Great Captains than it is about the superior 
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campaigns and sustained gains of supreme commanders. Today, what some would call “military 
genius” is not superhero-like, not flashy, and does not deliver instant knockouts; rather, a military 
genius for the modern age seems much more about patience and persuasion, consensus-building, 
and about “grinding rather than genius.”946 Real strategic change takes time. Instead of a single, 
perfect kill-shot to an adversary, it seems longer-term victories are earned in the modern era through 
a string of superior judgments over time, that, looked at cumulatively and comprehensively, are 
better than an opponent. In the end, it may be that Nolan was wrong to doubt the concept of 
military genius entirely. Instead, it might be that we have all simply misunderstood and 
mischaracterized the concept. Perhaps it is time for a new definition of “military genius.” 
This dissertation does not argue that supreme commanders win wars on their own with 
some brilliant, lightning-strike idea that instantly ends an enemy’s efforts. But it does argue that there 
are some cases where a supreme commander’s judgment can make a difference, in part because, as 
Eliot Cohen has written, “now and again, one comes across generals with the stuff of greatness in 
them.”947 Of course, even the best and most famous generals get beaten.948 And there is no precise 
formula that can be developed from these past greats.949 What we are left with, then, as this 
dissertation has attempted to determine, is to improve the way we understand how supreme 
commanders succeed.  
 
For other Academic Disciplines 
 
Some phenomena, like successful supreme commanders, are incredibly difficult to understand.950 
Edgar Puryear, Jr., conducted personal interviews with over one hundred senior general officers.951 
His work makes a significant contribution to the literature on senior military officers in the way of 
width. Yet at the same time, because these were in-person interviews, the subjects themselves were 
                                                        
946 Nolan, The Allure of Battle, 9-10.  
947 Eliot A. Cohen, “Book Review: Fighting the Cold War: A Soldier’s Memoir by John R. Galvin” in 
Foreign Affairs Vol. 95, No. 1 (January/February 2016), 173. 948 Luttwak, Strategy, 258. 
949 F. Constantin von Lossau quoted in Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London: Pimlico, 2002), 
73.  
950 Robert M. Gates, A Passion for Leadership: Lessons on Change and Reform from Fifty Years of Public 
Service (New York: Knopf, 2016), 17. 
951 Puryear Jr., American Generalship, Character is Everything, 338. 
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likely limited in how objective they can possibly be about themselves and their performance in 
military command. 
This dissertation, owing to the depth it provides in the study of successful supreme 
commanders, offers social psychologists, and those that study leadership, deeper research into senior 
military leadership. This contributes to the body of literature on an enduring societal role: those 
charged with leading military forces. There would appear to be follow-on research opportunities that 
come from studying such a class of individuals. Of the six supreme commanders looked at in this 
dissertation, five would have been considered to have had a troubled youth.952 The same might be 
said for several modern-era American commanders from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.953 Social 
psychologists would do well to study these senior officers, their childhood difficulties, the likely 
personal resilience gained, and these effects on later-life military career success. 
Business literature is often closely associated with leadership studies and organizational 
psychology. Research in these fields has found that “secondary skills,” like an individual’s ability to 
work well with others beyond formal education, are often key determinants in latter-career 
success.954 The findings from this dissertation, applied to organizational psychology, would support 
such a thesis. 
This dissertation’s findings would also contribute to the robust and well-studied role of the 
chief executive officer in business. While research has found that the leader of a particular company 
matters quite a bit, the problem is that there is no settled understanding of what qualities matter the 
most in this particular leader.955 This dissertation’s findings would seem to apply indirectly to the 
role of the leader in a business environment. 
                                                        
952 As previously covered in this chapter, all three successful supreme commanders had difficulties in 
youth. Additionally, while Howe’s childhood appears relatively normal (if aristocratic), Lee had a 
disgraced American Revolutionary War cavalryman for a father, and Hitler had a suffocating mother. 
953 General George Casey’s father died when he was 22; General John Abizaid’s father was hobbled 
by terrible emphysema and nearly died when Abizaid was 16; Generals Peter Chiarelli and David 
Petreaeus were the sons of new immigrants. David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, The Fourth Star: Four 
Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army (New York: Three Rivers Press, 
2009), 3, 10, 13, 16.  
954 Michael S. Malone, “The Secret to Midcareer Success,” Wall Street Journal (February 12, 2018), 
A17. 
955 Nicholas Bloom, professor of economics at Stanford University, quoted in Stephen Dubner, 
“What does a C.E.O. Actually Do?” Freakonomics (January 17, 2018), text, accessed March 8, 2018, 
http://freakonomics.com/podcast/c-e-o-actually/. 
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There is also some applicability in this dissertation to behavioral economics and the study of 
judgments and decisions. Judgments are formed when a person assigns odds as to the likelihood or 
risk in a particular course of action. Decision-making is the next step, which is the action taken as a 
result of a judgment.956 For example, while many others form judgments, only the supreme 
commander makes both a judgment and then a decision. Today, much of this research is gathered in 
mathematical labs and with “hypothetical gambles” where odds are “explicitly stated.” 957 Because 
this dissertation studied the judgments made and decisions taken by supreme commanders in depth, 
it is poised to make a contribution to this sort of academic study. 
There is one other avenue of continued study that may be of value. The last collaborative 
project of Israeli psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky was into what they called the 
“simulation heuristic,” which they considered the human susceptibility to let imagined future 
scenarios impact real-world decisions.958 This sort of thinking would certainly impact supreme 
commanders at war, and a researcher would find powerful examples in this dissertation’s case 
studies. Historian and strategist Donald Stoker has commented on such an occurrence in those 
charged with fighting a limited war, who often let “the fear of what might potentially happen in the 
future cloud their ability to actually deal with the problem that they have on their hands.”959 
 
6.4 Final Thoughts 
 
Twenty years later, when J.C. Wylie came back to evaluate Military Strategy, he reconsidered the book. 
His chief accomplishment, he thought, was in having developed a theory, “a pattern of relationships 
designed to account for events that have already happened with the expectation that this pattern will 
allow us to predict or foresee what will come to pass when comparable events take place in the 
future.” As with Wylie’s work, this dissertation identified a pattern in the “military mind.”960 
                                                        
956 Michael Lewis, The Undoing Project: A Friendship that Changed our Minds (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2017), 252.  
957 Lewis, The Undoing Project, 252.  
958 Lewis, The Undoing Project, 300.  
959 Donald Stoker, “How To Think About Limited War (Without Limiting Your Thinking),” 
Changing Chracter of War, Oxford University (January 24, 2018). Audio, at 24 minutes, accessed March 8, 
2018, http://www.ccw.ox.ac.uk/events/2018/1/23/how-to-think-about-limited-war-without-
limiting-your-thinking-by-professor-don-stoker-vienna-diplomatic-academy.  
960 Wylie, Military Strategy, 96, 8-9.  
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While not predictive, this research has made a contribution. In campaigns where both sides 
had an opportunity to achieve their aims, the successful supreme commanders exercised superior 
judgment and decisions relative to their adversaries, which translated to critical campaign gains and 
eventually led to victories in war. Those superior judgments were accompanied by a distinct sense of 
empathy as well as grit, and the successful supreme commanders shared several characteristics in 
common: they possessed sharp political instincts as all were two-term presidents, they were writers 
and effective communicators, they had mixed records with formal education but were all lifelong 
self-students, and each overcame childhood challenges. 
These findings may not surprise or stun academics; much will have been familiar to military 
historians. However, it is equally true that all readers should find in this research a fresh perspective 
and a new way of thinking about the study of supreme command. This is the only such work 
exclusively about the mind and the role of the supreme commander at war. Hopefully, it will not be 
the last. 
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